

RUGBY SCHOOL.

RUGBY SCHOOL. See EDUCATION, MODERN: EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: ENGLAND

RUGII, The.—A coast tribe in ancient Germany who seem to have occupied the extreme north of Pomerania and who probably gave their name to the Isle of Rugen—Church and Brodribb, *Geog. Notes to the Germany of Tacitus*—In the fifth century, after the breaking up of the empire of Attila, the Hun, a people called the Rugii, and supposed to be the same, were occupying a region embraced in modern Austria. There were many Rugians among the barbarian auxiliaries in the Roman army, and some of the annalists place among the number Odoacer, who gave the extinguishing blow to the empire—T Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*, bk 3, ch 8

RÜK. See CAROLINE ISLANDS

RUSSIA.

RULE OF ST. BENEDICT. See BENEDICTINE ORDERS

RUMP, The. See ENGLAND. A. D. 1648 (NOVEMBER—DECEMBER)

RUNES.—The ancient Scandinavian alphabet, believed to have been of Greek origin.

RUNJIT SINGH, OR RANJIT SINGH, The conquests of. See SIKHS

RUNNYMEDE. See ENGLAND. A. D. 1215

RUPERT'S LAND. See CANADA. A. D. 1869—1873

RUSCINO.—The ancient name of modern Roussillon

RUSSELL, Lord John, Ministries of. See ENGLAND. A. D. 1846, 1851—1852, 1865—1868

RUSSELL, Lord William, Execution of. See ENGLAND. A. D. 1681—1683.

RUSSIA.

A. D. 862.—**Scandinavian Origin of the name and the National Organization.**—"In the year 859," says Nestor [the oldest Russian chronicler, a monk of Kiev, who wrote early in the 12th century] "came the Varangians from beyond the sea and demanded tribute from the Chud and from the Slavonians, the Meria, the Ves, and the Krivichi, but the Khazars took tribute of the Polians, the Severians and of the Viatchi." Then he continues "In the year 862 they drove the Varangians over the sea, and paid them no tribute, and they began to govern themselves, and there was no justice among them, and clan rose against clan, and there was internal strife between them, and they began to make war upon each other. And they said to each other 'Let us seek for a prince who can reign over us and judge what is right. And they went over the sea to the Varangians, to Rus, for so were these Varangians called; they were called Rus as others are called Sve (Swedes), others Nurmanc (Northmen, Norwegians), others Anglanc (English, or Angles of Sleswick?), others Gote (probably the inhabitants of the island of Gothland). The Chud, the Slavonians, the Krivichi, and the Ves said to Rus: 'Our land is large and rich, but there is no order in it, come ye and rule and reign over us.' And three brothers were chosen with their whole clan, and they took with them all the Rus, and they came. And the eldest, Rurik, settled in Novgorod, and the second, Sineus, near Bielo ozero, and the third, Truvor, in Izborsk. And the Russian land, Novgorod, was called after these Varangians; they are the Novgorodians of Varangian descent; previously the Novgorodians were Slavonians. But after the lapse of two years Sineus and his brother Truvor died and Rurik assumed the government and divided the towns among his men, to one Polotak, to another Rostov, to another Bielo-ozero." Such is Nestor's naive description of the foundation of the Russian state. If it be read without prejudice or sophistical comment, it cannot be doubted that the word Varangians is used here as a common term for the inhabitants of Scandinavia, and that Rus was meant to be the name of a particular Scandinavian tribe; this tribe, headed by Rurik and his brothers, is said to have crossed the sea and founded a state whose capital, for a time, was Novgorod, and this state was the nucleus of the

present Russian empire. Next, Nestor tells us that in the same year two of Rurik's men, 'who were not of his family' Askold and Dir, separated themselves from him with the intention to go to Constantinople. They went down the Dnieper, but when they arrived at Kiev, the capital of the Polians, who at that time were tributary to the Khazars, they preferred to stay there, and founded in that town an independent principality. Twenty years after, in 882, this principality was incorporated by Rurik's successor, Oleg, by a stratagem he made himself master of the town and killed Askold and Dir, and from this time Kiev, 'the mother of all Russian towns' as it was called, remained the capital of the Russian state and the centre of the Russian name. From the time historical critics first became acquainted with Nestor's account, that is to say from the beginning of the last century, until about fifteen or twenty years ago [written in 1877], scarcely any one ventured to doubt the accuracy of his statement. Plenty of evidence was even gradually produced from other sources to corroborate in the most striking manner the tradition of the Russian chronicles"—V. Thomsen, *Relations between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia*, lect. 1.

Also in E Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch 55—R. G. Latham, *The Germany of Tacitus*, *Epilegomena*, sect 18.

A. D. 865.—**First attack of the Russians on Constantinople.** See CONSTANTINOPLE: A. D. 865

A. D. 865-900.—**Early relations with the Byzantine Empire.**—"The first Russian naval expedition against Constantinople in 865 would probably have been followed by a series of plundering excursions, like those carried on by the Danes and Normans on the coasts of England and France, had not the Turkish tribe called the Patzinaks rendered themselves masters of the lower course of the Dnieper, and become instruments in the hands of the emperors to arrest the activity of the bold Varangians. The northern rulers of Kiev were the same rude warriors that infested England and France, but the Russian people was then in a more advanced state of society than the mass of the population in Britain and Gaul. The majority of the Russians were freemen; the majority of the inhabitants of Britain and Gaul were serfs. The commerce of

the Russians was already so extensive as to influence the conduct of their government, and to modify the military ardour of their Varangian masters. . . . After the defeat in 865, the Russians induced their rulers to send envoys to Constantinople to renew commercial intercourse, and invite Christian missionaries to visit their country; and no inconsiderable portion of the people embraced Christianity, though the Christian religion continued long after better known to the Russian merchants than to the Varangian warriors. The commercial relations of the Russians with Cherson and Constantinople were now carried on directly, and numbers of Russian traders took up their residence in these cities. The first commercial treaty between the Russians of Kiev and the Byzantine empire was concluded in the reign of Basil I. The intercourse increased from that time."—G. Finlay, *Hist. of the Byzantine Empire*, from 716 to 1057, bk. 2, ch. 2, sect. 1.

A. D. 907-1043.—Wars, commerce and church connection with the Byzantines. See CONSTANTINOPLE: A. D. 907-1043.

10th Century.—The introduction of Christianity. See CHRISTIANITY: 10TH CENTURY.

A. D. 980-1054.—Family divisions and their consequence.—"Under Wladimir I. (980-1015), and under Jaroslaw I. (1019-1054), the power of the grand-duchy of Kiev was respectable. But Jaroslaw having divided it between his sons conducted to enfeeble it. In the 12th century, the supremacy passed from the grand-duchy of Kiev to the grand-duchy of Wladimir, without extricating Russia from division and impotence. The law of primogeniture not existing in Russia, where it was not introduced into the Czarean family until the 14th century, the principalities were incessantly divided."—S. Menzies, *Hist. of Europe*, ch. 36.

A. D. 988.—Acquisition of Cherson. See CHERSON: A. D. 988.

A. D. 1054-1237.—The early Russian territory and its divisions.—"It must not be forgotten that the oldest Russia was formed mainly of lands which afterwards passed under the rule of Poland and Lithuania. . . . The Dnieper, from which Russia was afterwards cut off, was the great central river of the elder Russia; of the Don and the Volga she held only the upper course. The northern frontier barely passed the great lakes of Ladoga and Onega, and the Gulf of Finland itself. It seems not to have reached what was to be the Gulf of Riga, but some of the Russian princes held a certain supremacy over the Finnish and Lettish tribes of that region. In the course of the 11th century, the Russian state, like that of Poland, was divided among princes of the reigning family, acknowledging the superiority of the great prince of Kiev. In the next century the chief power passed from Kiev to the northern Vladimir on the Kiasma. Thus the former Finnish land of Susdal on the upper tributaries of the Volga became the cradle of the second Russian power. Novgorod the Great, meanwhile, under elective princes, claimed, like its neighbour Pskof, to rank among commonwealths. Its dominion was spread far over the Finnish tribes to the north and east; the White Sea, and, far more precious, the Finnish Gulf, had now a Russian seaboard. It was out of Vladimir and Novgorod that the Russia of the future was to grow. Meanwhile a crowd of principalities,

Polotsk, Smolensk, the Severian Novgorod, Tchernigof, and others, arose on the Duna and Dnieper. Far to the east arose the commonwealth of Vintka, and on the frontiers of Poland and Hungary arose the principality of Halicz or Galicia, which afterwards grew for a while into a powerful kingdom. Meanwhile in the lands on the Euxine the old enemies, Patzinaks and Chuzars, gave way to the Cumans, known in Russian history as Polovtzi and Parthi. They spread themselves from the Ural river to the borders of Servia and Danubian Bulgaria, cutting off Russia from the Caspian. In the next century Russians and Cumans—momentary allies—fell before the advance of the Mongols, commonly known in European history as Tartars. Known only as ravagers in the lands more to the west, over Russia they become overlords for 250 years. All that escaped absorption by the Lithuanian became tributary to the Mongol. Still the relation was only a tributary one; Russia was never incorporated in the Mongol dominion, as Servia and Bulgaria were incorporated in the Ottoman dominion. But Kiev was overthrown; Vladimir became dependent; Novgorod remained the true representative of free Russia in the Baltic lands."—E. A. Freeman, *Hist. Geog. of Europe*, ch. 11, sect. 2.

A. D. 1235.—Formation of the grand-duchy of Lithuania, embracing a large area of Russian territory. See LITHUANIA: A. D. 1235.

A. D. 1237-1239.—Mongol conquest. See MONGOLS: A. D. 1229-1294.

A. D. 1237-1480.—Prosperity and greatness of Novgorod as a commercial republic.—Two centuries of Tartar domination.—Growing power of Lithuania and Poland.—Rise of the Duchy of Moscow, the nucleus of the future Russian Empire.—"Alone among the cities the ancient Novgorod has boasted its exemption from plunder [at the hands of the Tartars]. The great city, though fallen since the days of Rurik from being the capital of an Empire, had risen to the dignity of a Republic. It had found wealth in trade; and at successive epochs had introduced the riches of Constantinople to the North, the merchandise of the great Hanse Towns to the South. It had profited by the example, and had emulated the prosperity, of the rich cities of Germany. It had striven also to attain their freedom; and, though still continuing to acknowledge a vague allegiance to the Russian Princes, it had been able, by its wealth and its remoteness from control, to win or to assume privileges, until it had resembled Bremen or Lubeck in the sovereignty of its assemblies, and had surpassed those cities by the assumption of a style declaratory of its independence. It boasted further of a prince, St. Alexander Nevsky, to whom a glorious victory over the Swedes had already given a name, and whose virtues were hereafter to enrol him among the Saints; and it had a defence in the marshes and forests which surrounded it and which had already once deterred the invaders. But even the great city could not continue to defy the Tartar horde, and its submission is at once the last and most conclusive proof of the supremacy of their power. Thenceforth the nation felt the bitterness of servitude. The Tartars did not occupy the country they had conquered; they retired to establish their settlements upon the Volga, where they became known as the Golden Horde: but they ex-

acted the tribute and the homage of the Russian Princes. . . . Five centuries have been unable to obliterate the traces which this period has imprinted upon the national character. The Tartars oppressed and extorted tribute from the Russian princes; the princes in their turn became the oppressors and extortioners of their people. Deceit and lying, the refuge of the weak, became habitual. Increasing crime and increasing punishments combined to brutalise the people. The vice of drunkenness was universal. Trade indeed was not extinguished; and religion prospered so abundantly that of all the many monasteries of Russia there are but few that do not owe their origin to this time. . . . Meanwhile the provinces of the West were falling into the hands of other enemies. The Tartar wave had swept as far as Poland, but it had then recoiled, and had left the countries westward of the Dnieper to their fate. All links of the connection that had bound these regions to the Princes of Vladimir, were now broken. Vitepsk, Polotsk, Smolensk, and even provinces still nearer Moscow, were gradually absorbed by the growing power of Lithuania, which, starting from narrow limits between the Dvina and the Niemen, was destined to overshadow Russia [see LITHUANIA: A. D. 1235]. The provinces of the South for a time maintained a certain unity and independence under the name of the Duchy of Halicz or Kief; but these also, through claims of inheritance or feudal right, became eventually merged in the dominions of their neighbours. Poland obtained Black Russia, which has never since returned to its earlier masters. Lithuania acquired Volhynia and Red Russia, and thus extended her wide empire from the Baltic as far as the Red Sea. Then came the union of these powers by the acceptance in 1383 of the Grand Duke Jagellon as King of Poland, and all hopes for the Russian princes of recovering their possessions seemed lost. The ancient empire of Yaroslaf was thus ended; and its history is parted from that of mediæval Russia by the dark curtain of two centuries in which the Russian people were a race but not a nation. The obscure descendants of Rurik still occupied his throne, and ruled with some appearance of hereditary succession. They even chose this period of their weakness to solace their vanity by the adoption of the style of Sovereigns of All the Russias. But they were the mere vassals of the Golden Horde. . . . It was not until the reign of Dmitry IV., that any sign was shown of reviving independence. Time, by weakening the Tartars, had then brought freedom nearer to the Russians. The Horde, which had been united under Bati, when it had first precipitated itself upon Europe, had become divided by the ambition of rebellious Khans, who had aspired to establish their independent power; and the Russians had at length a prince who was able to profit by the weakness of his enemies. Dmitry, who reigned from 1362 to 1389, is celebrated as having checked the divisions which civil strife and appanages had inflicted upon his country, and as having also gloriously repulsed the Lithuanians from the walls of Moscow, now rising to be his capital. But his greatest deed, and that by which he lives in the remembrance of every Russian, is his victory upon the Don, which gave to him thenceforth the name of Donskoi. The Tartars, indignant at his prominence, had united with the

Lithuanians. For the first time the Russians turned against their tyrants, and found upon the field of Khoulifikof [1383] that their freedom was still possible. They did not achieve indeed for many years what they now began to hope. Their strength was crippled by renewed attacks of Tartars from the south and of Lithuanians from the west; and they could not dare to brave the revengeful enmity of the Horde. For a hundred years they still paid tribute, and the successors of Dmitry still renewed their homage at the camp upon the Volga. But progress gradually was made. The Grand Prince Vassili Dimitrievitch [1389-1425] was able to extend his rule over a territory that occupied the space of six or seven of the modern governments round Moscow, and though the country, under Vassili Vassilevitch [1425-1462], became enfeebled by a renewal of civil strife, the increasing weakness of the Tartar power continued to prepare the way for the final independence that was accomplished by the close of the 15th century. The reign of Ivan III became the opening of a new epoch in Russian history. He restored his people, long sunk out of the gaze of Europe, to a place among its nations, and recalled them in some degree from the barbarism of the East to the intercourse and civilization of the West. The Russia of old time was now no more; but the Grand Prince, or Duke of Moscow, as he was called, was still the heir of Rurik and of Yaroslaf, and in the growth of his Duchy their Empire reappeared. . . . Without the fame of a warrior, but with the wisdom of a statesman, with a strong hand and by the help of a long reign, he built up out of the fragments that surrounded him an Empire that exceeded vastly that of his immediate predecessor. . . . The fall of the republic of Novgorod [1478] and the final extinction of the Golden Horde, are the events which are most prominent. Riches had been the bane of the great city. They had fostered insolence, but they had given a distaste for war. The citizens had often rebelled; they had accepted the protection of Lithuania, and had later meditated, and even for a time accomplished, a union with Poland. But they had had no strength to defend the liberty to which they had aspired. . . . When Ivan advanced, determined, as he said, to reign at Novgorod as he reigned at Moscow, they were unable to repel or to endure a siege, and they surrendered themselves into his hand. Once he had pardoned them; now their independence was taken from them. Their assembly was dissolved; their great bell, the emblem of their freedom, was carried to Moscow. The extinction of the Golden Horde was due to time and policy, rather than to any deeds which have brought glory to the Russian people [see MONGOLS: A. D. 1238-1391]. . . . Released in this manner from the most dangerous both of domestic and of foreign foes the power of Ivan rapidly advanced. The broad province of Perm, that had begun to boast a half accomplished independence, had been early forced to acknowledge her subjection. The Khan of Kazan was now made tributary; and the rule of Ivan was extended from the Oural to the Neva. Provinces, as important, though less extensive, were acquired in the south. The Russian princes and cities that had preserved their independence were all, with the one exception of Riazan, compelled to acknowledge the sovereignty of Moscow. . . .

At the same time the Lithuanians were thrust back. Their greatness had gone by: and the territories of Tula, Kalouga, and Orel, now ceasing to own allegiance to a declining power, were incorporated with the rising Empire. That Empire had already reached the Dnieper, and was already scheming to recover the ancient capital of its princes"—C. F. Johnstone, *Historical Abstracts*, ch. 6

ALSO IN—A. Rambaud, *Hist of Russia*, ch. 8-14 (r. 1)

15th Century.—Effects of the Tartar domination.—Sources of autocracy.—“The invasion of the Mongols, in the beginning of the 13th century, snapped the thread of Russia's destinies. . . . Nature, after preparing the invasion, herself marked its bounds. The Tatars, now masters of the steppes in the southeast, which felt to them very much like home, grew ill at ease as soon as they began to lose themselves in the forests of the north. They did not settle there. These regions were too European to suit their half-nomadic habits, and they cared more for tribute-payers than for subjects. So the ‘kniazes’ received their principalities back from the hands of the Mongols—as liefs. They had to submit to the presence near their person of a sort of Tatar ‘residents,’—the ‘baskaks,’ whose duty it was to take the census and to collect the taxes. They were compelled to take the long, long journey to the ‘Horde,’ often encamped in the heart of Asia, in order to receive their investiture from the successors of Djinghiz, and ended by becoming the vassals of a vassal of the ‘Great-Khan.’ At this price Russia retained her religion, her dynasties, and—thanks to her clergy and her princes—her nationality. Never yet was nation put through such a school of patience and abject submission. . . . Under this humiliating and impoverishing domination the germs of culture laid in the old principalities withered up. . . . The Tartar domination developed in the Russians faults and faculties of which their intercourse with Byzance had already brought them the germs, and which, tempered by time, have since contributed to develop their diplomatic gifts. . . . The oppression by man, added to the oppression by the climate, deepened certain traits already sketched in by nature in the Great-Russian's soul. Nature inclined him to submission, to endurance, to resignation; history confirmed these inclinations. Hardened by nature, he was steeled by history. One of the chief effects of the Tartar domination and all that makes up Russian history, is the importance given to the national worship. . . . The domination of an enemy who was a stranger to Christianity fortified the sufferers' attachment to their worship. Religion and native land were merged into one faith, took the place of nationality and kept it alive. It was then that the conception sprang up which still links the quality of Russian to the profession of Greek orthodoxy, and makes of the latter the chief pledge of patriotism. . . . Upon Russia's political sovereignty the Tartar domination had two parallel effects: it hastened national unity and it strengthened autocracy. The country which, under the appanage system, was falling to pieces, was bound together by foreign oppression as by a chain of iron. Having constituted himself suzerain of the ‘Grand-Kniazes,’ whom he appointed and dethroned at will, the Khan conferred on them his authority.

The Asiatic tyranny of which they were the delegates empowered them to govern tyrannically. Their despotism over the Russians was derived from their servitude under the Tatars.

Every germ of free government, whether aristocratic or democratic, was stifled. Nothing remained but one power, the ‘Veliki-Kniaz,’ the autocrat,—and such now, after more than 500 years, still is the basis of the state.”—A. Leroy-Beaulieu, *The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians*, pt. 1, bk. 4, ch. 3

A. D. 1533-1682.—From Ivan the Terrible to Peter the Great.—The Poles at Moscow.—Origin of the dynasty of the Romanoffs.—“Apart from the striking and appalling character of Ivan himself, whom Mickiewicz, the Polish poet, calls, in his lectures on the Slavonians, ‘the most finished tyrant known in history—frivolous and debauched like Nero, stupid and ferocious like Caligula, full of dissimulation like Tiberius or Louis XI,’ the reign of Ivan the Terrible is interesting as marking the beginning of the intercourse between Russia and Western Europe, and especially between Russia and England. The natural approach to Russia from the west was, of course, through Poland; but the Poles impeded systematically, and for political reasons, the introduction of arts and artificers into Russia, and Sigismund wrote a letter to Elizabeth, warning her against the Muscovite power as a danger to civilization, only not formidable for the moment because it was still semi-barbarous. Ivan the Terrible was the third of the independent Tsars; and already under Ivan, sometimes called the ‘Great’—to whom indeed belongs the honour of having finally liberated Russia from the Tartar yoke—endeavours had been made to enter into relations with various European nations. Foreigners, too, were encouraged to visit Russia and settle there. The movement of foreigners towards Russia increased with each succeeding reign; and beginning with the first Tsar of Muscovy it became much more marked under the third, that Ivan the Terrible, under whose reign the mariners in the service of the English company of ‘merchant adventurers’ entered the White Sea, and, in their own language, ‘discovered’ Russia. Russia was, indeed, until that time, so far as Western Europe was concerned, an unknown land, cut off from Western civilization for political and warlike reasons by the Poles, and for religious reasons by the Catholic Church. On the 18th of March, 1584, Ivan was sitting half dressed, after his bath, ‘solacing himself and making merriment with pleasant songs, as he used to do.’ He called for his chess-board, had placed the men, and was just setting up the king, when he fell back in a swoon and died. . . . The death of Ivan was followed by strong dislike against the English at Moscow; and the English diplomatist and match-maker, Sir Jerome Bowes, after being ironically informed that ‘the English king was dead,’ found himself seized and thrown into prison. He was liberated through the representations of another envoy, who pointed out that it would be imprudent to excite Elizabeth's wrath; and though for a time intercourse between Russia and Western Europe was threatened, through the national hatred of foreigners as manifested by the councillors of the Tsar, yet when the weak-minded Feodor fell beneath the influence of his brother-in-law Boris Godounoff, the previous policy, soon

to become traditional, of cultivating relations with Western Europe, was resumed. . . . Nineteen years have yet to pass before the election of the first of the Romanoffs to the throne, for strange as it may seem, the first member of the dynasty of the Romanoffs was chosen and appointed to the imperial rule by an assembly representing the various estates. Meanwhile the order of succession had been broken. Several pretenders to the throne had appeared, one of whom, Demetrius, distinctively known as the 'Imposter,' attained for a time supreme power. Demetrius, married to a Polish lady, Marina Mniszek, was aided by her powerful family to maintain his position in Moscow, for the Mniszeks assembled and sent to the Russian capital a body of 4,000 men. Then Ladislas [son of the king] of Poland interfered, and after a time [1610] Moscow fell beneath the power of the Poles [see POLAND A. D. 1590-1648]. Soon however, the national feeling of Russia was aroused. A butcher, or cattle dealer of Nijni Novgorod, named Minin, whose patriotism has made him one of the most popular figures in Russian history, got together the nucleus of a national army, and called upon the patriotic nobleman, Prince Pojarski, to place himself at its head. Pojarski and Minin marched together to Moscow, and their success in clearing the capital of the foreign invaders [1612] is commemorated by a group of statuary which stands in the principal square of Moscow. Among the tombs of the metropolitans buried in [the cathedral of the Assumption at Moscow] are those of Philaret and Hermogenes, who were thrown into prison by the Poles for refusing to consent to the accession of Ladislas, the Polish prince, to the Russian throne. Hermogenes died soon after his arrest. Philaret, at the expulsion of the Poles, was carried away captive by them in their retreat from Moscow (1612), and was kept nine years a prisoner in Poland. On his return to Russia, he found his son Michael Feodorovitch elected to the throne. The belief, then, of the Russian people in Michael's patriotism, seems to have been founded on a knowledge of the patriotism of his father. The surname of the metropolitan who had defied the Polish power and had suffered nine years' imprisonment in Poland was Romanoff, Philaret was the name he had adopted on becoming a monk. His baptismal name was Feodor, and hence the patronymic Feodorovitch attached to the name of Michael, the first of the Romanoffs. There is little to say about the reign of Michael Feodorovitch, the circumstances having once been set forth under which he was elected to the vacant throne, and his son and successor, Alexis Michailovitch, is chiefly remembered as father of Peter the Great."—H. S. Edwards, *The Romanoffs*, ch. 1-2.

ALSO IN: W. K. Kelly, *Hist. of Russia*, ch. 13-19 (v. 1).—P. Mérimée, *Demetrius the Imposter*.
A. D. 1547.—Assumption of the title, Czar, or Tzar, by the Grand Prince of Moscow.—"In January 1547, Ivan [IV, known as Ivan the Terrible] ordered the Metropolitan Macarius to proceed with his coronation. He assumed at the ceremony not only the title of Grand Prince, but that of Tzar. The first title no longer answered to the new power of the sovereign of Moscow, who counted among his domestics, princes and even Grand Princes. The name of Tzar is that which the books in the Slavonic lan-

guage, ordinarily read by Ivan, give to the kings of Judæa, Assyria, Egypt, Babylon, and to the emperors of Rome and Constantinople. Now, was not Ivan in some sort the heir of the Tzar Nebuchadnezzar, the Tzar Pharaoh, the Tzar Ahasuerus, and the Tzar David, since Russia was the sixth empire spoken of in the Apocalypse? Through his grandmother Sophia Palæologus, he was connected with the family of the Tzars of Byzantium, through his ancestor Vladimir Monomachus, he belonged to the Porphyro geniti, and through Constantine the Great, to Cæsar. We may imagine what prestige was added to the dignity of the Russian sovereign by this dazzling title, borrowed from Biblical antiquity, from Roman majesty, from the orthodox sovereigns of Byzantium."—A. Rambaud, *Hist. of Russia*, v. 1, ch. 15.—"This title [Czar] is not a corruption of the word 'Cæsar,' as many have supposed [see CÆSAR, THE TITLE], but is an old Oriental word which the Russians acquired through the Slavonic translation of the Bible, and which they bestowed at first on the Greek emperors, and afterwards on the Tartar Khans. In Persia it signifies throne, supreme authority, and we find it in the termination of the names of the kings of Assyria and Babylon, such as Phalassar, Nabonasser, &c.—Karamsin."—W. K. Kelly, *Hist. of Russia*, v. 1, p. 125, foot note.—"Von Hammer, in his last note to his 31st book, says 'The title Czar or Tzar is an ancient title of Asiatic sovereigns. We find an instance of it in the title 'The Schar,' of the sovereign of Gardistan, and in that of Tzarina . . . of the Scythians.'"—Sir E. S. Creasy, *Hist. of the Ottoman Turks*, p. 213, foot note.

A. D. 1569-1571.—First collision with the Turks.—Their repulse from Astrakhan.—Moscow stormed and sacked by the Crimean Tartars.—Peace with the Porte.—At the time (1566) of the accession of Selim II to the Ottoman throne, the Russians "had been involved in fierce and frequent wars with the Sultan's vassals, the Crimean Tartars, but the Porte had taken no part in these contests. But the bold genius of the Vizier Sokolli now attempted the realisation of a project, which, if successful, would have barred the southern progress of Russia, by firmly planting the Ottoman power on the banks of the Don and the Volga, and along the shores of the Caspian Sea. Sokolli proposed to unite the rivers Don and Volga by a canal, and then send a Turkish armament up the sea of Azoph and the Don, thence across by the intended channel to the Volga, and then down the latter river into the Caspian, from the southern shores of which sea the Ottomans might strike at Tabriz and the heart of the Persian power. . . . Azoph already belonged to the Turks, but in order to realise the great project entertained it was necessary to occupy Astrakhan also. Accordingly, 3,000 Janissaries and 20,000 horse were sent [1569] to besiege Astrakhan, and a co-operative force of 30,000 Tartars was ordered to join them, and to aid in making the canal. 5,000 Janissaries and 3,000 pioneers were at the same time sent to Azoph to commence and secure the great work at its western extremity. But the generals of Ivan the Terrible did their duty to their stern master ably in this emergency. The Russian garrison of Astrakhan sallied on its besiegers, and repulsed them with considerable loss. And a Russian army, 15,000 strong, under Prince

Serebinoff, came suddenly on the workmen and Janissaries near Azoph, and put them to headlong flight. It was upon this occasion that the first trophies won from the Turks came into Russian hands. An army of Tartars, which marched to succour the Turks, was also entirely defeated by Ivan's forces; and the Ottomans, dispirited by their losses and reverses, withdrew altogether from the enterprise. . . . Russia was yet far too weak to enter on a war of retaliation with the Turks. She had subdued the Tartar Khanates of Kasan and Astrakhan; but their kinsmen of the Crimea were still formidable enemies to the Russians, even without Turkish aid. It was only two years after the Ottoman expedition to the Don and Volga that the Khan of the Crimea made a victorious inroad into Russia, took Moscow by storm, and sacked the city (1571). The Czar Ivan had, in 1570, sent an ambassador, named Nossolito, to Constantinople, to complain of the Turkish attack on Astrakhan, and to propose that there should be peace, friendship, and alliance between the two empires. . . . The Russian ambassador was favourably received at the Sublime Porte, and no further hostilities between the Turks and Russians took place for nearly a century."—Sir E. S. Creasy, *Hist. of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 11.

A. D. 1577-1580.—**Conquests by the Poles.** See POLAND: A. D. 1574-1590.

A. D. 1578-1579.—**Yermac's conquest of Siberia.** See SIBERIA.

A. D. 1613-1617.—**War with Sweden.**—**Cession of territory, including the site of St. Petersburg.** See SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN): A. D. 1611-1629.

A. D. 1652.—**Allegiance of the Cossacks of the Ukraine transferred from the King of Poland to the Czar.** See POLAND: A. D. 1648-1654.

A. D. 1655-1659.—**The great schism, known as the Rascol.**—"In the reign of Alexis took place the great revision of the Bible, carried out by the energy of Nikon, the Patriarch, who, finding that the church-books were full of ridiculous blunders caused by ignorant copyists, procured a quantity of the best Greek manuscripts from Mount Athos, and other places. In 1655, and the following year, he summoned two councils of the church, at which the newly translated service-books were promulgated and the old ones called in. In consequence of this change, a great schism took place in the Russian Church, a number of people attaching a superstitious veneration to the old books, errors and all. Thus was formed the large sect of the Staro-obriadtsi or Raskolniks, still existing in Russia, who have suffered great persecutions at many periods of her history."—W. R. Morfill, *The Story of Russia*, ch. 6.—"The most important innovation, which afterwards became the symbol and the war-cry of the religious rebellion, referred to the position of the fingers in making the sign of the cross. The Russians of Nikon's time when they crossed themselves held two fingers together, while the Oriental churches and the Greeks enjoined their adherents to cross themselves with three fingers united into one point. The two-fingered cross of the Muscovites was used in the Orient only for giving the priestly benediction. . . . Patriarch Nikon was anxious to return to ancient traditions. Reserving the two-fingered cross for priestly benedictions only, he re-established

the three-fingered Greek cross, or, as his opponents called it, 'the pinch-of-snuff cross,' for the private act of devotion. Then, too, in certain cases, for instance in stamping the round wafers, he introduced the use of the equilateral, four-sided cross. . . . The Russians celebrated the mass on seven wafers, while the Greeks and Orientals used only five. In the processions of the Church the Russians were in the habit of first turning their steps westward—going with the sun; the Greeks marched eastward—against the sun. In all these points Patriarch Nikon conformed to the traditions of the Greek mother-church. In conformity with this rule, moreover, he directed that the hallelujahs should be 'trebled,' or sung thrice, as with the Greeks, the Russians having up till then only 'doubled' it—singing, instead of the third hallelujah, its Russian equivalent, 'God be praised.' Finally, or we should rather say above all, Nikon introduced a fresh spelling of the name of Jesus. The fact is that, probably in consequence of the Russian habit of abbreviating some of the commonest scriptural names, the second letter in the name Jesus had been dropped altogether; it was simply spelt Jsus, without any sign of abbreviation. Patriarch Nikon corrected this orthographical error, replacing the missing letter. Was this all? Yes, this was all. As far as doctrinal matters were concerned, nothing more serious was at stake in the great religious schism of the 17th century, known by the name of the Rascol. And yet it was for these trifles—a letter less in a name, a finger more in a cross, the doubling instead of the trebling of a word—that thousands of people, both men and women, encountered death on the scaffold or at the stake. It was for these things that other scores of thousands underwent the horrible tortures of the knout, the strappado, the rack, or had their bodies mutilated, their tongues cut, their hands chopped off."—Stepniak, *The Russian Peasantry* (Am. ed.), pp. 237-239.

A. D. 1686-1696.—**War of the Holy League against the Turks.**—**Capture of Azov.**—**First foothold on the Black Sea acquired.** See TURKS: A. D. 1684-1696.

A. D. 1689.—**Accession of Peter the Great.**

A. D. 1697-1704.—**Peter the Great: his travels in pursuit of knowledge; his apprenticeship to the useful arts; his civilizing work in Muscovy.**—"Many princes before [Peter the Great] had renounced crowns, wearied out with the intolerable load of public affairs; but no man had ever divested himself of the royal character, in order to learn the art of governing better: this was a stretch of heroism which was reserved for Peter the Great alone. He left Russia in [1697], having reigned as yet but [a few] years, and went to Holland disguised under a common name, as if he had been a menial servant of that same Lefort, whom he sent in quality of ambassador-extraordinary to the States-General. As soon as he arrived at Amsterdam, he enrolled his name among the shipwrights of the admiralty of the Indies, and wrought in the yard like the other mechanics. At his leisure hours he learned such parts of the mathematics as are useful to a prince,—fortification, navigation, and the art of drawing plans. He went into the workmen's shops, and examined all their manufactures: nothing could escape his observation. From thence he passed over into England, where hav-

ing perfected himself in the art of ship-building, he returned to Holland, carefully observing every thing that might turn to the advantage of his country. At last, after two years of travel and labor, to which no man but himself would have willingly submitted, he again made his appearance in Russia, with all the arts of Europe in his train. Artists of every kind followed him in abundance. Then were seen, for the first time, large Russian ships in the Baltic, and on the Black Sea and the ocean. Stately buildings, of a regular architecture, were raised among the Russian huts. He founded colleges, academies, printing-houses, and libraries. The cities were brought under a regular police. The dress and customs of the people were gradually changed, though not without some difficulty; and the Muscovites learned by degrees the true nature of a social state. Even their superstitious rites were abolished; the dignity of the patriarch was suppressed; and the czar declared himself the head of the Church. This last enterprise, which would have cost a prince less absolute than Peter both his throne and his life, succeeded almost without opposition, and insured to him the success of all his other innovations. After having humbled an ignorant and a barbarous clergy, he ventured to make a trial of instructing them, though, by that means, he ran the risk of rendering them formidable. . . . The czar not only subjected the Church to the State, after the example of the Turkish emperors, but, what was a more masterly stroke of policy, he dissolved a militia of much the same nature with that of the janizaries; and what the sultans had attempted in vain, he accomplished in a short time: he disbanded the Russian janizaries, who were called Strelitz, and who kept the czars in subjection. These troops, more formidable to their masters than to their neighbors, consisted of about 80,000 foot, one half of which remained at Moscow, while the other was stationed upon the frontiers. The pay of a Strelitz was no more than four roubles a year; but this deficiency was amply compensated by privileges and extortions. Peter at first formed a company of foreigners, among whom he enrolled his own name, and did not think it below him to begin the service in the character of a drummer, and to perform the duties of that mean office; so much did the nation stand in need of examples! By degrees he became an officer. He gradually raised new regiments; and, at last, finding himself master of a well-disciplined army, he broke the Strelitz, who durst not disobey. The cavalry were nearly the same with that of Poland, or France, when this last kingdom was no more than an assemblage of fiefs. The Russian gentlemen were mounted at their own expense, and fought without discipline, and sometimes without any other arms than a sabre or a bow, incapable of obeying, and consequently of conquering. Peter the Great taught them to obey, both by the example he set them and by the punishments he inflicted; for he served in the quality of a soldier and subaltern officer, and as czar he severely punished the Boyards, that is, the gentlemen, who pretended that it was the privilege of their order not to serve but by their own consent. He established a regular body to serve the artillery, and took 500 bells from the churches to found cannon. . . . He was himself a good engineer; but his chief excellence lay in his

knowledge of naval affairs: he was an able sea-captain, a skilful pilot, a good sailor, an expert shipwright, and his knowledge of these arts was the more meritorious, as he was born with a great dread of the water. In his youth he could not pass over a bridge without trembling. . . . He caused a beautiful harbor to be built at the mouth of the Don, near Azof, in which he proposed to keep a number of galleys; and some time after, thinking that these vessels, so long, light, and flat, would probably succeed in the Baltic, he had upwards of 800 of them built at his favorite city of Petersburg. He showed his subjects the method of building ships with fir only, and taught them the art of navigation. He had even learned surgery, and, in a case of necessity, has been known to tap a dropsical person. He was well versed in mechanics, and instructed the artists. . . . He was always travelling up and down his dominions, as much as his wars would allow him; but he travelled like a legislator and natural philosopher, examining nature everywhere, endeavoring to correct or perfect her; sounding with his own hands the depths of seas and rivers, repairing sluices, visiting docks, causing mines to be searched for, assaying metals, ordering accurate plans to be drawn, in the execution of which he himself assisted. He built, upon a wild and uncultivated spot, the imperial city of Petersburg. . . . He built the harbor of Cronstadt, on the Neva, and Sainte-Croix, on the frontiers of Persia; erected forts in the Ukraine and Siberia; established offices of admiralty at Archangel, Petersburg, Astrakhan, and Azof; founded arsenals, and built and endowed hospitals. All his own houses were mean, and executed in a bad taste; but he spared no expenses in rendering the public buildings grand and magnificent. The sciences, which in other countries have been the slow product of so many ages, were, by his care and industry, imported into Russia in full perfection. He established an academy on the plan of the famous societies of Paris and London. . . . Thus it was that a single man changed the face of the greatest empire in the universe. It is however a shocking reflection, that this reformer of mankind should have been deficient in that first of all virtues, the virtue of humanity. Brutality in his pleasures, ferocity in his manners, and cruelty in his punishments, sullied the lustre of so many virtues. He civilized his subjects, and yet remained himself a barbarian. He would sometimes with his own hands execute sentences of death upon the unhappy criminals; and, in the midst of a revel, would show his dexterity in cutting off heads."—*Voltaire, Hist. of Charles XII., King of Sweden, bk. 1.*

Also in: J. L. Motley, *Peter the Great*.—E. Schuyler, *Peter the Great*, v. 1.—A. Leroy-Beaulieu, *The Empire of the Tsars*, pt. 1, bk. 4, ch. 4.

A. D. 1699.—The Peace of Carlowitz with the Sultan.—Possession of Azov confirmed. See HUNGARY: A. D. 1683-1699.

A. D. 1700.—Aggressive league with Poland and Denmark against Charles XII. of Sweden.—Defeat at Narva. See SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN): A. D. 1697-1700.

A. D. 1701-1706.—War with Charles XII. of Sweden in Poland and Livonia. See SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN): A. D. 1701-1707.

A. D. 1703-1718.—The founding of St. Petersburg.—"Immediately after the capture of

Nyenskantz [1708], a council of war was convened to consider the question of defending and utilising the mouth of the Neva, and whether it would be better to strengthen the little fort which had just been taken, or to seek a fit site for a commercial town nearer the sea. The latter course was decided upon. Near its mouth the Neva takes a sharp turn and divides into three or four branches, which by subsequent redivision form a number of islands, large and small. These marshy islands, overgrown with forests and thickets, and liable to be covered with water during the westerly winds, were inhabited by a few Finnish fishermen, who were accustomed to abandon their mud huts at the approach of high water, and seek a refuge on the higher ground beyond. It was on the first of these islands, called by the Finns Yanni-Saari, or Hare Island, where the river was still broad and deep, that Peter laid the foundation of a fortress and a city, named St. Petersburg, after his patron saint. . . . For this work many carpenters and masons were sent from the district of Novgorod, who were aided by the soldiers. Wheelbarrows were unknown (they are still little used in Russia), and in default of better implements the men scraped up the earth with their hands, and carried it to the ramparts on pieces of matting or in their shirts. Peter wrote to Ramodanofsky, asking him to send the next summer at least 2,000 thieves and criminals destined for Siberia, to do the heavy work under the direction of the Novgorod carpenters. At the same time with the construction of the bastions, a church was built in the fortress and dedicated to St. Peter and St. Paul. . . . Just outside of the fortress Peter built for himself a small hut, which he called his palace. It was about fifty-five feet long by twenty wide, built of logs roofed with shingles, and contained only three rooms, lighted by little windows set in leaden frames. In respect for this, his earliest residence in St. Petersburg, Peter subsequently had another building erected outside of it to preserve it from the weather, and in this state it still remains, an object of pilgrimage to the curious and devout. . . . In spite of disease and mortality among the men, in spite of the floods, which even in the first year covered nearly the whole place and drowned some who were too ill to move, the work went on. But in its infancy St. Petersburg was constantly in danger from the Swedes, both by sea and land. . . . St. Petersburg was the apple of Peter's eye. It was his 'paradise,' as he often calls it in his letters. It was always an obstacle, and sometimes the sole obstacle, to the conclusion of peace. Peter was willing to give up all he had conquered in Livonia and Esthonia, and even Narva, but he would not yield the mouth of the Neva. Nevertheless, until the war with Sweden had been practically decided by the battle of Poltava, and the position of St. Petersburg had been thus secured, although it had a certain importance as a commercial port, and as the fortress which commanded the mouth of the Neva, it remained but a village. The walls of the fortress were finally laid with stone, but the houses were built of logs at the best, and for many years, in spite of the marshy soil, the streets remained unpaved. If fate had compelled the surrender of the city, there would not have been much to regret. Gradually the idea came to Peter to make it his

capital. In 1714 the Senate was transported thither from Moscow, but wars and foreign enterprises occupied the Tsar's attention, and it was not until 1718 that the colleges or ministries were fully installed there, and St. Petersburg became in fact the capital of the Empire."—E. Schuyler, *Peter the Great*, ch. 46 (p. 2).

A. D. 1707-1718.—Invasion by Charles XII. of Sweden.—His ruinous defeat at Pultowa.—His intrigues with the Turks.—Unlucky expedition of the Czar into Moldavia.—Russian conquests in the north. See SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN). A. D. 1707-1718.

A. D. 1721.—The Peace of Nystad with Sweden.—Livonia and other conquests of Peter the Great secured.—Finland given up. See SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN): A. D. 1719-1721.

A. D. 1725-1739.—The reigns of Catherine I., Peter II., and Anne Ivanovna.—Fruitless war with Turkey.—Depredations in the Crimea.—The death of Peter found the Russian Court divided into two powerful factions. The reactionary party, filled with Russians of the old school, who had looked upon the reforms of Peter with no favourable eye, such as the Golitsins and the Dolgorukis, were anxious to raise to the throne Peter, the son of Alexis [Peter the Great's son, whom he had caused to be put to death], a mere boy, whereas the party of progress, led by Menshikov, wished that Catherine, the Tsar's widow, should succeed. . . . The party of reform finally triumphed. Catherine was elected the successor of her husband, and the chief authority fell into the hands of Alexander Menshikov. The brief reign of Catherine is distinguished only by two events which added any glory to Russia. The Academy of Sciences was founded in 1726, and Behring, a Dane, was sent on an exploring expedition to Kamchatka. He has left his name indelibly written on the geography of the world. . . . The Empress died on the 17th of May, 1727, a little more than two years after her accession to the throne, aged about 39 years. . . . A ukase of Peter permitted Catherine to choose her successor. She accordingly nominated Peter, the son of the unfortunate Alexis, and, in default of Peter and his issue, Elizabeth and Anne, her daughters. Anne died in 1728, the year after her mother; she had married Karl Friedrich, the Duke of Holstein, . . . and was the mother of the unfortunate Peter III. Menshikov was appointed the guardian of the young Tsar till he had reached the age of 17. In four months Menshikov was in disgrace and the young Tsar had signed a ukase which condemned him to Siberian banishment. He died in 1729, and was followed to the grave a year later by the boy autocrat whose fiat had been his ruin. On the death of Peter II., the will of Catherine, in favor of her daughters, was set aside, and the Council of the Empire conferred the crown on Anne [Anne Ivanovna], the widowed Duchess of Courland, who was a daughter of Ivan, elder brother of Peter the Great. An attempt was made to impose on her a constitution, somewhat resembling the *Pacta Conventa* of the Poles, but she evaded it. "The Empress threw herself entirely into the hands of German favourites, especially a Courlander of low extraction, named Biren, said to have been the son of a groom. . . . The Empress was a woman of vulgar mind, and the Court was given up to unrefined orgies. . . ."

CENTRAL EUROPE IN 1715

AFTER THE TREATIES OF UTRECHT AND RASTATT

- FRANCE (IN 1643)
- ACQUIRED BY FRANCE UNDER LOUIS XIV. (1643-1713)
- HABSBURG POSSESSIONS
- HOLSTEIN POSSESSIONS
- DANISH POSSESSIONS
- HOUSE OF NASSAU-GOTHORP
- ECCLIASTICAL STATES OF THE EMPIRE
- STATES OF THE CHURCH
- THE BOUNDARY OF THE EMPIRE IS SHOWN BY THE HEAVY RED LINE.



EASTERN EUROPE IN 1715

SHOWING SOME PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT CHANGES.

- HABSBURG POSSESSIONS
- HOLSTEIN POSSESSIONS
- VENETIAN POSSESSIONS
- DANISH AND NORWEGIAN POSSESSIONS
- SWEDISH POSSESSIONS
- TURKISH EMPIRE
- RUSSIA
- POLAND
- THE EASTERN BOUNDARY OF THE EMPIRE IS SHOWN BY THE HEAVY RED LINE.



Her reign was not an important one for Russia either as regards internal or foreign affairs. The right of primogeniture which had been introduced into the Russian law of real property by Peter the Great, was abolished, it was altogether alien to the spirit of Slavonic institutions. A four years' war with Turkey led to no important results.—W. R. Morfill, *The Story of Russia*, ch 8—"The Russians could have no difficulty in finding a pretence for the war [with Turkey], because the khan of the Turkish allies and dependents, the Tatars on the coast of the Black Sea and the Sea of Asof, and in the Crimea, could never wholly restrain his wandering hordes from committing depredations and making incursions into the neighbouring pasture lands of Russia. . . In 1735 a Russian corps marched into the Crimea, ravaged a part of the country, and killed a great number of Tatars, but having ventured too far without a sufficient stock of provisions, they were obliged to retreat, and sustained so great a loss in men that what had been accomplished bore no proportion to this misfortune. The almost total failure of this first attempt, which had cost the Russians 10,000 men, by no means deterred them from pursuing their designs of conquest. Count Munich marched with a large army from the Ukraine into the Crimea (1736). The Tatars suffered the Russian troops to advance unmolested, thinking themselves safe behind their entrenchments. But entrenchments of that kind were unable to resist the impetuosity of the Russian troops. They were surmounted, the Tatars repulsed, and a great part of the Crimea lay at the mercy of the conquerors. In the month of June they entered the Crimean fortress of Perekop. The Russian troops now retaliated the devastations committed by the Tatars in the Empire, but they found it impossible to remain long. Whatever the army was in want of had to be fetched with extreme difficulty from the Ukraine, so that Munich at length found himself, towards autumn, under the necessity of withdrawing with his troops by the shortest way to the Ukraine. While Munich was in the Crimea, endeavouring to chastise the Tatars for their depredations, Lascy had proceeded with another army against Asof. The attack proved successful, and on the 1st of July the fort of Asof had already submitted to his arms. The Ottomans published a manifesto against Russia, but they were neither able afterwards to protect the Crimea nor Moldavia, for they were soon threatened with an attack from Austria also. By the treaty with Russia, the emperor was bound to furnish 30,000 auxiliaries in case of a war with the Turks; but a party in the Austrian cabinet persuaded the emperor that it would be more advantageous to make war himself. . . . In the year 1737 a new expedition was undertaken from the Ukraine at an immense cost. . . . A new treaty had been concluded with Austria before this campaign, in which the two empires agreed to carry on the war in common, according to a stipulated plan. In order to gain a pretence for the war, Austria had previously acted as if she wished to force her mediation upon the Turks. The first year's campaign was so unfortunate that the Austrians were obliged to give up all idea of prosecuting their operations, and to think of the protection and defence of their own frontiers." But "the Russians were every where

victorious, and made the names of their armies a terror both in the east and the west. Lascy undertook a new raid into the Crimea. Munich first threatened Bender, then reduced Otchakof without much difficulty, and left a few troops behind him when he withdrew . . . who were there besieged by a large combined army of Turks and Tatars, supported by a fleet. The Russians not only maintained the fortress, which was, properly speaking, untenable, but they forced the Turks to retire with a loss of 10,000 men. The Russian campaign in 1738 was as fruitless, and cost quite as many men, as the Austrian, but it was at least the means of bringing them some military renown." In 1739, the Russians, under Munich, advanced in the direction of Moldavia, violating Polish territory. "The Turkish and Tatar army which was opposed to the Russians was beaten and routed [at Stavoutchani] on the first attack. . . . Immediately afterwards the whole garrison, struck with a panic, forsook the fortress of Khotzim, which had never been once attacked, and it was taken possession of by the Russians, who were astonished at the ease of the conquest. Jassy was also taken, and Munich even wished to attack Bender, when the news of the peace of Belgrade . . . made him infuriate, because he saw clearly enough that Russia alone was not equal to carry on the war. . . . By the peace of Belgrade Austria not only suffered shame and disgrace, but lost all the possessions which had been gained by Eugene in the last war, her best military frontier, and her most considerable fortresses. . . . By virtue of this treaty, Austria restored to Turkey Belgrade, Shabacz, the whole of Servia, that portion of Bosnia which had been acquired in the last war, and Austrian Wallachia. Russia was also obliged to evacuate Khotzim and Otchakof, the fortifications of the latter were, however, blown up, as well as those of Perekop. Russia retained Asof, and a boundary line was determined, which offered the Russians the most favourable opportunities for extending their vast empire southward, at the cost of the Tatars and Turks"—W. K. Kelly, *Hist. of Russia*, ch 33 (v 1).

A. D. 1726-1740.—The question of the Austrian Succession.—Guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction. See AUSTRIA A. D. 1718-1738, and 1740.

A. D. 1732-1733.—Interference in the election of king of Poland. See POLAND: A. D. 1732-1733.

A. D. 1740-1762.—Two regencies and two revolutions.—The reign of Empress Elizabeth.—The Empress Anne died in 1740. Her deceased sister, Catherine, had left a daughter, Anna, married to Anthony Ulrich, Prince of Brunswick, and this daughter had an infant son, Ivan. By the will of the Empress the child Ivan was named as her successor, and Biren was appointed Regent. He enjoyed the regency but a short time, when he was overcome by a palace conspiracy and sent in banishment to Siberia. The mother of the infant Ozer was now made Regent; but her rule was brief. Another revolution in the latter part of 1741, consigned her, with her son and husband, to a prison, and raised the Princess Elizabeth, second daughter of Peter the Great, to the Russian throne. "The Empress Anna might have ruled without control, and probably have transmitted the throne to her son Ivan, had Elizabeth been left to the quiet enjoy

ment of her sensual propensities. Elizabeth indulged without concealment or restraint in amours with subalterns, and even privates of the guard whose barracks lay near her residence; she was addicted, like them, to strong drink, and had entirely gained their favour by her good humour and joviality. Her indolence made her utterly averse to business, and she would never have thought of encumbering herself with the cares of government had she not been restricted in her amusements, reproved for her behaviour, and, what was worst of all, threatened with a compulsory marriage with the ugly and disagreeable Anthony Ulrich, of Brunswick Bevern, brother of the Regent's husband. At the instigation, and with the money, of the French ambassador, La Chétardie, a revolution was effected.

... Elizabeth, in the manifest which she published on the day of her accession, declared that the throne belonged to her by right of birth, in face of the celebrated ukase issued by her father in 1722, which empowered the reigning sovereign to name his successor. ... On communicating her accession to the Swedish Government [which had lately declared war and invaded Finland with no success], she expressed her desire for peace, and her wish to restore matters to the footing on which they had been placed by the Treaty of Nystadt. The Swedes, who took credit for having assisted the revolution which raised her to the throne, demanded from the gratitude of the Empress the restitution of all Finland, with the town of Wiborg and part of Carelia; but Elizabeth, with whom it was a point of honour to cede none of the conquests of her father, would consent to nothing further than the re-establishment of the Peace of Nystadt. On the renewal of the war the Swedes were again unsuccessful in every encounter, as they had been before."—T. H. Dyer, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, bk. 6, ch. 3 (v. 3).—"This war had no result except to show the weakness of the Sweden of Charles XII. against regenerate Russia. The Scandinavian armies proved themselves very unworthy of their former reputation. Elizabeth's generals, Lascy and Keith, subdued all the forts in Finland. At Helsingfors 17,000 Swedes laid down their arms before a hardly more numerous Russian force. By the treaty of Abo [August 17, 1743], the Empress acquired South Finland as far as the river Kiiumen, and caused Adolphus Frederic, Administrator of the Duchy of Holstein, and one of her allies, to be elected Prince Royal of Sweden, in place of the Prince Royal of Denmark. ... In her internal policy ... Elizabeth continued the traditions of the great Emperor. She developed the material prosperity of the country, reformed the legislation, and created new centres of population; she gave an energetic impulse to science and the national literature; she prepared the way for the alliance of France and Russia, emancipated from the German yoke; while in foreign affairs she put a stop to the threatening advance of Prussia." Elizabeth died in January, 1762.—A. Rambaud, *Hist. of Russia*, v. 2, ch. 6.

A. D. 1743.—Acquisition of part of Finland from Sweden. See SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN): A. D. 1720-1792.

A. D. 1755.—Intrigue with Austria and Saxony against Frederick the Great.—Causes of the Seven Years War. See GERMANY: A. D. 1755-1766.

A. D. 1758.—Invasion of Prussia.—Defeat at Zorndorf.—Retreat. See GERMANY: A. D. 1758.

A. D. 1759.—Renewed invasion of Prussia.—Victory at Kunersdorf. See GERMANY: A. D. 1759 (JULY—NOVEMBER).

A. D. 1761-1762.—Brief reign of Peter III.—His peace with Frederick the Great.—His deposition and death.—His queen, Catherine II., on the throne.—"Charles Peter Ulric, duke of Holstein Gottorp, whom Elizabeth had nominated her successor, who had embraced the Greek religion, and who, at his baptism, had received the name of Peter Fedorovitch, had arrived at St. Petersburg immediately after her accession: he was then in his fourteenth year. The education of this unfortunate prince was neglected. ... Military exercises were the only occupation for which he had any relish, and in them he was indulged. ... His potations, which were frequent and long, were encouraged by his companions; and, in a few years, he became a complete bacchanalian." In 1744 the young prince was married to "Sophia Augusta, daughter of the prince of Anhalt Zerbst, who, on her conversion to the Greek faith,—a necessary preliminary to her marriage,—had received the baptismal name of Catherine. This union was entitled to the more attention, as in its consequences it powerfully affected, not only the whole of Russia, but the whole of Europe. Shortly before its completion, Peter was seized with the small-pox, which left hideous traces on his countenance. The sight of him is said so far to have affected Catherine that she fainted away. But though she was only in her sixteenth year, ambition had already over her more influence than the tender passion, and she smothered her repugnance. Unfortunately, the personal qualities of the husband were not of a kind to remove the ill impression: if he bore her any affection, which appears doubtful, his manners were rude, even vulgar. ... What was still worse, she soon learned to despise his understanding; and it required little penetration to foresee that, whatever might be his title after Elizabeth's death, the power must rest with Catherine. Hence the courtiers in general were more assiduous in their attentions to her than to him,—a circumstance which did not much dispose him for the better. Finding no charms in his new domestic circle, he naturally turned to his boon companions; his orgies became frequent; and Catherine was completely neglected. Hence her indifference was exchanged into absolute dislike. ... Without moral principles; little deterred by the fear of worldly censure, in a court where the empress herself was any thing but a model of chastity; and burning with hatred towards her husband,—she soon dishonoured his bed." Elizabeth died on the 29th of December, 1761, and Peter III. succeeded to the throne without opposition. The plotting against him on behalf of his wife, had long been active, but no plans were ripe for execution. He was suffered to reign for a year and a half; but the power which he received at the beginning slipped quickly away from him. He was humane in disposition, and adopted some excellent measures. He suppressed the secret chancery—an inquisitorial court said to be as abominable as the Spanish inquisition. He emancipated the nobles from the servility to the crown which Peter the Great

had imposed on them. He improved the discipline of the army, and gave encouragement to trade. But the good will which these measures might have won for him was more than cancelled by his undisguised contempt for Russia and the Russians, and especially for their religion, and by his excessive admiration for Frederick the Great, of Prussia, with whom his predecessor had been at war [but with whom he entered into alliance.—See GERMANY: A. D. 1761-1762]. The clergy and the army were both alienated from him, and were easily persuaded to support the revolution which Catherine and her favorites planned for his overthrow. Their scheme was carried out on the morning of the 9th of July, 1762, when Peter was in the midst of one of his orgies at Oranienbaum, some miles from the capital. Catherine went to the barracks of the troops, and regiment after regiment declared for her. "Accompanied by about 2,000 soldiers, with five times that number of citizens, who loudly proclaimed her sovereign of Russia, she went to the church of Our Lady of Kasan. Here every thing was prepared for her reception: the archbishop of Novogorod, with a host of ecclesiastics, awaited her at the altar; she swore to observe the laws and religion of the empire; the crown was solemnly placed on her head; she was proclaimed sole monarch of Russia, and the grand-duke Paul her successor." The dethroned czar, when the news of these events reached him, doubted and hesitated until he lost even the opportunity to take to flight. On the day following Catherine's coronation he signed an act of abdication. Within a week he was dead. According to accounts commonly credited, he was poisoned, and then strangled, because the poison did its deadly work too slowly. "Whether Catherine commanded this deed of blood, has been much disputed. There can be little doubt that she did. None of the conspirators would have ventured to such an extremity unless distinctly authorised by her." Two years later Catherine added another murder to her crimes by directing the assassination of Ivan, who had been dethroned as an infant by Elizabeth in 1741, and who had grown to manhood in hopeless imprisonment.—*Hist. of Russia (Lardner's Cabinet Cyclop.)*, v. 2, ch. 10.

ALSO IN: *Hist. of the Reign of Peter III. and Catherine II.*, v. 1.—A. Rabbe and J. Duncan, *Hist. of Russia*, v. 1, pp. 203-221.

A. D. 1762-1796.—Character and reign of Catherine II.—Partition of Poland.—Wars with the Turks.—Acquisition of the Crimea and part of the Caucasus.—Extension of boundaries to the Dnieper.—"Thus was inaugurated the reign of Catherine II., a woman whose capacities were early felt to be great, but were great for evil as well as for good. . . . She was without scruple in the gratification of her passions, and without delicacy in their concealment; and a succession of lovers, installed ostentatiously in her palace, proclaimed to the world the shamelessness of their mistress. Yet she was great undoubtedly as a sovereign. With a clear and cultivated intellect, with high aims and breadth of views, and fearless because despising the opinions of others, she could plan and she could achieve her country's greatness; and in the extended dominions and improved civilization which she bequeathed to her successor is found a true claim to the gratitude of her

subjects. The foreign transactions of the reign begin with the history of Poland. With Frederick of Prussia, Catherine may be said to have shared both the scheme of partition and the spoils that followed [see POLAND: A. D. 1763-1773]. If it is doubtful which originated the transaction, there is at least no doubt but that Russian policy had prepared the way for such a measure. . . . The war with Turkey [see TURKS: A. D. 1768-1774] was closed with equal profit and yet greater glory to the Russian Empire. The Russian armies had fought and conquered upon the soil of Moldavia, and had invaded and occupied the Crimea. At the same time the Russian fleets, no longer confining themselves to the Baltic or Black Seas, had sailed round Europe, and had appeared in the Archipelago. An insurrection of the Greeks had aided their design; and for a time the Bosphorus and Constantinople had been threatened. The great Empress of the North had dazzled Europe by the vastness of her power and designs; and Turkey, exhausted and unequal to further contest, was constrained to purchase peace. The possession of Azof, Kertch, Yenikale, and Kinburn, the free navigation of the Euxine and the Mediterranean, were the immediate gains of Russia. A stipulation for the better treatment of the Principalities, and for the rights of remonstrance, both in their behalf, and in that of the Greek church at Constantinople, gave the opening for future advantages. Another clause assured the independence of the Khan of the Crimea, and of the Tartars inhabiting the northern shores of the Black Sea. Under the name of liberty, these tribes were now, like Poland, deprived of every strength except their own; and the way was prepared for their annexation by Russia. The Peace of Kainardji, as this settlement was called, was signed in 1774. Within ten years dissensions had arisen within the Crimea, and both Turks and Russians had appeared upon the scene. The forces of Catherine passed the isthmus as allies of the reigning Khan; but they remained to receive his abdication, and to become the masters of his country [see TURKS: A. D. 1776-1792]. At the same time the Kuban was entered and subdued by Souvarof, and thus already the Caucasus was reached. Catherine was now at the height of her power. In a triumphant progress she visited her new dominions, and gave the august name of Sebastopol to a new city which was already destined to be the scourge of the Turkish Empire. She believed herself to be upon the road to Constantinople; and, in the interviews which she held with the Emperor Joseph II., she began to scheme for the partition of Turkey, as she had done for that of Poland. . . . The Empress now found herself assailed in two distinct quarters. Gustavus III. of Sweden, allying with the Sultan, invaded Finland; and in her palace at St. Petersburg the Empress heard the Swedish guns [see SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN): A. D. 1720-1793]. She was relieved, however, on the north by the dissension in the Swedish army, which compelled the King to an inglorious retreat; and she became able to give an undivided attention to the affairs of the south. While an Austrian army, which supported her, was threatening the north-west of Turkey, her own forces conquered in the north-east. Under Souvarof the town of Oczakof was taken, and the battle of Rimnik was won. Ismail, that gave the key

of the Danube, next fell, and in the horrors of its fall drew forth a cry from Europe. The triumph of Catherine was assured; but already the clouds of revolution had risen in the west; Austria, too busy with the affairs of the Netherlands, had withdrawn from the fight; and the Empress herself, disquieted, and satisfied for the time with her successes, concluded the Peace of Jassy, which extended her frontiers to the Dniester, and gave her the coast on which so soon arose the rich city of Odessa. The acquisitions of Catherine upon the south were completed. Those upon the west had still to receive important additions. Poland, already once partitioned was again to yield new provinces to Russia [see POLAND: A. D. 1791-1792, and 1793-1796]. The internal government of the Empire was meant undoubtedly to rival these foreign successes, but unhappily fell short of them. . . . The long meditated secularization of the estates of the clergy was at last accomplished; the freedom of the serfs was now first urged; and, as a unique experiment in Russian history, the convoking of a kind of States General was made to discuss the project. But both project and parliament came to nothing. . . . There was much that was unreal in everything, and Europe, as well as the great Empress herself, was deceived. And so it came to pass that at the close of the reign there was the spectacle of much that had been begun but little finished. Before the death of Catherine [1796], in fact, her greatness may be said to have passed away."—C. F. Johnstone, *Historical Abstracts*, ch. 6.—"The activity of Catherine was prodigious, and her autocratic instincts extremely strong, and these impulses, affected by the French doctrines, which we must not forget set up despotism, if enlightened, as the perfection of wisdom, made her government attempt to accomplish all things and to meddle in every department of the national life. She tried to force civilisation into premature growths; established modern institutions of many kinds in a backward and half-barbaric empire; arranged industrial and economic projects and works in the minutest details; and rigidly prescribed even court dress and fashions. Ségur thus describes this omnipresent and ubiquitous interference:—"It is sought to create at the same time a third estate, to attract foreign commerce, to establish all kinds of manufactures, to extend agriculture, to increase paper money, to raise the exchanges, to reduce the interest of money, to found cities, to people deserts, to cover the Black Sea with a new navy, to conquer one neighbour and circumvent another, and finally to extend Russian influence all over Europe." These liberal reforms and grand aspirations came, however, for the most part to nothing; and Catherine's internal government grew by degrees into a grievous, cruel and prying despotism. . . . The antithesis of the liberalism in words and of the tyranny in deeds in Catherine's reign may be attributed to four main causes. She gradually found out that reform and progress were impossible in the Russian Empire—half Asiatic, backward and corrupt—and she swung back to the old tyranny of the past. The great rising of the serfs under Pugacheff, too—a servile outbreak of the worst kind—changed to a great extent the type of her government, and gave it a harsh and cruel complexion:—"The domestic policy of Catherine bore, until the end, the traces of those terrible years,

and showed, as it were, the bloody cicatrices of the blows given and received in a death struggle." . . . The foreign policy of Catherine was more successful than her government and administration at home, and the reasons are sufficiently plain. She found grand opportunities to extend her power in the long quarrels between France and England, in the alliance she maintained with Frederick the Great—an alliance she clung to, though she felt the burden—in the instability and weakness of the Austrian councils, in the confusion and strife of the French Revolution, above all in the decay of Islam; and Russia justly hailed her as a great conqueror. . . . The Muscovite race would not see her misdeeds in the march of conquest she opened for it; and her reputation has steadily increased in its eyes. "The spirit of the people passes, in its fulness, into her. It was this that enabled her to make a complete conquest of her empire, and by this we do not mean the power which she wrested from the weakness, the cowardice, and the folly of Peter III.; but the position which this German woman attained at the close of her life, and especially after her death, in the history, and the national life, and development of a foreign and hostile race. For it may be said that it is since her death, above all, that she has become what she appears now—the sublime figure, colossal alike and splendid, majestic and attractive, before which incline, with an equal impulse of gratitude, the humble Moujik and the man of letters, who shakes the dust of reminiscences and legends already a century old." In one particular, Catherine gave proof of being far in advance of the ideas of her day, and of extraordinary craft and adroitness. She anticipated the growing power of opinion in Europe, and skilfully turned it to her side by the patronage of the philosophers of France. In Napoleon's phrase, she did not spike the battery, she seized it and directed its fire; she had Voltaire, Diderot, and D'Alembert, admiring mouthpieces, to apologise for, nay to extol, her government. This great force had prodigious influence in throwing a glamour over the evil deeds of her reign, and in deceiving the world as to parts of her conduct:—"All this forms part of a system—a system due to the wonderful intuition of a woman, born in a petty German court, and placed on the most despotic throne of Europe; due, too—and so better—to her clear apprehension of the great power of the modern world—public opinion. It is, we do not hesitate to believe and affirm, because Catherine discovered this force, and resolved to make use of it, that she was able to play the part she played in history. Half of her reputation in Europe was caused by the admiration of Voltaire, solicited, won, managed by her with infinite art, nay, paid for when necessary."—*The Empress Catherine II.* (Edinburgh Rev., July, 1893).—"In 1781 Catherine had already sent to Grimm the following résumé of the history of her reign, set forth by her new secretary and factotum, Besborodko, in the fantastic form of an inventory:—Governments instituted according to the new form, 29; Towns built, 144; Treaties made, 30; Victories won, 78; Notable edicts, decreeing laws, 88; Edicts on behalf of the people, 128; Total, 492. Four hundred and ninety-two active measures! This astonishing piece of book-keeping, which betrays so naively all that there was of romantic, extravagant,

childish, and very feminine, in the extraordinary genius that swayed Russia, and in some sort Europe, during thirty-four years, will no doubt make the reader smile. It corresponds, however, truly enough, to a sum-total of great things accomplished under her direct inspiration . . . In the management of men . . . she is simply marvellous. She employs all the resources of a trained diplomatist, of a subtle psychologist, and of a woman who knows the art of fascination; she employs them together or apart, she handles them with unequalled 'inaestria.' If it is true that she sometimes takes her lovers for generals and statesmen, it is no less true that she treats on occasion her generals and statesmen as lovers. When the sovereign can do nothing, the Czar intervenes. If it avails nothing to command, to threaten, or to punish, she becomes coaxing and wheedling. Towards the soldiers that she sends to death, bidding them only win for her victory, she has delicate attentions, flattering forethought, adorable little ways. . . . Should fortune smile upon the efforts she has thus provoked and stimulated, she is profusely grateful, honours, pensions, gifts of money, of peasants, of land, rain upon the artisans of her glory. But she does not abandon those who have had the misfortune to be unlucky. Catherine's art of ruling was not, however, without its shortcomings, some of which were due to the mere fact of her sex, whose dependences and weaknesses she was powerless to overcome. 'Al! she cried one day, 'if heaven had only granted me breeches instead of petticoats, I could do anything. It is with eyes and arms that one rules, and a woman has only ears.' The petticoats were not solely responsible for her difficulties. We have already referred to a defect which bore heavily upon the conduct of affairs during her reign, this great leader of men, who knew so well how to make use of them, did not know how to choose them. It seems that her vision of men in general was disturbed, in this respect, by the breath of passion which influenced all her life. The general, the statesman, of whom she had need, she seemed to see only through the male whom she liked or disliked. . . . These mistakes of judgment were frequent. But Catherine did more than this, and worse. With the obstinacy which characterised her, and the infatuation that her successes gave her, she came little by little to translate this capital defect into a 'parti pris,' to formulate it as a system; one man was worth another, in her eyes, so long as he was docile and prompt to obey. . . . And her idea that one man is worth as much as another causes her, for a mere nothing, for a word that offends her, for a cast of countenance that she finds displeasing, or even without motive, for the pleasure of change and the delight of having to do with some one new, as she avows naively in a letter to Grimm, to set aside, disgraced or merely cashiered, one or another of her most devoted servants."—R. Waliszewski, *Romanes of an Empress*, v. 2, bk 2, ch. 1.

ALSO IN: W. Tooke, *Life of Catherine II*—*Memoirs of Catherine II*, by herself.—Princess Daschkaw, *Memoirs*.—S. Menzies, *Royal Favourites*.—F. O. Schlosser, *Hist. of the 18th Century*, v. 4-7.

A. D. 1784.—Establishment of the Jewish Pale. See Jews: A. D. 1787-1880.

A. D. 1791-1793.—Joined in the Coalitions against Revolutionary France. See FRANCE:

A. D. 1790-1791; 1791 (JULY—SEPTEMBER); 1793 (MARCH—SEPTEMBER).

A. D. 1796.—Accession of Paul.

A. D. 1798-1799.—The war of the Second Coalition against Revolutionary France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1798-1799 (AUGUST—APRIL).

A. D. 1799.—Suwarrow's victorious campaign in Italy and failure in Switzerland.—Anglo-Russian invasion of Holland.—Its disastrous ending. See FRANCE: A. D. 1799 (APRIL—SEPTEMBER), (AUGUST—DECEMBER); and (SEPTEMBER—OCTOBER).

A. D. 1800.—Desertion of the Coalition by the Czar.—His alliance with Napoleon. See FRANCE: A. D. 1800-1801 (JUNE—FEBRUARY).

A. D. 1800-1801.—War with England.—The Northern Maritime League and its sudden overthrow at Copenhagen by the British fleet.—Peace with England. See FRANCE: A. D. 1801-1802.

A. D. 1801.—Paul's despotism and assassination.—Accession of Alexander I.—The Emperor Paul's "choice of his Ministers was always directed by one dominant idea—that of surrounding himself with servants on whom he could entirely rely; for from the moment of his accession he foresaw and dreaded a Palace revolution. . . . He erred in the selection, and especially in the extent, of the means which he employed to save his life and his power, they only precipitated his deplorable end. Among the men whom he suspected, he persecuted some with implacable rigour, while he retained others at their posts and endeavoured to secure their fidelity by presents, this, however, only made them ungrateful. Never was there a sovereign more terrible in his severity, or more liberal when he was in a generous mood. But there was no certainty in his favour. A single word uttered intentionally or by accident in a conversation, the shadow of a suspicion, sufficed to make him persecute those whom he had protected. The greatest favourites of to-day feared to be driven from the Court on the morrow, and banished to a distant province. Yet the Emperor wished to be just. . . . All who belonged to the Court or came before the Emperor were thus in a state of continual fear." This fear, and the hatred which it inspired, produced in due time a conspiracy, headed by Counts Paulin and Pahlen, of the Emperor's Council. Purporting to have for its object only the deposition of the Czar, the conspiracy was known and acquiesced in by the heir to the throne, the Grand-Duke Alexander, who had been persuaded to look upon it as a necessary measure for rescuing Russia from a demented ruler. "Paul was precipitating his country into incalculable disasters, and into a complete disorganisation and deterioration of the Government machine. . . . Although everybody sympathised with the conspiracy, nothing was done until Alexander had given his consent to his father's deposition." Then it was hurried to its accomplishment. The conspirators, including a large number of military and civil officials, supped together, on the evening of March 3, 1801. At midnight, most of them being then intoxicated, they went in a body to the palace, made their way to the Emperor's bed-chamber—resisted by only one young valet—and found him, in his night-clothes, hiding in the folds of a curtain. "They dragged him out in his shirt, more dead than alive; the terror he had inspired was now

repaid to him with usury. . . . He was placed on a chair before a desk. The long, thin, pale, and angular form of General Bennigsen [a Hanoverian officer, just admitted to the conspiracy, but who had taken the lead when others showed signs of faltering], with his hat on his head and a drawn sword in his hand, must have seemed to him a terrible spectre. 'Sire,' said the General, 'you are my prisoner and have ceased to reign, you will now at once write and sign a deed of abdication in favour of the Grand-Duke Alexander.' Paul was still unable to speak, and a pen was put in his hand. Trembling and almost unconscious, he was about to obey, when more cries were heard. General Bennigsen then left the room, as he has often assured me, to ascertain what these cries meant, and to take steps for securing the safety of the palace and of the Imperial family. He had only just gone out when a terrible scene began. The unfortunate Paul remained alone with men who were maddened by a furious hatred of him. One of the conspirators took off his official scarf and tied it round the Emperor's throat. Paul struggled. But the conspirators seized the hand with which he was striving to prolong his life, and furiously tugged at both ends of the scarf. The unhappy emperor had already breathed his last, and yet they tightened the knot and dragged along the dead body, striking it with their hands and feet." When Alexander learned that an assassination instead of a forced abdication had vacated the throne for him, he "was prostrated with grief and despair. . . . The idea of having caused the death of his father filled him with horror, and he felt that his reputation had received a stain which could never be effaced. . . . During the first years of his reign, Alexander's position with regard to his father's murderers was an extremely difficult and painful one. For a few months he believed himself to be at their mercy, but it was chiefly his conscience and a feeling of natural equity which prevented him from giving up to justice the most guilty of the conspirators. . . . The assassins all perished miserably."—Prince Adam Czartoryski, *Memoirs*, v. 1, ch. 9 and 11.

A. D. 1805.—The Third Coalition against France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1805 (JANUARY—APRIL).

A. D. 1805.—The crushing of the Coalition at Austerlitz. See FRANCE: A. D. 1805 (MARCH—DECEMBER).

A. D. 1806-1807.—War with Napoleon in aid of Prussia.—Battle of Eylau.—Treaty of Bartenstein with Prussia.—Decisive defeat at Friedland. See GERMANY: A. D. 1806 (OCTOBER—DECEMBER); 1806-1807; and 1807 (FEBRUARY—JUNE).

A. D. 1807.—Ineffective operations of England as an ally against Turkey.—Treaty of Tilsit.—Secret understandings of Napoleon with the Czar. See TURKS: A. D. 1806-1807; and GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (JUNE—JULY).

A. D. 1807-1810.—Northern fruits of the Peace of Tilsit.—English seizure of the Danish fleet.—War with England and Sweden.—Conquest of Finland.—Peculiar annexation of the Grand Duchy to the Empire. See SCANDINAVIAN STATES: A. D. 1807-1810.

A. D. 1808.—Imperial conference and Treaty of Erfurt. See FRANCE: A. D. 1808 (SEPTEMBER—OCTOBER).

A. D. 1809.—Cession of Eastern Galicia by the Emperor of Austria. See GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (JULY—SEPTEMBER).

A. D. 1809-1812.—War with Turkey.—Treaty of Bucharest.—Acquisition of Bessarabia. See TURKS: A. D. 1789-1812.

A. D. 1810.—Grievances against France.—Desertion of the Continental System.—Resumption of commerce with Great Britain.—Rupture with Napoleon. See FRANCE: A. D. 1810-1812.

A. D. 1812 (June—September).—Napoleon's invasion.—Battles of Smolensk and Borodino.—The French advance to Moscow.—"With the military resources of France, which then counted 130 departments, with the contingents of her Italian kingdoms, of the Confederation of the Rhine, of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and with the auxiliary forces of Prussia and Austria, Napoleon could bring a formidable army into the field. On the first of June the Grand Army amounted to 678,000 men, 356,000 of whom were French, and 322,000 foreigners. It included not only Belgians, Dutchmen, Hanoverians, Hanses, Piedmontese, and Romans, then confounded under the name of Frenchmen, but also the Italian army, the Neapolitan army, the Spanish regiments, natives of Germany. . . . Besides Napoleon's marshals, it had at its head Eugène, Viceroy of Italy, Murat, King of Naples, Jerome, King of Westphalia, the princes royal and heirs of nearly all the houses in Europe. The Poles alone in this war, which recalled to them that of 1612, mustered 60,000 men under their standards. Other Slavs from the Illyrian provinces, Carinthians, Dalmatians, and Croats, were led to assault the great Slav empire. It was indeed the 'army of twenty nations,' as it is still called by the Russian people. Napoleon transported all these races from the West to the East by a movement similar to that of the great invasions, and swept them like a human avalanche against Russia. When the Grand Army prepared to cross the Niemen, it was arranged thus:—To the left, before Tilsit, Macdonald with 10,000 French and 20,000 Prussians under General York of Wartenburg; before Kovno, Napoleon with the corps of Davoust, Oudinot, Ney, the Guard commanded by Bessières, the immense reserve cavalry under Murat—in all a total of 180,000 men, before Pilyony, Eugène with 50,000 Italians and Bavarians, before Grodno, Jerome Bonaparte, with 60,000 Poles, Westphalians and Saxons, &c. We must add to these the 30,000 Austrians of Schwartzberg, who were to fight in Galicia as mildly against the Russians as the Russians had against the Austrians in 1809. Victor guarded the Vistula and the Oder with 30,000 men, Augereau the Elbe with 50,000. Without reckoning the divisions of Macdonald, Schwartzberg, Victor, and Augereau, it was with about 290,000 men, half of whom were French, that Napoleon marched to cross the Niemen and threaten the centre of Russia. Alexander had collected on the Niemen 90,000 men, commanded by Bagration; on the Bug, tributary to the Vistula, 60,000 men, commanded by Barclay de Tolly; those were what were called the Northern army and the army of the South. On the extreme right, Wittgenstein with 30,000 men was to oppose Macdonald almost throughout the campaign; on the extreme left, to occupy the Austrian Schwartzberg as harmlessly as possible,

Tormassof was placed with 40,000. Later this latter army, reinforced by 50,000 men from the Danube, became formidable, and was destined, under Admiral Tchitchagof, seriously to embarrass the retreat of the French. In the rear of all these forces was a reserve of 80,000 men—Cossacks and militia. . . . In reality, to the 290,000 men Napoleon had mustered under his hand, the Emperor of Russia could only oppose the 150,000 of Bagration and Barclay de Tolly. At the opening of the campaign the head-quarters of Alexander were at Wilna. . . . They deliberated and argued much. To attack Napoleon was to furnish him with the opportunity he wished, to retire into the interior, as Barclay had advised in 1807, seemed hard and humiliating. A middle course was sought by adopting the scheme of Pfühl—to establish an intrenched camp at Drissa, on the Dwina, and to make it a Russian Torres Vedras. The events in the Peninsula filled all minds. Pfühl desired to act like Wellington at Torres Vedras. But his intrenched camp was badly placed, it was easily turned, and was speedily abandoned when Napoleon advanced beyond the Niemen, which he did on the 24th of June. The Russian armies fell back. "Napoleon made his entry into Wilna, the ancient capital of the Lithuanian Gedimin. He had said in his second proclamation, 'The second Polish war has begun.' The Diet of Warsaw had pronounced the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland, and sent a deputation to Wilna to demand the adhesion of Lithuania, and to obtain the protection of the Emperor. Napoleon, whether to please Austria, whether to preserve the possibility of peace with Russia, or whether he was afraid to make Poland too strong, only took half measures. He gave Lithuania an administration distinct from that of Poland. . . . A last attempt to negotiate a peace had failed. Napoleon had proposed two unacceptable conditions—the abandonment of Lithuania, and the declaration of war against Great Britain. If Napoleon, instead of plunging into Russia, had contented himself with organising and defending the ancient principality of Lithuania, no power on earth could have prevented the re-establishment of the Polish-Lithuanian State within its former limits. The destinies of France and Europe would have been changed. . . . Napoleon feared to penetrate into the interior, he would have liked to gain some brilliant success not far from the Lithuanian frontier, and seize one of the two Russian armies. The vast spaces, the bad roads, the misunderstandings, the growing disorganisation of the army, caused all his movements to fail. Barclay de Tolly, after having given battle at Ostrovno and Vitepsk, fell back on Smolensk; Bagration fought at Mohilef and Orcha, and in order to rejoin Barclay retreated to Smolensk. There the two Russian generals held council. Their troops were exasperated by this continual retreat, and Barclay, a good tactician, with a clear and methodical mind, did not agree with Bagration, impetuous, like a true pupil of Suvorof. The one held firmly for a retreat, in which the Russian army would become stronger and stronger, and the French army weaker and weaker, as they advanced into the interior; the other wished to act on the offensive, full of risk as it was. The army was on the side of Bagration, and Barclay, a German of the Baltic provinces, was suspected

and all but insulted. He consented to take the initiative against Murat, who had arrived at Krasnoé, and a bloody battle was fought (August 14). On the 16th, 17th, and 18th of August, another desperate fight took place at Smolensk, which was burnt, and 20,000 men perished. Barclay still retired, drawing with him Bagration. In his retreat Bagration fought Ney at Valoutina; it was a lesser Eylau: 15,000 men of both armies remained on the field of battle. Napoleon felt that he was being enticed into the interior of Russia. The Russians still retreated, laying waste all behind them. . . . The Grand Army melted before their very eyes. From the Niemen to Wilna, without ever having seen the enemy, it had lost 50,000 men from sickness, desertion and marauding, from Wilna to Mohilef nearly 100,000. . . . In the Russian army, the discontent grew with the retreating movement; they began to murmur as much against Bagration as against Barclay. It was then that Alexander united the two armies under the supreme command of Koutouzof. . . . Koutouzof halted at Borodino. He had then 72,000 infantry, 18,000 regular cavalry, 7,000 Cossacks, 10,000 opolitchénie or militiamen, and 640 guns served by 14,000 artillerymen or pioneers; in all, 121,000 men. Napoleon had only been able to concentrate 86,000 infantry, 28,000 cavalry, and 587 guns, served by 16,000 pioneers or artillerymen. . . . On the 5th of September the French took the redoubt of Chevardino; the 7th was the day of the great battle, this was known as the battle of Borodino among the Russians, as that of the Moskowa in the bulletins of Napoleon, though the Moskowa flows at some distance from the field of carnage. The battle began by a frightful cannonade of 1,200 guns, which was heard 30 leagues round. Then the French, with an irresistible charge, took Borodino on one side and the redoubts on the other; Ney and Murat crossed the ravine of Semenevskoé, and cut the Russian army nearly in two. At ten o'clock the battle seemed won, but Napoleon refused to carry out his first success by employing the reserve, and the Russian generals had time to bring up new troops in line. They recaptured the great redoubt, and Platof, the Cossack, made an incursion on the rear of the Italian army; an obstinate fight took place at the outworks. At last Napoleon made his reserve troops advance; again Murat's cavalry swept the ravine; Caulaincourt's cuirassiers assaulted the great redoubt from behind, and flung themselves on it like a tempest, while Eugene of Italy scaled the ramparts. Again the Russians had lost their outworks. Then Koutouzof gave the signal to retreat. . . . The French had lost 30,000 men, the Russians 40,000. . . . Koutouzof retired in good order, announcing to Alexander that they had made a steady resistance, but were retreating to protect Moscow. But after a council of war, he decided to leave Moscow to its fate, and the retreating Russian army passed through and beyond the city, and the French entered it at their heels.—A. Rambaud, *Hist. of Russia*, v. 2, ch. 13.—The facts prove beyond doubt that Napoleon did not foresee the danger of an advance upon Moscow, and that Alexander I. and the Russian generals never dreamed of trying to draw him into the heart of the country. Napoleon was led on, not by any plan,—a plan had never been thought of,—but by the intrigues,

quarrels, and ambition of men who unconsciously played a part in this terrible war and never fore saw that the result would be the safety of Russia. . . . Amid these quarrels and intrigues, we are trying to meet the French, although ignorant of their whereabouts. The French encounter Neverovski's division, and approach the walls of Smolensk. It is impossible not to give battle at Smolensk. We must maintain our communications. The battle takes place, and thousands of men on both sides are killed. Contrary to the wishes of the tsar and the people, our generals abandon Smolensk. The inhabitants of Smolensk, betrayed by their governor, set fire to the city, and, with this example to other Russian towns, they take refuge in Moscow, deploring their losses and sowing on every side the seeds of hate against the enemy. Napoleon advances and we retreat, and the result is that we take exactly the measures necessary to conquer the French"—Count L. Tolstoi, *The Physiology of War: Napoleon and the Russian Campaign*, ch. 1.

ALSO IN: C. Joyneville, *Life and Times of Alexander I.*, v. 2, ch. 4.—Baron Jomini, *Life of Napoleon*, ch. 18 (p. 3).—Count P. de Ségur, *Hist. of the Expedition to Russia*, bk. 1-8 (p. 1-2).

A. D. 1812 (September).—The French in Moscow.—The burning of the city.—“With rapid steps the French army advanced towards the heights whence they hoped to perceive at length the great city of Moscow; and, if the Russians were filled with the utmost sadness, the hearts of the French were equally inspired with feelings of joy and triumph, and the most brilliant illusions. Reduced from 420,000 (which was its number at the passage of the Niemen) to 100,000, and utterly exhausted, our army forgot all its troubles on its approach to the brilliant capital of Muscovy. . . . Imagination was strongly excited within them at the idea of entering Moscow, after having entered all the other capitals of Europe with the exception of London, protected by the sea. Whilst Prince Eugene advanced on the left of the army, and Prince Poniatowski on its right, the bulk of the army, with Murat at its head, Davout and Ney in the centre, and the Guard in the rear, followed the great Smolensk road. Napoleon was in the midst of his troops, who, as they gazed upon him and drew near to Moscow, forgot the days of discontent, and uttered loud shouts in honour of his glory and their own. The proposal submitted by Miloradovitch was readily accepted, for the French had no desire to destroy Moscow, and it was agreed that not a shot should be fired during the evacuation, on condition that the Russian army should continue to defile across the city without a moment's halt. . . . The Russian rear-guard defiled rapidly to yield the ground to our advanced guard, and the King of Naples, followed by his staff and a detachment of cavalry, plunged into the streets of Moscow, and, traversing by turns the humblest quarters and the wealthiest, perceived everywhere the most profound solitude, and seemed to have entered a city of the dead. . . . The information which was now obtained—that the whole population of the city had fled—saddened the exultation of the commanders of our advanced guard, who had flattered themselves that they would have had the pleasure of surprising the inhabitants by their kindness. . . . On the morning of the 15th September, Napoleon entered Moscow,

at the head of his invincible legions, but passed through a deserted city, and his soldiers were now, for the first time on entering a capital, the sole witnesses of their own glory. Their feelings on the occasion were sad ones. As soon as Napoleon had reached the Kremlin, he hastened to ascend the lofty tower of the great Ivan, and to survey from its elevation the magnificent city he had conquered. . . . A sullen silence, broken only by the tramp of the cavalry, had replaced that populous life which during the very previous evening had rendered the city one of the most animated in the world. The army was distributed through the various quarters of Moscow, Prince Eugene occupying the northwest quarter, Marshal Davout the southwest, and Prince Poniatowski the southeast. Marshal Ney, who had traversed Moscow from west to east, established his troops in the district comprised between the Riazan and Vladimir roads, and the Guard was naturally posted at the Kremlin and in its environs. The houses were full of provisions of every kind, and the first necessities of the troops were readily satisfied. The superior officers were received at the gates of palaces by numerous servants in livery, eager in offering a brilliant hospitality; for the owners of these palaces, perfectly unaware that Moscow was about to perish, had taken great pains, although they fully shared the national hatred against the French, to procure protectors for their rich dwellings by receiving into them French officers.

From their splendid lodgings, the officers of the French army wandered with equal delight through the midst of the city, which resembled a Tartar camp sown with Italian palaces. They contemplated with wonder the numerous towns of which the capital is composed, and which are placed in concentric circles, the one within the other. . . . A few days before, Moscow had contained a population of 300,000 souls, of whom scarcely a sixth part now remained, and of these the greater number were concealed in their houses or prostrated at the foot of the altars. The streets were deserts, and only echoed with the footsteps of our soldiers. . . . But although the solitude of the city was a source of great vexation to them, they had no suspicion of any approaching catastrophe, for the Russian army, which alone had hitherto devastated their country, had departed, and there appeared to be no fear of fire. The French army hoped, therefore, to enjoy comfort in Moscow, to obtain, probably, peace by means of its possession, and at least good winter-cantonments in case the war should be prolonged. But, on the afternoon they had entered, columns of flame arose from a vast building containing . . . quantities of spirits, and just as our soldiers had almost succeeded in mastering the fire in this spot, a violent conflagration suddenly burst forth in a collection of buildings called the Bazaar, situated to the northeast of the Kremlin, and containing the richest magazines, abounding in stores of the exquisite tissues of India and Persia, the rarities of Europe, colonial produce, and precious wines. The troops of the Guard immediately hastened up and attempted to subdue the flames; but their energetic efforts were unfortunately unsuccessful, and the immense riches of the establishment fell a prey to the fire, with the exception of some portions which our men were able, to snatch from the devouring element. This fresh

accident was again attributed to natural causes, and considered as easily explicable in the tumult of an evacuation. During the night of the 15th of September, however, a sudden change came over the scene, for then as though every species of misfortune were to fall at the same moment on the ancient Muscovite capital, the equinoctial gales suddenly arose with the extreme violence usual to the season and in countries where widespread plains offer no resistance to the storm. This wind, blowing first from the east, carried the fire to the west into the streets comprised between the Iwer and Smolensk routes, which were the most beautiful and the richest in all Moscow. Within some hours the fire, spreading with frightful rapidity, and throwing out long arrows of flame, spread to the other westward quarters. And soon rockets were observed in the air, and wretches were seized in the act of spreading the conflagration. Interrogated under threat of instant death, they revealed the frightful secret,—the order given by Count Rostopschin for the burning of the city of Moscow as though it had been a simple village on the Moscow route. This information filled the whole army with consternation. Napoleon ordered that military commissions should be formed in each quarter of the city for the purpose of judging, shooting, and hanging incendiaries taken in the act, and that all the available troops should be employed in extinguishing the flames. Immediate recourse was had to the pumps, but it was found they had been removed; and this latter circumstance would have proved, if indeed any doubt on the matter had remained, the terrible determination with which Moscow had been given to the flames. In the mean time, the wind, increasing in violence every moment, rendered the efforts of the whole army ineffectual, and, suddenly changing, with the abruptness peculiar to equinoctial gales, from the east to the northwest, it carried the torrent of flame into quarters which the hands of the incendiaries had not yet been able to fire. After having blown during some hours from the northwest, the wind once more changed its direction, and blew from the southwest, as though it had a cruel pleasure in spreading ruin and death over the unhappy city, or, rather, over our army. By this change of the wind to the southwest the Kremlin was placed in extreme peril. More than 400 ammunition wagons were in the court of the Kremlin, and the arsenal contained some 400,000 pounds of powder. There was imminent danger, therefore, that Napoleon with his Guard, and the palace of the Czars, might be blown up into the air. . . . Napoleon, therefore, followed by some of his lieutenants, descended from the Kremlin to the quay of the Moskova, where he found his horses ready for him, and had much difficulty in threading the streets, which, towards the northwest (in which direction he proceeded), were already in flames. The terrified army set out from Moscow. The divisions of Prince Eugene and Marshal Ney fell back upon the Zwenigard and St Petersburg roads, those of Marshal Davout fell back upon the Smolensk route, and, with the exception of the Guard, which was left around the Kremlin to dispute its possession with the flames, our troops drew back in horror from before the fire, which, after flaming up to heaven, darted back towards them as though it wished to devour them. The few inhabitants who had remained

in Moscow, and had hitherto lain concealed in their dwellings, now fled, carrying away such of their possessions as they valued most highly, uttering lamentable cries of distress, and, in many instances, falling victims to the brigands whom Rostopchin had let loose, and who now exulted in the midst of the conflagration, as the genius of evil in the midst of chaos. Napoleon took up his quarters at the Château of Petrowskoïé, a league's distance from Moscow on the St Petersburg route, in the centre of the cantonments of the troops under Prince Eugene, awaiting there the subsidence of the conflagration, which had now reached such a height that it was beyond human power either to increase or extinguish it. As a final misfortune the wind changed on the following day from southwest to direct west, and then the torrents of flame were carried towards the eastern quarters of the city, the streets Messnitskaia and Bassmanaia, and the summer palace. As the conflagration reached its terrible height, frightful crashes were heard every moment,—roofs crushing inward, and stately façades crumbling headlong into the streets as their supports became consumed in the flames. The sky was scarcely visible through the thick cloud of smoke which overshadowed it, and the sun was only apparent as a blood-red globe. For three successive days—the 16th, the 17th, and the 18th of September—this terrific scene continued, and in unabated intensity. At length, after having devoured four-fifths of the city, the fire ceased, gradually quenched by the rain, which, as is usually the case, succeeded the violence of the equinoctial gales. As the flames subsided, only the spectre, as it were, of what had once been a magnificent city was visible; and, indeed, the Kremlin, and about a fifth part of the city, were alone saved,—their preservation being chiefly due to the exertions of the Imperial Guard. As the inhabitants of Moscow themselves entered the ruins, seeking what property still remained in them undestroyed, it was scarcely possible to prevent our soldiers from acting in the same manner. . . . Of this horrible scene the chiefest horror of all remains to be told: the Russians had left 15,000 wounded in Moscow, and, incapable of escaping, they had perished, victims of Rostopchin's barbarous patriotism."—A. Thiers, *Hist. of the Consulate and the Empire*, bk. 44 (c. 4).

ALSO IN: Gen. Count M. Dumas, *Memoirs*, ch. 15 (c. 2)—J. Philippart, *Northern Campaigns*, 1812–1813, c. 1, pp. 81–115.

A. D. 1812 (October–December).—The retreat from Moscow.—Its horrors.—"Napoleon waited in vain for propositions from the Czar; his own were scornfully rejected. Meanwhile the Russians were reorganizing their armies, and winter set in. On the 18th of October, the first frost gave warning that it was time to think of the retreat, which the enemy, already on the French flank, was threatening to cut off. Leaving Mortier with 10,000 men in the Kremlin, the army quitted Moscow on the 19th of October, thirty-five days after it had entered the city. It still numbered 80,000 fighting men and 600 cannons, but was encumbered with camp-followers and vehicles. At Malo-Jaroslavetz a violent struggle took place on the 24th. The town was captured and recaptured seven times. It was finally left in the hands of the French. Here, however, the route changed. The road became

increasingly difficult, the cold grew intense, the ground was covered with snow, and the confusion in the quartermaster's department was terrible. When the army reached Smolensk, there were only 50,000 men in the ranks (November 9). Napoleon had taken minute precautions to provide supplies and reinforcements all along his line of retreat, but the heedlessness of his subalterns, and the difficulty of being obeyed at such distances and in such a country, rendered his foresight useless. At Smolensk, where he hoped to find provisions and supplies, everything had been squandered. Meanwhile there was not a moment to lose. Wittgenstein, with the army of the North, was coming up on the French right. Tchitchagof was occupying Minsk behind the Beresina, with the army which had just come from the banks of the Danube. Kutusof was near at hand. The three Russian armies proposed to unite and bar the Beresina, which the French were obliged to cross. The French began their march, but the cold became suddenly intense, all verdure had disappeared, and there being no food for the horses, they died by the thousand. The cavalry was forced to dismount; it became necessary to destroy or abandon a large portion of the cannon and ammunition. The enemy surrounded the French columns with a cloud of Cossacks, who captured all stragglers. On the following days the temperature moderated. Then arose another obstacle,—the mud, which prevented the advance, and the famine was constant. Moreover, the retreat was one continuous battle. Ney, 'the bravest of the brave,' accomplished prodigies of valor. At Krasnoi the Emperor himself was obliged to charge at the head of his guard. When the Beresina was reached, the army was reduced to 40,000 fighting men, of whom one-third were Poles. The Russians had burned the bridge of Borisof, and Tchitchagof, on the other shore, barred the passage. Fortunately a ford was found. The river was filled with enormous blocks of ice, General Eblé and his pontoniers, plunged in the water up to their shoulders, built and rebuilt bridges across it. Almost all the pontoniers perished of cold or were drowned. Then, while on the right of the river Ney and Oudinot held back the army of Tchitchagof, and Victor on the left that of Wittgenstein, the guard, with Napoleon, passed over. Victor, after having killed or wounded 10,000 of Wittgenstein's Russians, passed over during the night. When, in the morning, the rear-guard began to cross the bridges, a crowd of fugitives rushed upon them. They were soon filled with a confused mass of cavalry, infantry, caissons, and fugitives. The Russians came up and poured a shower of shells upon the helpless crowd. This frightful scene has ever since been famous as the passage of the Beresina. The governor of Minsk had 24,000 dead bodies picked up and burned. Napoleon conducted the retreat towards Wilna, where the French had large magazines. At Smorgoni he left the army, to repair in all haste to Paris, in order to prevent the disastrous effects of the last events, and to form another army. The army which he had left struggled on under Murat. The cold grew still more intense, and 20,000 men perished in three days. Ney held the enemy a long time in check with desperate valor; he was the last to recross the Niemen (December 20). There the retreat ended, and with it this fatal campaign.

Beyond that river the French left 300,000 soldiers, either dead or in captivity."—Victor Duruy, *Hist. of France*, ch. 66—"Thousands of horses soon lay groaning on the route, with great pieces of flesh cut off their necks and most fleshy parts by the passing soldiery for food, whilst thousands of naked wretches were wandering like spectres, who seemed to have no sight or sense, and who only kept reeling on till frost, famine, or the Cossack lance put an end to their power of motion. In that wretched state no nourishment could have saved them. There were continual instances, even amongst the Russians, of their lying down, dozing, and dying within a quarter of an hour after a little bread had been supplied. All prisoners, however, were immediately and invariably stripped stark naked and marched in columns in that state, or turned adrift to be the sport and the victims of the peasantry, who would not always let them, as they sought to do, point and hold the muzzles of the guns against their own heads or hearts to terminate their suffering in the most certain and expeditious manner, for the peasantry thought that this mitigation of torture 'would be an offence against the avenging God of Russia, and deprive them of His further protection.' A remarkable instance of this cruel spirit of retaliation was exhibited on the pursuit to Wiazma. Milaradowitch, Beningsen, Korf, and the English General, with various others, were proceeding on the high road, about a mile from the town, where they found a crowd of peasant women, with sticks in their hands, hopping round a felled pine tree, on each side of which lay about sixty naked prisoners, prostrate, but with their heads on the tree, which those furies were striking in accompaniment to a national air or song which they were yelling in concert, while several hundred armed peasants were quietly looking on as guardians of the direful orgies. When the cavalcade approached, the sufferers uttered piercing shrieks, and kept incessantly crying 'La mort, la mort, la mort!' Near Dorogobouche a young and handsome Frenchwoman lay naked, writhing in the snow, which was enguined all around her. On hearing the sound of voices she raised her head, from which extremely long black, shining hair flowed over the whole person. Tossing her arms about with wildest expression of agony, she kept frantically crying, 'Rendez moi mon enfant'—Restore me my babe. When soothed sufficiently to explain her story, she related, 'That on sinking from weakness, a child newly born had been snatched away from her, that she had been stripped by her associates, and then stabbed to prevent her falling alive into the hands of their pursuers.' . . . The slaughter of the prisoners with every imaginable previous mode of torture by the peasantry still continuing, the English General sent off a despatch to the Emperor Alexander 'to represent the horrors of these outrages and propose a check.' The Emperor by an express courier instantly transmitted an order 'to prohibit the parties under the severest menaces of his displeasure and punishment,' at the same time he directed 'a ducat in gold to be paid for any prisoner delivered up by peasant or soldier to any civil authority for safe custody.' The order was beneficial as well as creditable, but still the conductors were offered a higher price for their charge, and frequently were prevailed on to surrender their trust, for

they doubted the justifiable validity of the order. Famine also ruthlessly decimated the enemy's ranks. Groups were frequently overtaken, gathered round the burning or burnt embers of buildings which had afforded cover for some wounded or frozen; many in these groups were employed in peeling off with their fingers and making a repast of the charred flesh of their comrades' remains. The English General having asked a grenadier of most martial expression, so occupied, 'if this food was not loathsome to him?' 'Yes,' he said, 'it was; but he did not eat it to preserve life—that he had sought in vain to lose—only to lull gnawing agonies.' On giving the grenadier a piece of food, which happened to be at command, he seized it with voracity, as if he would devour it whole; but suddenly checking himself, he appeared suffocating with emotion, looking at the bread, then at the donor, tears rolled down his cheeks, endeavouring to rise, and making an effort as if he would catch at the hand which administered to his want, he fell back and had expired before he could be reached. Innumerable dogs crouched on the bodies of their former masters, looking in then faces, and howling their hunger and their loss, whilst others were tearing the still living flesh from the feet, hands, and limbs of moaning wretches who could not defend themselves, and whose torment was still greater, as in many cases their consciousness and senses remained unimpaired. The clinging of the dogs to their masters' corpses was most remarkable and interesting. At the commencement of the retreat, at a village near Selino, a detachment of fifty of the enemy had been surprised. The peasants resolved to bury them alive in a pit: a drummer boy bravely led the devoted party and sprang into the grave. A dog belonging to one of the victims could not be secured, every day, however, the dog went to the neighbouring camp, and came back with a bit of food in his mouth to sit and moan over the newly turned earth. It was a fortnight before he could be killed by the peasants, afraid of discovery. The peasants showed the English General the spot and related the occurrence with exultation, as if they had performed a meritorious deed. The shots of the peasantry at stragglers or prisoners rang continuously through the woods, and altogether it was a complication of misery, of cruelty, of desolation, and of disorder, that can never have been exceeded in the history of mankind. Many incidents and crimes are indeed too horrible or disgusting for relation"—General Sir R. Wilson, *Narrative of Events during the Invasion of Russia*, pp. 255-261.—The same, *Private Journal*, v. 1, pp. 202-257.—When Napoleon abandoned the army, at Smorghoni, on the 6th of December, the King of Naples was left in command. "They marched with so much disorder and precipitation that it was only when they arrived at Wilna that the soldiers were informed of a departure as discouraging as it was unexpected. 'What!' said they among themselves, 'is it thus that he abandons those of whom he calls himself the father? Where then is that genius, who, in the height of prosperity, exhorted us to bear our sufferings patiently? He who lavished our blood, is he afraid to die with us? Will he treat us like the army of Egypt, to whom, after having served him faithfully, he became indifferent, when, by a shameful flight, he found himself free from

danger?' Such was the conversation of the soldiers, which they accompanied by the most violent execrations. Never was indignation more just, for never were a class of men so worthy of pity. The presence of the emperor had kept the chiefs to their duty, but when they heard of his departure, the greater part of them followed his example, and shamefully abandoned the remains of the regiments with which they had been intrusted. . . . The road which we followed presented, at every step, brave officers, covered with rags, supported by branches of pine, their hair and beards stiffened by the ice. These warriors, who, a short time before, were the terror of our enemies, and the conquerors of Europe, having now lost their fine appearance, crawled slowly along, and could scarcely obtain a look of pity from the soldiers whom they had formerly commanded. Their situation became still more dreadful, because all who had not strength to march were abandoned, and every one who was abandoned by his comrades, in an hour afterwards inevitably perished. The next day every bivouac presented the image of a field of battle. The soldiers burnt whole houses to avoid being frozen. We saw round the fires the half consumed bodies of many unfortunate men, who, having advanced too near, in order to warm themselves, and being too weak to recede, had become a prey to the flames. Some miserable beings, blackened with smoke, and besmeared with the blood of the horses which they had devoured, wandered like ghosts round the burning houses. They gazed on the dead bodies of their companions, and, too feeble to support themselves, fell down, and died like them. . . . The route was covered with soldiers who no longer retained the human form, and whom the enemy disdained to make prisoners. Every day these miserable men made us witnesses of scenes too dreadful to relate. Some had lost their hearing, others their speech, and many, by excessive cold and hunger, were reduced to a state of frantic stupidity, in which they roasted the dead bodies of their comrades for food, or even gnawed their own hands and arms. Some were so weak that, unable to lift a piece of wood, or roll a stone towards the fires which they had kindled, they sat upon the dead bodies of their comrades, and, with a haggard countenance, steadfastly gazed upon the burning coals. No sooner was the fire extinguished, than these living spectres, unable to rise, fell by the side of those on whom they had sat. We saw many who were absolutely insane. To warm their frozen feet, they plunged them naked into the middle of the fire. Some, with a convulsive laugh, threw themselves into the flames, and perished in the most horrid convulsions, and uttering the most piercing cries; while others, equally insane, immediately followed them, and experienced the same fate."—E. Labaume, *Circumstantial Narrative of the Campaign in Russia*, pt. 2, bk. 5.

ALSO IN: Count P. de Segur, *Hist. of the Expedition to Russia*, bk. 9-13 (v. 2).—C. Joyneville, *Life and Times of Alexander I.*, v. 2, ch. 5.—Earl Stanhope, *The French Retreat from Moscow* (*Hist. Essays*; and, also, *Quart. Rev.*, Oct. 1867—v. 128).—Baron de Marbot, *Memoirs*, v. 2, ch. 28-32.

A. D. 1812-1813.—Treaty of Kalisch with Prussia.—The War of Liberation in Germany.—Alliance of Austria.—The driving of the

French beyond the Rhine. See GERMANY: A. D. 1812-1813, to 1814.

A. D. 1814 (January-April).—The Allies in France and in possession of Paris.—Fall of Napoleon. See FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (JANUARY—MARCH), and (MARCH—APRIL).

A. D. 1814 (May).—The Treaty of Paris.—Evacuation of France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (APRIL—JUNE).

A. D. 1814-1815.—The Congress of Vienna.—Acquisitions in Poland.—Surrender of Eastern Galicia. See VIENNA, THE CONGRESS OF.

A. D. 1815.—Napoleon's return from Elba.—The Quadruple Alliance.—The Waterloo campaign and its results. See FRANCE: A. D. 1814-1815, to 1815 (JUNE—AUGUST).

A. D. 1815.—The Allies again in France.—Second Treaty of Paris. See FRANCE: A. D. 1815 (JULY—NOVEMBER).

A. D. 1815.—The Holy Alliance. See HOLY ALLIANCE.

A. D. 1817.—Expulsion of Jesuits. See JESUITS: A. D. 1769-1871.

A. D. 1820-1822.—The Congresses of Troppau, Laybach and Verona. See VERONA, THE CONGRESS OF.

A. D. 1825.—Accession of Nicholas.

A. D. 1827-1829.—Intervention on behalf of Greece.—Battle of Navarino. See GREECE: A. D. 1821-1829.

A. D. 1830-1832.—Polish revolt and its suppression.—Barbarous treatment of the insurgents. See POLAND: A. D. 1830-1832.

A. D. 1831-1846.—Joint occupation of Cracow.—Extinction of the republic.—Its annexation to Austria. See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1815-1846.

A. D. 1833-1840.—The Turko-Egyptian question and its settlement. See TURKS: A. D. 1831-1840.

A. D. 1839-1859.—Subjugation of the Caucasus. See CAUCASUS.

A. D. 1849.—Aid rendered to Austria against the Hungarian patriots. See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1848-1849.

A. D. 1853-1854.—Causes of the Crimean War with Turkey, England and France. — "The immediate cause of the war which broke out in 1853 was a dispute which had arisen between France and Russia upon the custody of the Holy Places in Jerusalem. The real cause was the intention of Russia to hasten the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. Nicholas, in a memorable conversation, actually suggested to the British ambassador at St. Petersburg that England should receive Egypt and Crete as her own portion of the spoil. This conversation, which took place in January 1853, was at once reported to the British Government. It undoubtedly prepared the way for future trouble. . . . It had the effect of rendering the British Ministry suspicious of his intentions, at a moment when a good understanding with this country was of the first importance to the Czar of Russia. There can, then, be very little doubt that Nicholas committed a grave error in suggesting a partition, which may have seemed reasonable enough to Continental statesmen, but which was regarded with horror by England. Almost at the same moment he affronted France by declining to call Napoleon 'Monsieur mon frère.' . . . Nicholas had the singular indiscretion to render a British ministry suspicious of

him, and a French emperor angry with him, in the same month. Napoleon could easily avenge the affront. . . . The Greek and Latin Churches both claimed the right of protecting the Holy Places of Palestine. Both appealed to a Mahometan arrangement in support of their claim: each declined to admit the pretensions of the other. The Latin Church in Palestine was under the protection of France; the Greek Church was under the protection of Russia; and France and Russia had constantly supported, one against the other, these rival claims. In the beginning of 1853 France renewed the controversy. She even threatened to settle the question by force. The man whom Nicholas would not call 'mon frère' was stirring a controversy thick with trouble for the Czar of Russia. It happened, moreover, that the controversy was one which, from its very nature, was certain to spread. Nearly eighty years before, by the Treaty of Kainardji, the Porte had undertaken to afford a constant protection to its Christian subjects, and to place a new Greek Church at Constantinople, which it undertook to erect, 'and the ministers who officiated at it under the specific protection of the Russian Empire.' The exact meaning of this famous article had always been disputed. In Western Europe it had been usually held that it applied only to the new Greek Church at Constantinople, and the ministers who officiated at it. But Russian statesmen had always contended that its meaning was much wider; and British statesmen of repute had supported the contention. The general undertaking which the Porte had given to Russia to afford a constant protection to its Christian subjects gave Russia — so they argued — the right to interfere when such protection was not afforded. In such a country as Turkey, where chronic misgovernment prevailed, opportunity was never wanting for complaining that the Christians were inadequately protected. The dispute about the Holy Places was soon superseded by a general demand of Russia for the adequate protection of the Christian subjects of the Porte. In the summer of 1853 the demand took the shape of an ultimatum; and, when the Turkish ministers declined to comply with the Russian demand, a Russian army crossed the Pruth and occupied the Principalities. In six months a miserable quarrel about the custody of the Holy Places had assumed dimensions which were clearly threatening war. At the advice of England the Porte abstained from treating the occupation of the Principalities as an act of war; and diplomacy consequently secured an interval for arranging peace. The Austrian Government framed a note, which is known as the Vienna Note, as a basis of a settlement. England and the neutral powers assented to the note; Russia accepted it; and it was then presented to the Porte. But Turkey, with the obstinacy which has always characterised its statesmen, declined to accept it. War might even then have been prevented if the British Government had boldly insisted on its acceptance, and had told Turkey that if she modified the conditions she need not count on England's assistance. One of the leading members of Lord Aberdeen's Ministry wished to do this, and declared to the last hour of his life that this course should have been taken. But the course was not taken. Turkey was permitted, or, according to Baron Stockmar, se-

couraged to modify the Vienna Note; the modifications were rejected by Russia; and the Porte, on the 26th of September, delivered an ultimatum, and on the 4th of October 1853 declared war. These events excited a very widespread indignation in this country. The people, indeed, were only imperfectly acquainted with the causes which had produced the quarrel; many of them were unaware that the complication had been originally introduced by the act of France; others of them failed to reflect that the refusal of the Porte to accept a note which the four Great Powers—of which England was one—had agreed upon was the immediate cause of hostilities. Those who were better informed thought that the note was a mistake, and that the Turk had exercised a wise discretion in rejecting it; while the whole nation instinctively felt that Russia, throughout the negotiations, had acted with unnecessary harshness. In October 1853, therefore, the country was almost unanimously in favour of supporting the Turk. The events of the next few weeks turned this feeling into enthusiasm. The Turkish army, under Omar Pasha, proved its mettle by winning one or two victories over the Russian troops. The Turkish fleet at Sinope was suddenly attacked and destroyed. Its destruction was, undoubtedly, an act of war: it was distorted into an act of treachery; a rupture between England and Russia became thenceforward inevitable; and in March 1854 England and France declared war."—S. Walpole, *Foreign Relations*, ch. 3.

ALSO IN: A. W. Kinglake, *The Invasion of the Crimea*, v. 1.—J. Morley, *Life of Richard Cobden*, v. 2, ch. 6.

A. D. 1854 (September).—The Crimean War: Landing of the Allies.—Battle of the Alma.—Sufferings of the invading army.—"England, then, and France entered the war as allies. Lord Raglan, formerly Lord Fitzroy Somerset, an old pupil of the Great Duke in the Peninsular War, and who had lost his right arm serving under Wellington at Waterloo, was appointed to command the English forces. Marshal St. Arnaud, a bold, brilliant soldier of fortune, was intrusted by the Emperor of the French with the leadership of the soldiers of France. The allied forces went out to the East and assembled at Varna, on the Black Sea shore, from which they were to make their descent on the Crimea. The war, meantime, had gone badly for the Emperor of Russia in his attempt to crush the Turks. The Turks had found in Omar Pasha a commander of remarkable ability and energy; and they had in one or two instances received the unexpected aid and counsel of clever and successful Englishmen. . . . The invasion of the Danubian provinces was already, to all intents, a failure. Mr. Kinglake and other writers have argued that but for the ambition of the Emperor of the French and the excited temper of the English people the war might well have ended then and there. The Emperor of Russia had found, it is contended, that he could not maintain an invasion of European Turkey; his fleet was confined to its ports in the Black Sea, and there was nothing for him but to make peace. But we confess we do not see with what propriety or wisdom the allies, having entered on the enterprise at all, could have abandoned it at such a moment, and allowed the Czar to escape thus merely scotched. . . . The

allies went on. They sailed from Varna for the Crimea. . . . There is much discussion as to the original author of the project for the invasion of the Crimea. The Emperor Napoleon has had it ascribed to him; so has Lord Palmerston; so has the Duke of Newcastle; so, according to Mr. Kinglake, has the 'Times' newspaper. It does not much concern us to know in whom the idea originated, but it is of some importance to know that it was essentially a civilian's and not a soldier's idea. It took possession almost simultaneously, as far as we can observe, of the minds of several statesmen, and it had a sudden fascination for the public. The Emperor Nicholas had raised and sheltered his Black Sea fleet at Sebastopol. That fleet had sallied forth from Sebastopol to commit what was called the massacre of Sinope. Sebastopol was the great arsenal of Russia. It was the point from which Turkey was threatened; from which, it was universally believed, the embodied ambition of Russia was one day to make its most formidable effort of aggression. Within the fence of its vast sea-forts the fleet of the Black Sea lay screened. From the moment when the vessels of England and France entered the Euxine the Russian fleet had withdrawn behind the curtain of these defences, and was seen upon the open waves no more. If, therefore, Sebastopol could be taken or destroyed, it would seem as if the whole material fabric, put together at such cost and labor for the execution of the schemes of Russia, would be shattered at a blow. . . . The invasion of the Crimea, however, was not a soldier's project. It was not welcomed by the English or the French commander. It was undertaken by Lord Raglan out of deference to the recommendations of the Government; and by Marshal St. Arnaud out of deference to the Emperor of the French, and because Lord Raglan, too, did not see his way to decline the responsibility of it. The allied forces were, therefore, conveyed to the south-western shore of the Crimea, and effected a landing in Kalamita Bay, a short distance north of the point at which the river Alma runs into the sea. Sebastopol itself lies about 30 miles to the south; and then, more southward still, divided by the bulk of a jutting promontory from Sebastopol, is the harbor of Balaklava. The disembarkation began on the morning of September 14th, 1854. It was completed on the fifth day; and there were then some 27,000 English, 30,000 French, and 7,000 Turks landed on the shores of Catherine the Great's Crimea. The landing was effected without any opposition from the Russians. On September 19th, the allies marched out of their encampments and moved southward in the direction of Sebastopol. They had a skirmish or two with a reconnoitring force of Russian cavalry and Cossacks; but they had no business of genuine war until they reached the nearer bank of the Alma. The Russians, in great strength, had taken up a splendid position on the heights that fringed the other side of the river. The allied forces reached the Alma about noon on September 20th. They found that they had to cross the river in the face of the Russian batteries armed with heavy guns on the highest point of the hills or bluffs, of scattered artillery, and of dense masses of infantry which covered the hills. The Russians were under the command of Prince Mentschikoff. It is certain that Prince Menta-

chikoff believed his position unassailable, and was convinced that his enemies were delivered into his hands when he saw the allies approach and attempt to effect the crossing of the river. . . . The attack was made with desperate courage on the part of the allies, but without any great skill of leadership or tenacity of discipline. It was rather a pell mell sort of fight, in which the headlong courage and the indomitable obstinacy of the English and French troops carried all before them at last. A study of the battle is of little profit to the ordinary reader. It was an heroic scramble. There was little coherence of action between the allied forces. But there was happily an almost total absence of generalship on the part of the Russians. The soldiers of the Czar fought stoutly and stubbornly, as they have always done, but they could not stand up against the blended vehemence and obstinacy of the English and French. The river was crossed, the opposite heights were mounted, Prince Mentschikoff's great redoubt was carried, the Russians were driven from the field, the allies occupied their ground; the victory was to the Western Powers. . . . The Russians ought to have been pursued. They themselves fully expected a pursuit. They retreated in something like utter confusion. . . . But there was no pursuit. Lord Raglan was eager to follow up the victory; but the French had as yet hardly any cavalry, and Marshal St. Arnaud would not agree to any further enterprise that day. Lord Raglan believed that he ought not to persist; and nothing was done. . . . Except for the bravery of those who fought, the battle was not much to boast of. . . . At this distance of time it is almost touching to read some of the heroic contemporaneous descriptions of the great scramble of the Alma. . . . Very soon, however, a different note came to be sounded. The campaign had been opened under conditions differing from those of most campaigns that went before it. Science had added many new discoveries to the art of war. Literature had added one remarkable contribution of her own to the conditions amidst which campaigns were to be carried on. She had added the 'special correspondent.' . . . When the expedition was leaving England it was accompanied by a special correspondent from each of the great daily papers of London. The 'Times' sent out a representative whose name almost immediately became celebrated—Mr. William Howard Russell, the 'preux chevalier' of war correspondents in that day, as Mr. Archibald Forbes of the 'Daily News' is in this. . . . Mr. Russell soon saw that there was confusion; and he had the soundness of judgment to know that the confusion was that of a breaking-down system. Therefore, while the fervor of delight in the courage and success of our army was still fresh in the minds of the public at home, while every music-hall was ringing with the cheap rewards of valor, in the shape of popular glorifications of our commanders and our soldiers, the readers of the 'Times' began to learn that things were faring badly indeed with the conquering army of the Alma. The ranks were thinned by the ravages of cholera. The men were pursued by cholera to the very battle-field, Lord Raglan himself said. . . . The hospitals were in a wretchedly disorganized condition. Stores of medicines and strengthening food were decaying in places where no one wanted them or

could well get at them, while men were dying in hundreds among our tents in the Crimea for lack of them. The system of clothing, of transport, of feeding, of nursing—everything had broken down. Ample provisions had been got together and paid for; and when they came to be needed no one knew where to get at them. The special correspondent of the 'Times' and other correspondents continued to din these things into the ears of the public at home. Exultation began to give way to a feeling of dismay. The patriotic anger against the Russians was changed for a mood of deep indignation against our own authorities and our own war administration. It soon became apparent to every one that the whole campaign had been planned on the assumption that it was to be like the career of the hero whom Byron laments, 'brief, brave, and glorious.' Our military authorities here at home—we do not speak of the commanders in the field—had made up their minds that Sebastopol was to fall, like another Jericho, at the sound of the war trumpets' blast. Our commanders in the field were, on the contrary, rather disposed to overrate than to underrate the strength of the Russians. . . . It is very likely that if a sudden dash had been made at Sebastopol by land and sea, it might have been taken almost at the very opening of the war. But the delay gave the Russians full warning, and they did not neglect it. On the third day after the battle of the Alma the Russians sank seven vessels of their Black Sea fleet at the entrance of the harbor of Sebastopol. This was done full in the sight of the allied fleets, who at first, misunderstanding the movements going on among the enemy, thought the Russian squadron were about to come out from their shelter and try conclusions with the Western ships. But the real purpose of the Russians became soon apparent. Under the eyes of the allies the seven vessels slowly settled down and sank in the water, until at last only the tops of their masts were to be seen; and the entrance of the harbor was barred as by sunken rocks against any approach of an enemy's ship. There was an end to every dream of a sudden capture of Sebastopol."—J. McCarthy, *Hist. of Our Own Times*, ch. 27 (v. 2).

ALSO IN: Gen. Sir E. Hamley, *The War in the Crimea*, ch. 2-3.—W. H. Russell, *The British Expedition to the Crimea*, bk. 1-2.

A. D. 1854 (September—October).—Opening of the siege of Sebastopol.—Four days after the battle of the Alma the allies reached the Belbek, so close to Sebastopol that "it became a matter of necessity to decide upon their next step. It appears to have been the wish of the English at once to take advantage of their victory and assault the north side. It is now known that such a step would almost certainly have been successful. . . . But again St. Arnaud offered objections." It was then determined "to undertake a flank march round the head of the harbour, and to take possession of the heights on the south. It was a difficult operation, for the country was unknown and rough, and while in the act of marching the armies were open to any assault upon their left flank. It was however carried out unmolested. . . . On the 26th the English arrived at the little landlocked harbour of Balaclava, at the foot of the steep hills forming the eastern edge of the plateau. The fleet, duly warned of the operation, had already arrived.

... Canrobert ... had now succeeded the dying St. Arnaud. ... A similar question to that which had arisen on the 24th now again rose. Should Sebastopol be attacked at once or not? Again it would appear that Lord Raglan, Sir Edmund Lyons, and others, were desirous of immediate assault. Again the French, more instructed in the technical rules of war, and supported by the opinion of Sir John Burgoyne, who commanded the English Engineers, declined the more vigorous suggestion, and it was determined at least to wait till the siege guns from the fleet were landed, and the artillery fire of the enemy weakened, in preparation for the assault. In the light of subsequent knowledge, and perhaps even with the knowledge then obtainable if rightly used, it appears that in all the three instances mentioned the bolder less regular course would have been the true wisdom. For Menschikoff had adopted a somewhat strange measure of defence. He had given up all hopes of using his fleet to advantage. He had caused some of his vessels to be sunk at the entrance of the harbour, which was thus closed; and having drawn the crews, some 18,000 in number, from the ships, he had intrusted to them the defence of the town, and had marched away with his whole army. The garrison did not now number more than 25,000, and they were quite unfit—being sailors—for operations in the field. The defences were not those of a regular fortress, but rather of an entrenched position. There were in Sebastopol two men who, working together, made an extraordinary use of their opportunities. Korniloff, the Admiral, forcing himself to the front by sheer nobleness of character and enthusiasm, found in Colonel von Todleben, at that time on a voluntary mission in the town, an assistant of more than common genius. ... The decision of the allies to await the landing of their siege train was more far-reaching than the generals at the time conceived, although some few men appear to have understood its necessary result. It in fact changed what was intended to be a rapid coup de main into a regular siege—and a regular siege of an imperfect and inefficient character, because the allied forces were not strong enough to invest the town. ... Preparation had not been made to meet the change of circumstances. The work thrown upon the administration was beyond its powers, the terrible suffering of the army during the ensuing winter was the inevitable result. ... The bombardment of the suburb, including the Malakoff and the Redan, fell to the English; the French undertook to carry it out against the city itself, directing their fire principally against the Flagstaff battery. ... Slowly the siege trains were landed and brought into position in the batteries marked out by the engineers. ... It was not till the 16th of October that these preparations were completed. ... The energy of Korniloff and the skill of Todleben had by this time roused the temper of the garrison, and had rendered the defences far more formidable; and in the beginning of October means had been taken to persuade Menschikoff to allow considerable bodies of troops to return to the town. ... On the 17th the great bombardment began. The English batteries gained the mastery over those opposed to them, but the efforts of the French, much reduced by the fire of the besieged, were brought to a speedy conclusion by a great ex-

plosion within their lines. Canrobert sent word to Lord Raglan that he should be unable to resume the fire for two days. The attack by the fleet had been to little purpose. Every day

till the 25th of October the fire of the allies was continued. But under cover of this fire (always encountered by the ceaseless energy of Todleben) the change had begun, and the French were attacking the Flagstaff bastion by means of regular approaches. On that day the siege was somewhat rudely interrupted. The presence of the Russian army outside the walls and the defect in the position of the allies became evident." —J. F. Bright, *Hist. of Eng., 1837-1880*, pp. 251-256

ALSO IN. A. W. Kinglake, *The Invasion of the Crimea*, v. 3-4

A. D. 1854 (October—November).—The Crimean War: Balaklava and Inkermann.—“The Russian general soon showed that he was determined not to allow the allies to carry on their operations against the town undisturbed. Large parties of Russian soldiers had for some time been reconnoitring in the direction of Balaklava, showing that an attack in that quarter was meditated. At length, on the 25th of October, an army of 30,000 Russians advanced against the English position, hoping to get possession of the harbours and to cut the allies off from their supplies, or at any rate to destroy the stores which had already been landed. The part of the works on which the Russian troops first came was occupied by redoubts, defended by a body of Turkish recruits, recently arrived from Tunis, who, after offering a very feeble resistance, fled in confusion. But when the Russians, flushed with this first success, attempted to pursue the advantage they had gained, they soon encountered a very different foe in the Highlanders, commanded by Sir Colin Campbell, who bore the brunt of the Russian attack with great firmness. The British cavalry particularly distinguished themselves in this action, routing a far superior force of Russian cavalry. It was in the course of this engagement that the unfortunate blunder occurred, in consequence of which 607 men [the ‘Light Brigade’ immortalized by Tennyson] galloped forth against an army, and only 198 came back, the rest having been killed, wounded, or made prisoners. A long, unsatisfactory controversy was carried on some time after, having for its object to decide who was to blame for throwing away, in this foolish manner, the lives of so many gallant men. It seems that the orders were not very clearly expressed, and that the general—Lord Lucan—by whom they were received, misapprehended them more completely than a man in his position ought to have done. In the end, the Russians were forced to retire, without having effected their object, but as they retained some portion of the ground that had been occupied by the allies at the commencement of the battle, they too claimed the victory, and Te-Deums were sung all over Russia in honour of this fragmentary success. However, the Russian commander did not abandon the hope of being able to obtain possession of Balaklava. On the very day following the affair which has just been related, the Russians within the town made a sortie with a force of about 6,000 men; but near the village of Inkermann they encountered so strong a resistance from a far inferior force, that they were obliged to retreat. The Russian

army at Balaklava had been prepared to coöperate with them; but the promptitude and vigour with which the allies repelled the sortie prevented the Russians from entrenching themselves at Inkermann, and thus frustrated the plan of a combined attack on the allied position which had probably been formed. The village of Inkermann, which was the scene of this skirmish, shortly after witnessed a more deadly and decisive contest. It was on the morning of Sunday, November 5th, that the approach of the Russian army was heard, while it was still concealed from view by the mists which overhung the British position. That army had been greatly increased by the arrival of large reinforcements, and every effort had been made to exalt the courage of the soldiers, they had been stimulated by religious services and exhortations, as well as by an abundant supply of ardent spirits, and they came on in the full confidence that they would be able to sweep the comparatively small British force from the position it occupied. That position was the centre of a grand attack made by the whole Russian army. The obscurity prevented the generals of the allies from discovering what was going on, or from clearly discerning, among a series of attacks on different parts of their position, which were real, and which were mere feints. There was a good deal of confusion in both armies, but the obscurity, on the whole favoured the Russians, who had received their instructions before they set out, and were moving together in large masses. It was, in fact, a battle fought pell-mell, man against man, and regiment against regiment, with very little guidance or direction from the commanding officers, and consequently one in which the superior skill of the British gave them little advantage. The principal point of attack throughout was the plateau of Inkermann, occupied by the Guards and a few British regiments, who maintained a long and unequal struggle against the main body of the Russian army. It was, in fact, a hand-to-hand contest between superior civilization on the one hand, and superior numbers on the other, in which it is probable that the small British force would have been eventually swept off the field. Bonaquet, the ablest of the French generals, with a soldier's instinct at once divined, amid all the obscurity, turmoil, and confusion, that the British position was the real point of attack; and therefore, leaving a portion of his force to defend his own position, he marched off to Inkermann, and never halted till his troops charged the Russians with such fury that they drove them down the hill, and decided the fate of the battle in favour of the allies. . . . Meanwhile Mr. Sidney Herbert, the minister at war, had succeeded in inducing Miss Florence Nightingale, well known in London for her skilful and self-denying benevolence, to go out and take charge of the military hospitals in which the wounded soldiers were received. Everything connected with the hospitals there was in a state of the most chaotic confusion. The medical and other stores which had been sent out were rotting in the holds of vessels, or in places where they were not wanted. Provisions had been despatched in abundance, and yet nothing could be found to support men who were simply dying from exhaustion. The system of check and counter-check, which had been devised to prevent waste and extravagance in the time of peace, proved to be the very cause

of the most prodigious waste, extravagance, and inefficiency in the great war in which England was now embarked. The sort of dictatorial authority which had been conferred on Miss Nightingale, supported by her own admirable organising and administrative ability, enabled her to substitute order for confusion, and procure for the multitudes of wounded men who came under her care the comforts as well as the medical attendance they needed. She arrived at Scutari with her nurses on the very day of the battle of Inkermann. Winter was setting-in in the Crimea with unusual rigour and severity. — W. N. Molesworth, *Hist. of Eng.*, 1830-1874, v. 3, ch. 1.

ALSO IN: E. H. Nolan, *Illustrated Hist. of the War against Russia*, ch. 40-48 (v. 1) — *Chambers' Pict. Hist. of the Russian War*, ch. 7-8.

A. D. 1854-1855.— Siege and capture of Kars. — "Everywhere unsuccessful in Europe, the Russians were more fortunate in Asia. Towards the close of 1854, the Turkish army at Kars was in a wretched and demoralised condition. Its unsatisfactory state, and the reverses it had experienced, resulting, it was well known, from the misconduct of the Turkish officials, induced the British government to appoint colonel Williams as a commissioner to examine into the causes of previous failures, and endeavour to prevent a repetition of them. . . . Colonel Williams, attended only by major Teesdale and Dr. Sandwith, arrived at Kars at the latter end of September, 1854, where he was received with the honour due to his position. Kars, in past times considered the key of Asia Minor, is 'a true Asiatic town in all its picturesque squalor,' and has a fortress partly in ruins, but once considered most formidable. On inspecting the Turkish army there, colonel Williams found the men in rags, their pay fifteen and even eighteen months in arrear; the horses half starved; discipline so relaxed that it could be scarcely said to exist, and the officers addicted to the lowest vices and most disorderly habits. . . . Though treated with an unpardonable superciliousness and neglect by lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British ambassador at Constantinople, colonel Williams succeeded in promoting a proper discipline, and in securing the men from being plundered by their officers. In the January of 1855, the Turkish government granted colonel Williams the rank of *terik*, or general in the Ottoman army, together with the title of Williams Pasha. The inactivity of the Russian army at Gumri excited much surprise; but notwithstanding the condition of the Turks, they permitted spring to pass away, and summer to arrive, before active hostilities were resumed. . . . During this period, the Turks at Kars had been employed, under the direction of colonel Lake, in throwing up fortifications around the town, which gradually assumed the appearance of a formidably entrenched camp. Early in June the Russians left Gumri, and encamped within five leagues of Kars. They were estimated at 40,000 men; while the Turkish troops amounted to about 15,000 men, who had been familiarised with defeat, and scourged by fever and the scurvy. In addition to this, their provisions were insufficient to enable them to sustain a siege of any considerable duration, and their stock of ammunition was very low. The Russians made a partial attack on the town on the 16th of June, but they met with a repulse. . . . The road to Erzeroum was in their posses-

sion, and the supplies intended for the Turks fell into their hands. In effect, they had blockaded Kars by drawing a cordon of troops around it. A period of dreary inaction followed this movement of the Russians, broken only by trivial skirmishes at the outposts. Want was already felt within the town, and the prospect of surrender or starvation was imminent. . . . Omar Pasha, and a large body of Turkish troops from the Crimea, had landed at Batoum, and it was expected that they would soon arrive to raise the siege of Kars. This circumstance, occurring shortly after the arrival of the news of the fall of Sebastopol, induced many of the officers of the besieged army to believe that the Russians were about to retire. This surmise was strengthened by the fact, that, for several days, large convoys of heavily laden waggons were observed leaving the Russian camp. General Williams, however, was not deceived by this artifice, and correctly regarded it as the prelude to an extensive attack upon Kars. An hour before dawn on the 29th of September, the tramp of troops and the rumble of artillery wheels was heard in the distance, and the Turkish garrison made hurried preparations to receive the foe. Soon the dim moonlight revealed a dark moving mass in the valley. It was an advancing column of the enemy, who had hoped to take the Turks by surprise. In this they were deceived, for no sooner were they within range, than a crushing shower of grape informed them that the Moslems were on the alert. The battle commenced almost immediately. The assailants rushed up the hill with a shout, and advanced in close column on the breastworks and redoubts. From these works a murderous fire of musketry and rifles was poured forth, aided by showers of grape from the great guns. This told with terrible effect upon the dense masses of the foe, who fell in heaps. . . . Riddled with shot, the Russians were completely broken, and sent headlong down the hill, leaving hundreds of dead behind them. . . . Had not the Turkish cavalry been destroyed by starvation—a circumstance which rendered pursuit impossible—the Russian army might have been almost annihilated. The Turks had obtained an unequivocal victory, after a battle of nearly seven hours' duration. Their loss did not exceed 463 killed, of whom 101 were townspeople, and 681 wounded. That of the Russians was enormous; 6,300 of them were left dead upon the field, and it is said that they carried 7,000 wounded off the ground. Though the Russians had suffered a severe reverse, they were not driven from the position they held prior to the battle . . . and were enabled to resume the blockade of the city with as much strictness as before. The sufferings of the unhappy garrison and inhabitants of Kars form one of the most terrible pictures incidental to this war. Cholera and famine raged within the town; and those who were enfeebled by the last frequently fell victims to the first. The hospitals were crowded with the sick and wounded, but the nourishment they required could not be obtained. The flesh of starved horses had become a luxury, and the rations of the soldiers consisted only of a small supply of coarse bread, and a kind of broth made merely of flour and water. . . . Children dropt and died in the streets; and every morning skeleton-like corpses were found in various parts of the camp. The

soldiers deserted in large numbers, and discipline was almost at an end. . . . As all hope of relief from Selim Pasha or Omar Pasha had expired, general Williams resolved to put an end to these miseries by surrendering the town to the foe. . . . Articles of surrender were signed on the 25th of November. . . . The fall of Kars was a disgrace and a scandal to all who might have contributed to prevent it."—T. Gaspey, *Hist. of Eng., Geo. III.—Victoria, ch. 56 (v. 3)*.

ALSO IN: T. H. Ward, *Humphrey Sandwith, ch. 9*.—S. Lane-Poole, *Life of Stratford Canning, ch. 31 (v. 2)*.

A. D. 1854-1856.—Unfruitful peace negotiations at Vienna.—Renewed bombardment of Sebastopol.—Battle of the Tchernaya.—Repulse of the English from the Redan.—Taking of the Malakhoff by the French.—The congress at Paris.—Peace.—In November, 1854, the Czar, Nicholas I., authorized Gortschakoff, his Minister at Vienna, to signify to the Western Powers his willingness to conclude peace on the basis of "the four points" which the latter had laid down in the previous spring. These "four points" were as follows: "(1) The protectorate which Russia had hitherto exercised over the Principalities was to be replaced by a collective guarantee; (2) the navigation of the mouths of the Danube was to be freed from all impediments; (3) the treaty of 1841 was to be revised in the interests of the European equilibrium; and (4) Russia was to renounce all official protectorate over the Sultan's subjects, of whatever religion they might be. . . . The Czar's new move was not entirely successful. It did not prevent Austria from concluding a close arrangement with the Western Powers, and it induced her, in concert with France and England, to define more strictly the precise meaning attached to the four points. With some disappointment, Russia was doomed to find that every successive explanation of these points involved some fresh sacrifice on her own part. The freedom of the lower Danube, she was now told, could not be secured unless she surrendered the territory between that river and the Pruth which she had acquired at the treaty of Adrianople; the revision of the treaty of 1841, she was assured, must put an end to her preponderance in the Black Sea. These new exactions, however, did not deter the Czar from his desire to treat. By no other means was it possible to prevent Austria from taking part against him; and a conference, even if it ultimately proved abortive, would in the interim confine her to neutrality. Under these circumstances, Nicholas consented to negotiate. . . . The conference which it was decided to hold in December did not assemble till the following March. The negotiation which had been agreed to by Aberdeen, was carried out under Palmerston; and, with the double object of temporarily ridding himself of an inconvenient colleague, and of assuring the presence of a statesman of adequate rank at the conference, Palmerston entrusted its conduct to Russell. While Russell was on his way to Vienna, an event occurred of momentous importance. Sore troubled at the events of the war, alarmed at the growing strength of his enemies, the Emperor of Russia had neither heart nor strength to struggle against a slight illness. His sudden death [March 2, 1855] naturally made a profound impression on the mind of Europe. . . . Alexander, his successor,

a monarch whose reign commenced with disaster and ended with outrage, at once announced his adherence to the policy of his father. His accession, therefore, did not interrupt the proceedings of the Conference, and, in the first instance the diplomatists who assembled at Vienna succeeded in arriving at a welcome agreement. On the first two of the four points all the Powers admitted to the Conference were substantially in accord. On the third point no such agreement was possible. The Western Powers were determined that an effectual limitation should be placed on the naval strength of Russia in the Black Sea; and they defined this limit by a stipulation that she should not add to the six ships of war which they had ascertained she had still afloat. Russia, on the contrary, regarded any such condition as injurious to her dignity and her rights, and refused to assent to it. Russia, however, did not venture on absolutely rejecting the proposal of the allies. Instead of doing so, she offered either to consent to the opening of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to the ships of war of all nations, or to allow the Sultan a discretion in determining whether he would open them to the vessels either of the Western Powers or of Russia. The Western Powers, however, were firm in their determination to prevent the fleets of Russia from passing into the Mediterranean, and refused the alternative. With its rejection the Conference practically terminated. After its members separated, however, Buol, the Austrian Minister, endeavoured to evolve from the Russian offer a possible compromise. . . . The rejection of the Austrian alternative necessitated the continuance of the war. But the struggle was resumed under conditions very different from those on which it had previously been conducted. Austria, indeed, considered that the rejection of her proposal released her from the necessity of actively joining the Western Powers, and, instead of taking part in the war, reduced her armaments. But the Western Powers obtained other aid. The little State of Sardinia sent a contingent to the Crimea; later on in the year Sweden joined the alliance. Fresh contingents of troops rapidly augmented the strength of the French and English armies, and finer weather as well as better management banished disease from the camp. Under these circumstances the bombardment was renewed in April. In May a successful attack on Kertch and Yenikale, at the extreme east of the Crimea, proved the means of intercepting communication between Sebastopol and the Caucasian provinces, and of destroying vast stores intended for the sustenance of the garrison. In June the French, to whose command Pelissier, a Marshal of more robust fibre than Canrobert, had succeeded, made a successful attack on the Mamelon, while the English concurrently seized another vantage-ground. Men at home, cheered by the news of these successes, fancied that they were witnessing the beginning of the end. Yet the end was not to come immediately. A great assault, delivered on the 18th of June, by the French on the Malakhoff, by the English on the Redan, failed; and its failure, among other consequences, broke the heart of the old soldier [Lord Raglan] who for nine months had commanded the English army. . . . His capacity as a general does not suffer from any comparison with that of his successor, Gen-

eral Simpson. That officer had been sent out to the Crimea in the preceding winter; he had served under Raglan as chief of the staff; and he was now selected for the command. He had, at least, the credit which attaches to any military man who holds a responsible post in the crisis of an operation. For the crisis of the campaign had now come. On both sides supreme efforts were made to terminate the struggle. On the 16th of August the Russian army in force crossed the Tchernaya, attacked the French lines, but experienced a sharp repulse. On the 8th of September the assault of June was repeated; and though the British were again driven back from the Redan, the French succeeded in carrying the Malakhoff. The Russians, recognising the significance of the defeat, set Sebastopol and their remaining ships on fire, and retreated to the northern bank of the harbour. After operations, which had lasted for nearly a year, the allies were masters of the south side of the city. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to prolong any further the narrative of operations which had little influence on history. The story of the defence of Kars and of the bombardment of Sveaborg have an interest of their own. But they had no effect on the events which followed or on the peace which ensued. Soon after, the Vienna Conference was dissolved, indeed, it became evident that the war was approaching its close. The cost and the sacrifices which it involved were making the French people weary of the struggle, and the accidental circumstances, which gave them in August and September the chief share in the glory, disposed them to make peace. The reasons which made the French, however, eager for peace, did not apply to the English. They, on the contrary, were mortified at their failures. Their expectations had been raised by the valour of their army at Alma, at Balaklava, and at Inkerman. But, since the day of Inkerman, their own share in the contest had added no new page of splendour to the English story. The English troops had taken no part in the battle of the Tchernaya; their assaulting columns had been driven back on the 18th of June; they had been repulsed in the final attack on the Redan; and the heroic conduct of their own countrymen at Kars had not prevented the fall of that fortress. Men at home, anxious to account for the failure of their expectations, were beginning to say that England is like the runner, never really ripe for the struggle till he has gained his second wind. They were reluctant that she should retire from the contest at the moment when, having repaired her defective administration and reinforced her shattered army, she was in a position to command a victory. Whatever wishes, however, individual Englishmen might entertain, responsible statesmen, as the autumn wore on, could not conceal from themselves the necessity of finding some honourable means for terminating the war. In October the British Cabinet learned with dismay that the French Emperor had decided on withdrawing 100,000 men from the Crimea. About the same time the members of the Government learned with equal alarm that, if war were to be continued at all, the French public were demanding that France should secure some advantage in Poland, in Italy, and on the left bank of the Rhine. In November the French military took a much more extreme course, and concerted with Austria terms of peace without the

knowledge of England. . . . It was impossible any longer to depend on the co-operation of France, and . . . it was folly to continue the struggle without her assistance. The protocol which Austria had drawn up, and to which France had assented, was, with some modifications, adopted by Britain and presented, as an ultimatum, to Russia by Austria. In the middle of January, 1856, the ultimatum was accepted by Russia; a Congress at which Clarendon, as Foreign Minister, personally represented his country, was assembled at Paris. The plenipotentiaries, meeting on the 25th of February, at once agreed on a suspension of hostilities. Universally disposed towards peace, they found no difficulty in accommodating differences which had proved irreconcilable in the previous year, and on the 30th of March, 1856, peace was signed. The peace which was thus concluded admitted the right of the Porte to participate in the advantages of the public law of Europe, it pledged all the contracting parties, in the case of any fresh misunderstanding with the Turk, to resort to mediation before using force. It required the Sultan to issue and to communicate to the Powers a firman ameliorating the condition of his Christian subjects, it declared that the communication of the firman gave the Powers no right, either collectively or separately, to interfere between the Sultan and his subjects, it neutralised the Black Sea, opening its waters to the mercantile marine of every nation, but, with the exception of a few vessels of light draught necessary for the service of the coast, closing them to every vessel of war, it forbade the establishment or maintenance of arsenals on the shores of the Euxine, it established the free navigation of the Danube, it set back the frontier of Russia from the Danube, it guaranteed the privileges and immunities of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, it similarly guaranteed the privileges of Servia, though it gave the Sultan the right of garrison in that province, and it undertook that Russia and Turkey should restore the conquests which they had made in Asia [Kars, etc.] one from another during the war. Such were the terms on which the war was terminated. Before the plenipotentiaries separated they were invited by Walewski, the Foreign Minister and first representative of France, to discuss the condition of Greece of the Roman States, and of the two Sicilies, to condemn the licence to which a free press was lending itself in Belgium; and to concert measures for the mitigation of some of the worst evils of maritime war"—(see DECLARATION OF PARIS).

—S. Walpole, *Hist. of Eng. from 1815*, ch. 24.

Also in: E. Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, v. 2, doc's 263-272.

A. D. 1855.—Accession of Alexander II.

A. D. 1859.—Improved treatment of the Jews. See Jews: A. D. 1727-1880.

A. D. 1859-1876.—Conquests in Central Asia.—Subjugation of Bokhara, Khiva and Khokand.—"The original cause of Russia's appearance in Central Asia or Turkestan may be considered either the turbulence of the Kirghiz tribes, or the ambitious and clearly defined policy of Peter the Great. . . . Although the Czarina Anne received in 1734 the formal surrender of all the Kirghiz hordes, it was not until the present century had far advanced that the Russian Government could so

much as flatter itself that it had effectually coerced them. . . . When the Kirghiz were subjugated Russia found no difficulty in reaching the lower course of the Jaxartes, on which [in 1849] . . . she established her advanced post at Kazala, or Fort No. 1. With her ultimate task thus simplified, nothing but the Crimean War prevented Russia's immediate advance up the Jaxartes into Turkestan. . . . The conquest of the Khanate of Turkestan began with the siege and capture of the forts Chulak Kurgan and Yani Kurgan in 1859; its successful progress was shown by the fall of the fortified towns of Turkestan and Auliata in 1864; and it was brought to a conclusion with the storming of Tashkent in 1865. The conquest of this Khanate, which had been united early in the century with that of Khokand, was thus speedily achieved, and this rapid and remarkable triumph is identified with the name of General Tcherniaieff."—D. C. Boulger, *Central Asian Questions*, ch. 1.—"Khudayar Khan, the ruler of Khokand, a noted coward even in Central Asia, had soon lost his spirits, and implored Muzaffar-ed-din-Khan for assistance. Bokhara, reputed at that time the very stronghold of moral and material strength in Central Asia, was soon at hand with an army outnumbering the Russian adventurers ten or fifteen times, an army in name only, but consisting chiefly of a rabble, ill-armed, and devoid of any military qualities. By dint of preponderating numbers, the Bokharots succeeded so far as to inflict a loss upon the daring Russian general at Irdjar, who, constrained to retreat upon Tashkend, was at once deposed by his superiors in St. Petersburg, and, instead of praises being bestowed upon him for the capture of Tashkend, he had to feel the weight of Russian ingratitude. His successor, General Romanovsky, played the part of a consolidator and a preparer, and as soon as this duty was fulfilled he likewise was superseded by General Kauffmann, a German from the Baltic Russian provinces, uniting the qualities of his predecessors in one person, and doing accordingly the work entrusted to him with pluck and luck in a comparatively short time. In 1868 the Yaxartes valley, together with Samarkand, the former capital of Timur, fell into the hands of Russia, and General Kauffmann would have proceeded to Bokhara, and even farther, if Muzaffar-ed-din Khan . . . had not voluntarily submitted and begged for peace. At the treaty of Serpul, the Emir was granted the free possession of the country which was left to him, beginning beyond Kermineh, as far as Tchardjui in the south. . . . Of course the Emir had to pledge himself to be a true and faithful ally of Russia. He had to pay the heavy war indemnity . . . ; he had to place his sons under the tutorship of the Czar in order to be brought up at St. Petersburg . . . ; and ultimately he had to cede three points on his southern frontier—namely, Djamb, Kerki, and Tchardjui. . . . Scarcely five years had elapsed when Russia . . . cast her eyes beyond the Oxus upon the Khan of Khiva. . . . A plea for a 'casus belli' was soon unearthed. . . . The Russian preparations of war had been ready for a long time, provisions were previously secured on different points, and General Kauffmann, notoriously fond of theatrical pageantries, marched through the most perilous route across bottomless sands from the banks of the Yaxartes to the Oxus [1878]. . . . Without fighting a

single battle, the whole country on the Lower Oxus was conquered. Russia again showed herself magnanimous by replacing the young Khan upon the paternal throne, after having taken away from him the whole country on the right bank of the Oxus, and imposed upon his neck the burden of a war indemnity which will weigh him down as long as he lives, and cripple even his successors, if any such are to come after him. Three more years passed, when Russia . . . again began to extend the limits of her possessions in the Yaxartes Valley towards the East. In July, 1876, one of the famous Russian embassies of amity was casually (?) present at the Court of Khudayar Khan at Khokand, when suddenly a rebellion broke out, endangering not only the lives of the Russian embassy but also of the allied ruler. No wonder, therefore, that Russia had to take care of the friend in distress. An army was despatched to Khokand, the rebellion was quelled, and, as a natural consequence, the whole Khanate incorporated into the dominions of the Czar. The Khokandians, especially one portion of them called the Kiptchaks, did not surrender so easily as their brethren in Bokhara and Khiva. The struggle between the conqueror and the native people was a bloody and protracted one; and the butchery at Namangan, an engagement in which the afterwards famous General Skobelev won his spurs, surpasses all the accounts hitherto given of Russian cruelty. Similar scenes occurred in Endidjan and other places, until the power of the Kiptchaks, noted for their bravery all over Central Asia, was broken, and 'peace,' a pendant to the famous tableau of Vereshitchagin, 'Peace at Shipka,' prevailed throughout the valleys of Ferghana, enabling the Russian eagle to spread his wings undisturbedly over the whole of Central Asia, beginning from the Caspian Sea in the west to the Issyk Kul in the east, and from Siberia to the Turkoman sands in the south."—A. Vambéry, *The Coming Struggle for India*, ch. 2.

ALSO IN: F. von Hellwald, *The Russians in Central Asia*, ch. 7-11.—J. Hutton, *Central Asia*, ch. 12 and 18.

A. D. 1860-1880.—The rise, spread and character of Nihilism. See Nihilism.

A. D. 1861.—Emancipation of serfs. See SLAVERY, MEDIEVAL AND MODERN: RUSSIAN SERFDOM.

A. D. 1864.—Organization of Public Instruction. See EDUCATION, MODERN: EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.—RUSSIA.

A. D. 1867.—Sale of Alaska to the United States. See ALASKA: A. D. 1867.

A. D. 1869-1881.—Advance in Central Asia from the Caspian.—Capture of Geok Tepe.—Subjugation of the Turkomans.—Occupation of Merv.—Down to 1869 the Russian advance into Central Asia was conducted from Orenburg and the various military posts of Western Siberia. Year by year the frontier was pushed to the southward, and the map of the Asiatic possessions of Russia required frequent revision. The long chain of the Altai Mountains passed into the control of the Czar; the Aral Sea became a Russian lake; and vast territories with a sparse population were brought under Russian rule. . . . The Turkoman country extends westward as far as the Caspian Sea. To put a stop to the organized thieving of the Turkomans, and more especially to increase the extent of territory under their

control, and open the land route to India, the Russians occupied the eastern shore of the Caspian in 1869. A military expedition was landed at Krasnovodsk, where it built a fort, and took permanent possession of the country in the name of the Czar. Points on the eastern coast of the Caspian had been occupied during the time of Peter the Great, and again during the reign of Nicholas I., but the occupation of the region was only temporary. The force which established itself at Krasnovodsk consisted of a few companies of infantry, two sotnias of Cossacks, and half a dozen pieces of artillery. Three men who afterwards obtained considerable prominence in the affairs of Central Asia, and one of whom gained a world-wide reputation as a soldier, were attached to this expedition. The last was Skobelev, the hero of Plevna and the Russo-Turkish campaign of 1877-78. The others were Stoliétoff and Grodekoff. . . . The Yomut Turkomans in the Caspian region made no resistance; they are far less warlike than the Tekke Turkomans farther to the east, who afterwards became the defenders of Geok Tepe. . . . From 1869 to 1873 there were numerous skirmishes and reconnoitings, during which the steppes were pretty well explored as far as Kizil-Arvat. General Stoliétoff was in command until 1872, when he was succeeded by Colonel Markuseff, who pushed his explorations to the wells of Igdy, then bending to the southwest, he passed Kizil-Arvat on his return to Krasnovodsk. There appeared to be no obstacle to a Russian advance into the heart of the country. But when General Lomakin was ordered there during the years between 1873 and '79, he found that beyond Kizil-Arvat were the Tekke Turkomans, who seemed determined to make a decided opposition to the Muscovite designs. . . . He advanced with 4,000 men and reached Geok Tepe without resistance, but no sooner was he in front of it than the Turkomans fell upon him. He was severely defeated and made a hasty retreat to Krasnovodsk with the remnant of his army. General Tergukasoff was next appointed to the command, but when he saw the difficulties confronting him he resigned. He was succeeded by General Petrusovitch under the chief command of Skobelev. Thus from Stoliétoff to Skobelev there were no fewer than seven generals who had tried to conquer the Tekke Turkomans. Skobelev, seeing the vast difficulties of the situation, matured a skilful and scientific plan of operations, for which he obtained the imperial sanction. . . . Skobelev's first work [1880] was to secure a safe transport, establish a regular line of steamers across the Caspian, to build suitable docks, secure 20,000 camels, and build a railway from Michaelovsk to Kizil-Arvat. Michaelovsk is a small bay near Krasnovodsk and better suited as a harbor than the latter place. Skobelev's first reconnoitring convinced him that Geok Tepe could only be taken by a regular siege. . . . Geok Tepe, sometimes called Geok Tepe ('The Green Hills'), is situated on the Akhal oasis, in the Turkoman steppes, 387 versts (250 miles), east of the Caspian Sea. The chain of hills called the Kopet-Dag, lies south and southwest of Geok Tepe, and on the other side it touches the sandy desert of Kara Kum, with the hill of Geok on the east. The Turkomans, or rather the Tekke Turkomans, who held it are the most numerous of the nomad tribes in this region.

They are reported to count about 100,000 kikitkas, or tents; reckoning 5 persons to a kikitka, this would give them a strength of half a million. Their great strength in numbers and their fighting abilities enabled them to choose their position and settle on the most fertile oases along the northern border of Persia for centuries. These oases have been renowned for their productiveness, and in consequence of the abundance of food, the Tekkes were a powerful race of men, and were feared throughout all that part of Asia. . . . The fortress of Geok Tepe at the time of the Russian advance consisted of walls of mud 12 or 15 feet high towards the north and west, and 6 or 8 feet thick. In front of these walls was a ditch, 6 feet deep, supplied by a running stream, and behind the walls was a raised platform for the defenders. The space between the first and second interior wall was from 50 to 60 feet wide, and occupied by the kikitkas of the Tekke Turcomans and their families. The second wall was exactly like the outer one. The Russian siege was opened at the beginning of the year 1881. . . . The first parallel, within 800 yards of the walls, was successfully cut by January 4th. From that date it was a regular siege, interrupted occasionally by sallies of the Tekkes within the fort or attacks by those outside. In one of these fights General Petrussovitch was killed. The besieging army was about 10,000 strong, while the besieged were from 30,000, to 40,000. . . . Throughout the siege the Turcomans made frequent sallies and there was almost continuous fighting. Sometimes the Turcomans drove the Russians from the outposts, and if they had been as well armed as their besiegers it is highly probable that Skobelev would have fared no better than did Lomakin in his disastrous campaign. The storming columns were ordered to be ready for work on January 24th. . . . At 7 o'clock in the morning of the 24th, Gaidaroff advanced to attack the first fortification on the south front, supported by 36 guns. The wall had already been half crumbled down by an explosion of powder and completely broken by the firing of a dynamite mine. At 11 30 the assault took place, and during the action the mine on the east front was exploded. It was laid with 125 cwt of gunpowder, and in its explosion completely buried hundreds of Tekkes. . . . About 1 30 P. M. Gaidaroff carried the southwestern part of the walls, and a battle raged in the interior. Half an hour later the Russians were in possession of Denghil-Tepe, the hill redoubt commanding the fortress of Geok Tepe. The Tekkes then seemed to be panic-stricken, and took to flight leaving their families and all their goods behind. . . . The ditches to Geok Tepe were filled with corpses, and there were 4,000 dead in the interior of the fortress. The loss of the enemy was enormous. In the pursuit the Russians are said to have cut down no less than 8,000 fugitives. The total loss of the Tekkes during the siege, capture, and pursuit was estimated at 40,000. . . . Skobelev pushed on in pursuit as far as Askabad, the capital of the Akhal Tekkes, 27 miles east of Geok Tepe, and from Askabad he sent Kuropatkin with a reconnoitring column half-way across the desert to Merv. Skobelev wanted to capture Merv; but . . . he did not feel strong enough to make the attempt. Kuropatkin was recalled to Askabad, which remained the frontier post of

the Russians for several months, until circumstances favored the advance upon Sarakhs and the Tejed, and the subsequent swoop upon Merv, with its bloodless capture [February, 1884]. The siege and capture of Geok Tepe was the most important victory ever achieved by the Russians in Central Asia. It opened the way for the Russian advance to the frontier of India, and carried the boundaries of the empire southward to those of Persia. In the interest of humanity, it was of the greatest importance, as it broke up the system of man stealing and its attendant cruelties, which the Turcomans had practised for centuries. The people of Northern Persia no longer live in constant terror of Turcoman raids, the slave markets of Central Asia are closed, and doubtless forever."—T. W. Knox, *Decisive Battles since Waterloo*, ch. 22.—"There is a vast tract of country in Central Asia that offers great possibilities for settlement. Eastern Afghan, and Western Turkestan, with an area of 1,500,000 square miles, have a population which certainly does not exceed 15,000,000, or ten to the square mile. Were they peopled as the Baltic provinces of Russia are—no very extreme supposition—they would support 90,000,000. It is conceivable that something like this may be realized at no very distant date, when railroads are carried across China, and when water—the great want of Turkestan—is provided for by a system of canalisation and artesian wells. Meanwhile it is important to observe that whatever benefit is derived from an increase of population in these regions will mostly fall to China. That empire possesses the better two thirds of Turkestan, and can pour in the surplus of a population of 400,000,000. Russia can only contribute the surplus of a population of about 100,000,000, and though the Russian is a fearless and good colonist, there are so many spaces in Russia in Europe to be filled up, so many growing towns that need workmen, so many counter attractions in the gold bearing districts of Siberia, that the work of peopling the outlying dependencies of the empire is likely to be very gradual. Indeed it is reported that Russia is encouraging Chinese colonists to settle in the parts about Merv."—C. H. Pearson, *National Life and Character*, pp. 43-44.

ALSO IN Gen Skobelev, *Siege and Assault of Denghil-Tepe (Geok Tepe): Official Rep't.*—C. Marvin, *The Russians at the Gates of Herat*, ch. 1-2.

A. D. 1877-1878.—Successful war with Turkey.—Siege and reduction of Plevna.—Threatening advance towards Constantinople.—Treaty of San Stefano.—Congress and Treaty of Berlin. See *TURES: A. D. 1861-1877; 1877-1878; and 1878.*

A. D. 1878-1880.—Movements in Afghanistan. See *AFGHANISTAN: A. D. 1869-1881.*

A. D. 1879-1881.—Nihilist attempts against the life of the Czar Alexander II.—His assassination.—In November, 1879, "the Czar paid his annual visit to the memorial church at Sevastopol, when a requiem was celebrated, and he left the Crimea on November 30. The following evening, as his train was entering Moscow, followed by another carrying his baggage, an explosion took place under the baggage train from a mine of dynamite below the rails, which destroyed one carriage, and threw seven more off

the line. He was informed of the cause of the noise he had just heard, as he stepped on to the platform at Moscow, and it proved to be another Nihilist outrage [see Nihilism], designed chiefly by an ex-Jew, who escaped to France, and by Sophia Perovsky, who was afterwards concerned in the Emperor's death. A similar mine, of which the wire was accidentally cut by a passing cart before the train arrived, had been laid further south at Alexandrovsk; and another nearer to Odessa was discovered in time by the officials, who reversed the usual position of the Imperial trains, thereby probably saving the Czar's life. He telegraphed the same night to the Empress at Cannes that he had arrived safely at Moscow, but did not mention his escape, which she learned from the newspapers, and from her attendants. In her weak, nervous state, it is not surprising that the effect was most injurious.

Another plot was discovered to blow up the landing stage at Odessa when the Emperor embarked for Yalta on his way from Warsaw in September, but the arrest of the conspirators frustrated a scheme by which hundreds as well as the sovereign might have perished. . . . The Revolutionary Committee put forth a circular acknowledging their part in the explosion, and calling on the people to aid them against the Czar. . . . A formal sentence of death was forwarded to him at Livadia by the Revolutionary Committee in the autumn of 1879; and December 1 was evidently selected for the Moscow attempt, being the anniversary of the death of Alexander I.; therefore a fatal day for monarchs in the eyes of the Nihilists. The Empress continued very ill, and her desire to return to Russia increased. At last it was decided to gratify her, as her case was pronounced hopeless. . . . The Emperor joined her in the train three stations before she arrived at St. Petersburg, and drove alone with her in the closed carriage, in which she was removed from the station to the Winter Palace. Only a fortnight later [February 17, 1880], a diabolical attempt was made to destroy the whole Imperial family. The hours when they assembled in the dining room were well known. . . . The Empress was confined to her room, only kept alive by an artificial atmosphere being preserved in her apartment, which was next to the dining-room. Her only surviving brother, Prince Alexander of Hesse-Darmstadt, had arrived the same evening on a visit, and his letter to his wife on the occasion describes the result of the plot: . . . 'We were proceeding through a large corridor to His Majesty's rooms, when suddenly a fearful thundering was heard. The flooring was raised as if by an earthquake, the gas lamps were extinguished, and we were left in total darkness. At the same time a horrible dust and the smell of gunpowder or dynamite filled the corridor. Some one shouted to us that the chandelier had fallen down in the saloon where the table was laid for the dinner of the Imperial family. I hastened thither with the Czarovitch and the Grand-Duke Vladimir, while Count Adlerberg, in doubt as to what might happen next, held back the Emperor. We found all the windows broken, and the walls in ruins. A mine had exploded under the room. The dinner was delayed for half an hour by my arrival, and it was owing to this that the Imperial family had not yet assembled in the dining-hall.' One of the Princes remarked that it was

a gas explosion; but the Emperor, who fully retained his composure, said, 'O no, I know what it is,' and it was subsequently stated that for several weeks past he had found a sealed black-bordered letter on his table every morning, always containing the same threat, that he should not survive the 2nd of March, the twenty-fifth anniversary of his accession. His first care was to see that his daughter was safe, and he then asked her to go to the Empress, and prevent her from being alarmed, while he personally inspected the scene of the catastrophe. General Todleben was of opinion that 144 lbs of dynamite must have been used; and one of the cooks — a foreigner — and another official disappeared; but none of those concerned in the plot was arrested at that time. Subsequent information showed that the explosion was intended for the 2nd of March, but hastened on account of the arrest of some one acquainted with the plot. It was caused by machinery placed in the flue, and set for 6 P. M. It killed and wounded two servants and thirty three brave soldiers of the Finnish Guard, who were assembled in the hall under the dining room and above the flue where the dynamite was laid. The Russian and foreign newspapers teemed with advice to the Emperor to grant a constitution, or abdicate in order to save his life, and it is reported that in a Council of his Ministers and relations he offered to hand over the sceptre at once to his eldest son, if they agreed that it would be best for their own safety, and for Russia; but that he was earnestly requested to continue in power. However this might be, he took an extraordinary and decisive step. He appointed an Armenian, General Melikof, a man of 56 years of age, distinguished in the war with Turkey, and subsequently as Governor of Charkof, to be the temporary dictator of the Empire, with almost absolute powers, and over the six Governors-General who in 1879 were established throughout Russia. The Commission was for six months. . . . The explosion in the Winter Palace caused the greatest panic in St. Petersburg, and people would no longer take tickets for the opera, till they ascertained that the Emperor was not likely to be there. . . . The sad condition of the Empress, who lingered, hardly conscious, between life and death, the incessant Nihilist circulars which day after day were found among his clothes, or on his writing table, with the real attempts made to poison him in letters and other ways, and of assassins to penetrate into the Palace under the guise of sweeps, petitioners, fire-lighters, and guards, the danger to which his nearest relations were exposed, and the precautions which he looked upon as a humiliation that were taken to ensure his safety, added to the cares of Empire, must have rendered his [the Emperor's] existence hardly tolerable. It is not surprising that at last he desired to be left to take his chance. . . . He was again seen driving in the streets in an open droschki, with only his coachman and one Cossack. . . . In May the Court usually repaired to Gatchina for the summer manoeuvres of the troops. . . . The Empress, having somewhat rallied, desired to go as usual to Gatchina. . . . But early in the morning of June 8, she passed quietly away in her sleep. . . . It has been since ascertained that the Nihilists had planned to blow up the bridge over which the

funeral procession must pass, so as to destroy all the mourners, including the foreign princes, the Imperial hearse, and the numerous guards and attendants, but a tremendous storm of rain and wind on the previous night and morning, which raised the Neva to a level with its banks, and threatened to postpone the ceremony, prevented the last measures being taken to secure the success of the plot. . . . On March 2, the Emperor, as usual, attended the Requiem Mass for his father, and the service to celebrate his own accession to the throne. During the last week of his life, he lived in comparative retirement, as it was Lent, and he was preparing for the Holy Communion, which he received with his sons on the morning of Saturday, March 12. At 12 that day, Melikof came to tell him of the capture of one of the Nihilists concerned in the explosion in the Winter Palace. This man refused to answer any questions, except that his capture would not prevent the Emperor's certain assassination, and that his Majesty would never see another Easter. Both Melikof and the Czarovitz begged the Emperor in vain not to attend the parade the next day. . . . After the Parade [Sunday, March 13, 1881] the Emperor drove with his brother Michael to the Michael Palace, the abode of their cousin, the widowed Grand-Duchess Catherine; and, leaving his brother there, he set off about two o'clock by the shortest way to the Winter Palace, along the side of the Catherine Canal. There, in the part where the road runs between the Summer Garden and the Canal, a bombshell was hurled under the Imperial carriage, and exploded in a shower of snow, throwing down two of the horses of the escort, tearing off the back of the carriage, and breaking the glass, upsetting two lamp-posts, and wounding one of the Cossacks, and a baker's boy who was passing with a basket on his head. As soon as he saw the two victims lying on the pavement, the Emperor called to the coachman to stop, but the last only drove on faster, having received private orders from the Emperor's family to waive all ceremony, and to prevent his master from going into dangerous situations, or among crowds. However, the Emperor pulled the cord round the coachman's arm till he stopped; and then, in spite of the man's request to let himself be driven straight home, got out to speak to the sufferers, and to give orders for their prompt removal to the hospital, as the thermometer was below zero. . . . The Emperor gave his directions, and seeing the man who had thrown the bomb in the grasp of two soldiers, though still struggling to point a revolver at his sovereign, he asked his name, on which the aid-de-camp replied: 'He calls himself Griznoff, and says he is a workman.' The Emperor made one or two more remarks, and then turned to go back to his carriage. It was observed he was deadly pale, and walked very slowly; and as splashes of blood were found in the carriage, it was afterwards supposed that he had already received slight wounds. Several men had been placed at different points of the road with explosive bombs, and hearing the first explosion, two of these hurried up to see the effect. One of them flung a bomb at the Emperor's feet when he had gone a few paces towards his carriage, and it exploded, blowing off one leg, and shattering the other to the top of the thigh, besides mortally wounding

the assassin himself, who fell with a shriek to the ground, and injuring twenty foot passengers. The other accomplice, according to his own evidence, put down his bomb, and instinctively ran forward to help the Emperor, who did not utter a sound, though his lips moved as if in prayer. He was supporting himself with his back against a buttress by grasping the rails on the canal. His helmet was blown off, his clothes torn to rags, and his orders scattered about on the snow, while the windows of houses 150 yards distant were broken by the explosion, which raised a column of smoke and snow, and was heard even at the Anitchkof Palace. . . . Besides his shattered limbs, the Emperor had a frightful gash in the abdomen, his left eye-lid was burnt, and his sight gone, his right hand was crushed, and the rings broken. . . . The Emperor expired from loss of blood at five-and-twenty minutes to four. . . . More than twenty persons were killed and injured by the two bombs."—C. Joyneville, *Life of Alexander II.*, ch. 13.

ALSO IN: *Annual Register*, 1879-1881.

A. D. 1881.—Accession of Alexander III.

A. D. 1881-1894.—Character and reign of Alexander III.—Persecution of Jews and un-orthodox Christians.—Hostility to western civilization.—According to an apparently authentic report in the Cracow paper 'Czas,' confirmed by later publications, the Emperor Alexander II. had signed the very morning of the day on which he was murdered a Ukase addressed to the Senate, by which a committee was to be appointed for realising Count Loris Melikow's project of a general representative assembly composed of delegates from the provincial assemblies. On March 20th Alexander III. convoked a grand council of the principal dignitaries, asking their opinion on Loris Melikow's proposal. A lively discussion took place, of which the 'Czas' gives a detailed account. . . . The Emperor, thanking the members, said that the majority had declared for the convening of an assembly elected by the nation for discussing the affairs of the State, adding, 'I share this opinion of the majority, and wish that the reform Ukase shall be published as under the patronage of my father, to whom the initiative of this reform is due.' The Ukase, however, was not published, Podobenszew and Ignatiew having succeeded in discrediting it in the eyes of the Czar, asserting that it would only create excitement and increase the existing fermentation. On May 13th a manifesto appeared, in which the Czar declared his will 'to keep firmly the reins in obedience to the voice of God, and, in the belief in the force and truth of autocratic power, to fortify that power and to guard it against all encroachments.' A few days later Count Ignatiew, the head of the Slavophil party, was appointed Minister of the Interior, and by-and-by the other more liberal Ministers of Alexander II. disappeared. By far the most important personage under the present government is Podobenszew, High Procurator of the Holy Synod, an office equivalent to a Minister of Public Worship for the State Church. Laborious and of unblemished integrity, this man is a fanatic by conviction. Under Alexander II., who was too much of a European to like him, he had but a secondary position, but under his pupil, the present Emperor, he has become all-powerful.

the more so because his orthodoxy wears the national garb, and he insists that the break-down of the Nicolas I. system was only caused through governing with Ministers of German origin. He is seconded by Count Tolstoi, the Minister of Internal Affairs (who replaced the more liberal Saburow), to whom belong the questions concerning the foreign, i. e., non-orthodox, confessions. These two, supported by the Minister of Justice, Manassein, have enacted persecutions against Catholics, Uniates, Protestants, and Jews [see JWS 19TH CENTURY], which seem incredible in our age, but which are well attested. Thousands of persons who have committed no wrong other than that of being faithful to their inherited creed have been driven from their homes, and exiled to Siberia, or to distant regions without any means of livelihood. As regards Catholics, these measures are principally directed against the clergy; but the Uniates, i. e., the Catholics who have the Slav liturgy, are unsparingly deported if they refuse to have their children baptised by an orthodox Pope, and this is done with men, women, and children, peasants and merchants. Twenty thousand Uniates alone have been removed from the western provinces to Szwatow. Those who remain at home have Cossacks quartered upon them, and all sorts of compulsory means are used to stamp out this sect. . . . It is pretty certain that Alexander III is ignorant of the atrocities committed in his name, for he is not a man to sanction deliberate injustice or to tolerate persons of manifest impurity in important offices. Though the Czar insists upon having personally honest Ministers, mere honesty is not sufficient for governing a great empire. Truth does not penetrate to the ear of the autocrat; the Russian Press does not reflect public opinion with its currents, but is simply

the speaking-tube of the reigning coterie, which has suppressed all papers opposed to it, while the foreign Press is only allowed to enter mutilated by the censorship. Some people have, indeed, the privilege to read foreign papers in their original shape, but the Autocrat of All the Russias does not belong to them. . . . The Emperor is peaceful and will not hear of war; he has, in fact, submitted to many humiliations arising from Russia's conduct towards Bulgaria. . . . With all this, however, he is surrounded by Pan-slavists and allows them to carry on an underground warfare against the Balkan States. . . . He is strongly opposed to all Western ideas of civilisation, very irritable, and unflinching in his personal dislikes, as he has shown in the case of Prince Alexander of Battenberg, and, with his narrow views, he is unable to calculate the bearing of his words and actions, which often amount to direct provocation against his neighbours. If, nevertheless, tolerable relations with England, Austria, and Germany have been maintained, this is for the most part the merit of M. de Giers, the Foreign Secretary, an unpretending, cautious, and personally reliable man of business, whose influence with the Czar lies in the cleverness with which he appears not to exercise any."—Prof. Gelfcken, *Russia under Alexander III.* (New Review, Sept., 1891)

ALSO IN: H. von Samson Himmelstierna, *Russia under Alexander III.*

A. D. 1894.—Death of Alexander III.—Accession of Nicholas II.—The Czar Alexander III died on the 1st of November 1894, at Livadia, and the accession of his eldest son, who ascends the throne as Nicholas II., was officially proclaimed at St Petersburg on the following day. The new autocrat was born in 1868. He is wed the Princess Alix of Hesse Darmstadt.

RUSSIA, Great, Little, White, and Black.

—"Little Russia consists of the governments of Podolia, Volhynia, Kiev, Tchernigof, Poltava, and Kharkof. . . . To protect Poland from Tartar raids, the Polish king entrusted to the keeping of the Cossacks the whole south-east frontier of Poland, the former Grand Duchy of Kiev, which acquired the name of Ukraine, 'border land,' and also of Little Russia, in contradistinction to the Grand Duchy of Moscow or Great Russia [see COSSACKS]. . . . The provinces of Moghilef, Minsk, and Vitebsk are popularly known by the name of White Russia. . . . The peaceful, industrious, good tempered White Russians are descendants of the old Slav race of the Krevitchi. . . . The name of 'the land of the Krevitchi,' by which White Russia was called in the 11th century, died out on the rise of the Principalities of Polotsk, Mstislavsk, and Minsk, which belonged first to Kiev, next to Lithuania, and later still to Poland."—H. M. Chester, *Russia, Past and Present*, pp. 225, 228, 270-271.—"The epithet of 'White,' applied also to the Muscovite Russians in the sense of 'free,' at the time when they were rescued from the Tatar yoke, has been the special designation of the Russians of the Upper Dnieper only since the end of the 14th century. At first applied by the Poles to all the Lithuanian possessions torn from the Muscovites, it was afterwards used in a more restricted sense. Catherine II. gave the name of White Russia to the present provinces of Vitebsk and Moghilev, and Nicholas abolished the ex-

pression altogether, since when it has lost all its political significance, while preserving its ethnical value. . . . The term 'White' is generally supposed to refer to the colour of their dress in contradistinction to the 'Black Russians,' between the Pripiet and Niemen, who form the ethnical transition from the Little to the White Russians. . . . The terms Little Russia (Malo-Russia, Lesser Russia), Ukraina, Ruthenia, have never had any definite limits, constantly shifting with the vicissitudes of history, and even with the administrative divisions. . . . The name itself of Little Russia appears for the first time in the Byzantine chronicles of the 13th century in association with Galicia and Volhynia, after which it was extended to the Middle Dnieper, or Kiyovia. In the same way Ukraina—that is 'Frontier'—was first applied to Podolia to distinguish it from Galicia, and afterwards to the southern provinces of the Lithuanian state, between the Bug and Dnieper."—E. Reclus, *The Earth and its Inhabitants: Europe*, v. 5 pp. 282-290.

RUSSIAN AMERICA. See ALASKA.

RUSTCHUK, Battle of (1594). See BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES: 14-18TH CENTURIES (ROUMANIA, ETC.).

RUTENI, The.—The Ruteni were a Gallic tribe, who bordered on the Roman Gallia Provincia, . . . occupying the district of France called Rouergue before the Revolution.—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 4, ch. 17.

RUTGERS COLLEGE. See EDUCATION, MODERN AMERICA: A. D. 1770.

RÜTLI, OR GRÜTLI, The Meadow of. See SWITZERLAND: THE THREE FOREST CANTONS.

RUTULIANS, The. See LATIUM.

RUTUPIÆ.—The principal Kentish seaport of Roman Britain; now Richborough. It was celebrated for its oysters.—T. Wright, *Celt, Roman and Saxon*, ch. 5.

Also in: C. Roach Smith, *Antiq. of Richborough*.—See ENGLAND: A. D. 449–473.

RUWARD OF BRABANT.—"This office was one of great historical dignity, but somewhat anomalous in its functions. . . . A Ruward was

not exactly dictator, although his authority was universal. He was not exactly protector, nor governor, nor stadholder. His functions . . . were commonly conferred on the natural heir to the sovereignty—therefore more lofty than those of ordinary stadholders."—J. L. Motley, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic*, pt. 5, ch. 4.

RYE-HOUSE PLOT, The. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1681–1683.

RYOTS OF BENGAL, The. See INDIA: A. D. 1785–1793.

RYSWICK, The Peace of. See FRANCE: A. D. 1695–1696; and 1697.

S.

SAARBRÜCK, OR SAARBRÜCKEN: United to France (1680). See FRANCE: A. D. 1679–1681.

SAARBRÜCK, OR SAARBRÜCKEN, Battle of. See FRANCE: A. D. 1870 (JULY–AUGUST).

SABÆANS, The. See ARABIA: ANCIENT SUCCESSION AND FUSION OF RACES.

SABANA DE LA CRUZ, Battle of (1859). See VENEZUELA: A. D. 1829–1886.

SABBATHAISTS.—A Jewish sect, believers in the Messianic pretensions of one Sabbathai Sevi, of Smyrna, who made an extraordinary commotion in the Jewish world about the middle of the 17th century, and who finally embraced Mahometanism.—H. H. Milman, *Hist. of the Jews*, bk. 28.

SABELLIANS, The. See SABINES; also, ITALY: ANCIENT.

SABELLIANS, The sect of the. See NOËTIANS.

SABINE CROSS ROADS, OR MANSFIELD, Battle of. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (MARCH–MAY: LOUISIANA).

SABINE WARS, The.—The Roman historians—Dionysius, Plutarch, Livy, and others—gave credit to traditions of a long and dangerous war, or series of wars, with the Sabines, following the expulsion of the Tarquins from Rome and the founding of the Republic. But modern skeptical criticism has left little ground for any part of the story of these wars. It seems to have been derived from the chronicles of an ancient family, the Valerian family, and, as a recent writer has said, it is suspicious that "a Valerius never holds a magistracy but there is a Sabine war." Inne conjectures that some annalist of the Valerian family used the term Sabine in relating the wars of the Romans with the Latins, and with the Tarquins, struggling to regain their lost throne, and that this gave a start to the whole fictitious narrative of Sabine wars.—W. Inne, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 1, ch. 12.

SABINE WOMEN, The Rape of the. See ROME: B. C. 753–510.

SABINES, OR SABELLIANS, The.—"The greatest of the Italian nations was the Sabellian. Under this name we include the Sabines, who are said by tradition to have been the progenitors of the whole race, the Samnites, the Picenians, Vestinians, Marsians, Marrucinians, Pelignians, and Frentanians. This race seems to have been naturally given to a pastoral life, and therefore fixed their early settlements in the upland valleys of the Apennines. Pushing gradually along this central range, they pene-

trated downwards towards the Gulf of Tarentum; and as their population became too dense to find support in their native hills, bands of warrior youths issued forth to settle in the richer plains below. Thus they mingled with the Opican and Pelasgian races of the south, and formed new tribes known by the names of Apulians, Lucanians, and Campanians. These more recent tribes, in turn, threatened the Greek colonies on the coast. . . . It is certain that the nation we call Roman was more than half Sabellian. Traditional history . . . attributes the conquest of Rome to a Sabine tribe. Some of her kings were Sabine; the name borne by her citizens was Sabine; her religion was Sabine; most of her institutions in war and peace were Sabine; and therefore it may be concluded that the language of the Roman people differed from that of Latium Proper by its Sabine elements, though this difference died out again as the Latin communities were gradually absorbed into the territory of Rome."—H. G. Liddell, *Hist. of Rome*, introd., sect. 2.—See, also, ITALY, ANCIENT; and LATIUM.

SABINIAN, Pope, A. D. 604–606.

SABRINA.—The ancient name of the Severn river.

SAC AND SOC.—A term used in early English and Norman times to signify grants of jurisdiction to individual land-owners. The manorial court-leets were the products of these grants.—W. Stubbs, *Const. Hist. of Eng.*, ch. 7, sect. 73.—See, also, MANORS.

SAC, OR SAUK, INDIANS, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ALGONQUIAN FAMILY, and SACS, FOXES, ETC.

SACÆ, The.—"The Sacæ were neighbours of the Hyrcanians, the Parthians, and the Bactrians in the steppes of the Oxus. Herodotus tells us that the Sacæ were a nation of the tribe of the Scythians, and that their proper name was Amyrgians; the Persians called all the Scythians Sacæ."—M. Duncker, *Hist. of Antiquity*, bk. 8, ch. 2 (p. 5).—See, also, SCYTHIANS.

SACERDOTES.—These were the public priests of the ancient Romans, who performed the 'sacra publica' or religious rites for the people, at public expense.—E. Guhl and W. Koner, *Life of the Greeks and Romans*, sect. 108.

SACHEM.—**SAGAMORE.**—"Each totem of the Lenape [or Delaware Indians of North America] recognized a chieftain, called sachem, 'sakima,' a word found in most Algonquin dialects, with slight variations (Chip, 'ogima,' Cree, 'okimaw,' Pequot, 'sachimma'), and derived from a root 'ôki,' signifying above in

SACHEM.

space, and, by a transfer frequent in all languages, above in power. . . . It appears from Mr. Morgan's inquiries, that at present and of later years, 'the office of sachem is hereditary in the gens, but elective among its members.' Loskiel, however, writing on the excellent authority of Zeisberger, states explicitly that the chief of each totem was selected and inaugurated by those of the remaining two. By common and ancient consent, the chief selected from the Turtle totem was head chief of the whole Lenape nation. The chieftains were the 'peace chiefs.' They could neither go to war themselves, nor send nor receive the war belt—the ominous string of dark wampum, which indicated that the tempest of strife was to be let loose. . . . War was declared by the people at the instigation of the 'war captains,' valorous braves of any birth or family who had distinguished themselves by personal prowess"—D. G. Brinton, *The Lenape and their Legends*, ch. 3.—"At the institution of the League [of the Iroquois] fifty permanent sachemships were created, with appropriate names, and in the sachems who held these titles were vested the supreme powers of the confederacy. . . . The sachems themselves were equal in rank and authority, and instead of holding separate territorial jurisdictions, their powers were joint, and coextensive with the League. As a safeguard against contention and fraud, each sachem was 'raised up' and invested with his title by a council of all the sachems, with suitable forms and ceremonies. . . . The sachemships were distributed unequally between the five nations, but without thereby giving to either a preponderance of political power. Nine of them were assigned to the Mohawk nation, nine to the Oneida, fourteen to the Onondaga, ten to the Cayuga and eight to the Seneca. The sachems united formed the Council of the League, the ruling body, in which resided the executive, legislative and judicial authority."—L. H. Morgan, *The League of the Iroquois*, bk. 1, ch. 3—"The New-England Indians had functionaries; . . . the higher class known as sachems, the subordinate, or those of inferior note or smaller jurisdiction, as sagamores. . . . This is the distinction commonly made (Hutchinson, Mass., I. 410). But Williamson (Maine, I. 494) reverses it; Dudley (Letter to the Countess of Lincoln) says, 'Sagamore, so are the kings with us called, as they are sachems southward' (that is, in Plymouth); and Gookin (Mass. Hist. Coll., I. 154) speaks of the two titles of office as equivalent."—J. G. Palfrey, *Hist. of New Eng.*, v. 1, ch. 1, and foot-note.

SACHEVERELL, Henry: Impeachment of. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1710-1712.

SACHSENSPIEGEL. See GERMANY: A. D. 1225-1272.

SACKETT'S HARBOR. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1812 (SEPT.—NOV.).

SACKINGEN: Capture by Duke Bernhard (1637). See GERMANY: A. D. 1634-1639.

SACRAMENTARIANS. See SWITZERLAND: A. D. 1528-1531.

SACRED BAND OF CARTHAGE. See CARTHAGE, THE DOMINION OF.

SACRED BAND OF THEBES. See THEBES, GREECE: B. C. 378.

SACRED MONTH OF THE CHARTISTS, The. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1838-1843.

SADDUCEES.

SACRED MOUNT AT ROME, The. See ROME: B. C. 494-492.

SACRED PROMONTORY, The.—The southwestern extremity of Spain—Cape St. Vincent—was anciently called the Sacred Promontory, and supposed by early geographers to be the extreme western point of the known world.—E. H. Bunbury, *Hist. of Ancient Geog.*, ch. 26, pt. 1 (v. 2).

SACRED ROADS IN GREECE.—"After the chariot races came into vogue [at the sacred festivals and games] these equally necessitated good carriage roads, which it was not easy to make in a rocky locality like Delphi. Thus arose the sacred roads, along which the gods themselves were said to have first passed, as Apollo once came through pathless tracks to Delphi. . . . Hence the art of road-making and of building bridges, which deprived the wild mountain streams of their dangers, took its first origin from the national sanctuaries, especially from those of Apollo. While the foot paths led across the mountain ridges, the carriage roads followed the ravines which the water had formed. The rocky surface was leveled, and ruts hollowed out which, carefully smoothed, served as tracks in which the wheels rolled on without obstruction. This style of roads made it necessary, in order to a more extended intercourse, to establish an equal gauge, since otherwise the festive as well as the racing chariots would have been prevented from visiting the various sanctuaries. And since as a matter of fact, as far as the influence of Delphi extended in the Peloponnesus and in central Greece, the same gauge of 5 ft 4 in demonstrably prevailed, not merely the extension, but also the equalization, of the net-work of Greek roads took its origin from Delphi"—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 2, ch. 4.

SACRED TRUCE, The. See OLYMPIC GAMES.

SACRED WAR, The First. See ATHENS: B. C. 610-586, and DELPHI.

The Second.—The Phocians, B. C. 449, counting on the support of Athens, whose allies they were, undertook to acquire possession of the sacred and wealthy city of Delphi. The Spartans sent an army to the defense of the sanctuary and expelled them; whereupon the Athenians sent another and restored them.—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 45.

The Ten Years. See GREECE: B. C. 857-836.

SACRED WAY AT ATHENS.—The road which led from the great gate of Athens called Dipylum straight to Eleusis, along which the festive processions moved, was called the Sacred Way.—W. M. Leake, *Topography of Athens*, sect. 2.

SACRED WAY AT ROME, The. See VIA SACRA.

SACRIPORTUS, Battle of (B. C. 83). See ROME: B. C. 88-78.

SADDUCEES, The.—"There is a tradition that the name of Sadducees was derived from Zadok, a disciple of Antigonus of Socko. But the statement is not earlier than the seventh century after the Christian Era, and the person seems too obscure to have originated so widespread a title. It has been also intentionally con-

jectured that the name, as belonging to the whole priestly class, is derived from the famous high priest of the time of Solomon. But of this there is no trace in history or tradition. It is more probable that, as the Pharisees derived their name from the virtue of Isolation (pharishah) from the Gentile world on which they most prided themselves, so the Sadducees derived theirs from their own special virtue of Righteousness (zadikah), that is, the fulfillment of the Law, with which, as its guardians and representatives of the law, they were specially concerned. The Sadducees—whatever be the derivation of the word—were less of a sect than a class.”—Dean Stanley, *Lect's on the Hist. of the Jewish Church*, lect. 49.—“At the time when we first meet with them [the Sadducees] in history, that is to say, under Jonathan the Asmonean [B. C. 159-144—see Jews: B. C. 166-40], they were, though in a modified form, the heirs and successors of the Hellenists [see Jews: B. C. 332-167]. . . . Hellenism was conquered under the Asmoneans, and beaten out of the field, and a new gush of Jewish patriotism and zeal for the law had taken its place. The Sadducees, who from the first appear as a school suited for the times, including the rich and educated statesmen, adopted the prevailing tone among the people. They took part in the services and sacrifices of the temple, practised circumcision, observed the Sabbath, and so professed to be real Jews and followers of the law, but the law rightly understood, and restored to its simple text and literal sense. They repudiated, they said, the authority of the new teachers of the law (now the Pharisees), and of the body of tradition with which they had encircled the law. In this tradition they of course included all that was burdensome to themselves. . . . The peculiar doctrines of the Sadducees obviously arose from the workings of the Epicurean philosophy, which had found special acceptance in Syria. They admitted indeed the creation, as it seems, but denied all continuous operation of God in the world. . . . The Sadducees proved they were real followers of Epicurus, by denying the life of the soul after death. The soul, they said, ‘passes away with the body.’ . . . The mass of the people stood aloof from the Sadducees, whom they regarded with mistrust and aversion.”—J. J. I. Dollinger, *The Gentile and the Jew in the Courts of the Temple of Christ*, v. 2, pp. 302-303.

ALSO IN: E. Schürer, *Hist. of the Jewish People in the Time of Christ*, sect. 26 (div. 2. v. 2).

SADOWA, OR KÖNIGGRÄTZ, Battle of. See GERMANY: A. D. 1866.

SAFFARY DYNASTY, The. See SAMANIDS.

SAGAMORE. See SACHEM.

SAGAMOSO, Battle of (1819). See COLOMBIAN STATES: A. D. 1810-1819.

SAGARTIANS, The.—A nomadic people, described by Herodotus, who wandered on the western borders of the great Iranian desert—the desert region of modern Persia.

SAGAS. See NORMANS.—NORTHMEN: A. D. 880-1100.

SAGGENASH, The. See YANKEE.

SAGUENAY. See CANADA: NAMES.

SAGUNTUM, Capture of, by Hannibal. See PUNIC WAR, THE SECOND.

SAHAPTINS, The. See AMERICAN INDIANS: NEZ PERCÉS.

SAHAY, Battle of. See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1742 (JUNE—DECEMBER).

SAILOR'S CREEK, Battle of. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1865 (APRIL: VIRGINIA).

SAIM. See TIMAR.

SAINT ALBANS (England). Origin of. See VERULAMIUM.

A. D. 1455-1461.—Battles of York and Lancaster.—The town of St. Albans, in England, was the scene of two battles in the lamentable Wars of the Roses. The first collision of the long conflict between Lancaster and York occurred in its streets on the 23d of May, 1455, when King Henry VI. was taken prisoner by the Duke of York and 5,000 to 8,000 of his supporters were slain. Six years later, on the 17th of February, 1461, the contending forces met again in the streets of St. Albans with a different result. The Yorkists were put to flight by the Lancastrians under Queen Margaret. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1455-1471.

SAINT ALBANS CONFEDERATE RAID. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (OCTOBER) THE ST. ALBANS RAID.

SAINT ALBANS FENIAN RAID. See CANADA: A. D. 1866-1871.

SAINT ANDREW, The Russian order of.—An order of knighthood instituted in 1698 by Peter the Great.

The Scottish order of.—“To keep pace with other sovereigns, who affected forming orders of knighthood, in which they themselves should preside, like Arthur at his round table, or Charlemagne among his paladins, James [IV. of Scotland, A. D. 1488-1513] established the order of Saint Andrew, assuming the badge of the thistle, which since that time has been the national emblem of Scotland.”—Sir W. Scott, *Hist. of Scotland*, ch. 21.

SAINT ANDREWS, Siege of the Castle of. See SCOTLAND: A. D. 1546.

SAINT ANGELO, Castle. See CASTLE ST. ANGELO.

SAINT AUGUSTINE, Canons of. See AUSTIN CANONS.

SAINT AUGUSTINE, Florida: A. D. 1565.—Founded by the Spaniards. See FLORIDA: A. D. 1565.

A. D. 1701.—Attack from South Carolina. See SOUTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1701-1706.

A. D. 1740.—Unsuccessful attack by the English of Georgia and Carolina. See GEORGIA: A. D. 1738-1743.

A. D. 1862.—Temporary occupation by Union forces. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (FEBRUARY—APRIL: GEORGIA—FLORIDA).

SAINT BARTHOLOMEW'S DAY, The Massacre of. See FRANCE: A. D. 1572 (AUGUST).

SAINT BRICE'S DAY, The Massacre of. See ENGLAND: A. D. 979-1016.

SAINT CHRISTOPHER, The Island. Ceded to England (1713). See UTRECHT: A. D. 1712-1714.

SAINT CLAIR.

SAINT CLAIR, General Arthur. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY A D 1790-1795
SAINT CLOUD DECREE, The. See FRANCE: A D 1806-1810
SAINT CROIX. See WEST INDIES.
SAINT DENIS (France), Battle of (1567). See FRANCE A D 1563-1570
SAINT DENIS (Belgium), Battle of (1678). See NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND) A D 1674-1678
SAINT DIDIER, Battle of. See FRANCE A D 1814 (JANUARY-MARCH)
SAINT DOMINGO, OR HAYTI, The Island. See HAYTI
SAINT DOMINGO, The Republic. See HAYTI A D 1804-1880
SAINT GEORGE, Bank of. See MONEY AND BANKING GENOA, also GENOA A D 1407-1448
SAINT GEORGE, The order of.—Founded by Catherine II of Russia in 1769
SAINT GERMAIN-EN-LAYE, Peace of (1570). See FRANCE A D 1563-1570

SAINT GERMAINS, The French court. See FRANCE A D 1647-1648

The Jacobite court.—When James II, driven from England by the Revolution of 1688, took refuge in France, he was received with great hospitality by Louis XIV, who assigned to the exiled king the palace of Saint-Germain for his residence, with a pension or allowance which enabled him to maintain a regal court of imposing splendor. "There was scarcely in all Europe a residence more enviably situated than that which the generous Lewis had assigned to his suppliants. The woods were magnificent, the air clear and salubrious, the prospects extensive and cheerful. No charm of rural life was wanting, and the towers of the greatest city of the Continent were visible in the distance. The royal apartments were richly adorned with tapestry and marquetry, vases of silver, and mirrors in gilded frames. A pension of more than 40,000 pounds sterling was annually paid to James from the French treasury. He had a guard of honour composed of some of the finest soldiers in Europe. . . . But over the mansion and the domain brooded a constant gloom, the effect, partly of bitter regrets and of deferred hopes, but chiefly of the abject superstition which had taken complete possession of his own mind, and which was affected by all those who aspired to his favour. His palace wore the aspect of a monastery. . . . Thirty or forty ecclesiastics were lodged in the building; and their apartments were eyed with envy by noblemen and gentlemen who had followed the fortunes of their Sovereign, and who thought it hard that, when there was so much room under his roof, they should be forced to sleep in the garrets of the neighbouring town. . . . All the saints of the royal household were praying for each other and backbiting each other from morning to night"—Lord Macaulay, *Hist. of Eng.*, ch. 20 (p. 4)

SAINT GOTTHARD, Battle of (1664). See HUNGARY. A D. 1660-1664

SAINT GREGORY, Order of.—Instituted in 1831 by Pope Gregory XVI

SAINT HELENA, Napoleon's captivity at. See FRANCE: A. D. 1815 (JUNE—AUGUST).

SAINT ILDEFONSO, Treaty of. See ARGENTINE REPUBLIC: A D. 1580-1777; and LOUISIANA: A. D. 1798-1808.

SAINT LAZARUS.

SAINT ILDEFONSO, University of. See EDUCATION, MEDIEVAL SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

SAINT JAGO, Knights of the order of. See CALATRAVA

SAINT JAMES, The Palace and Court of. —"Of the British Monarchy the official and diplomatic seat is St. James', a dingy and shabby pile of brick, which by its meanness, compared with the Tuilleries and Versailles, aptly symbolizes the relation of the power which built it to that of the Monarchy of Louis XIV. . . . At St. James' are still held the Levees. But those rooms having been found too small for the prodigiously increasing crowds of ladies, foreign and colonial, who pant, by passing under the eye of Royalty, to obtain the baptism of fashion, the Drawing-Rooms are now held in Buckingham Palace. The modern town residence of Royalty, Buckingham Palace, is large without being magnificent, and devoid of interest of any kind, historical or architectural"—Goldwin Smith, *A Trip to England*, p. 54

SAINT JAMES OF COMPOSTELLA, Knights of. See CALATRAVA

SAINT JEAN D'ACRE. See ACRE

SAINT JOHN, Knights of; or Hospitalers. See HOSPITALIERS

SAINT JOHN OF THE LATERAN, Order of.—An order of knighthood instituted in 1580 by Pope Pius IV

SAINT JUST, and the French Revolutionary Committee of Public Safety. See FRANCE A. D. 1793 (JUNE—OCTOBER), to 1794 (JULY)

SAINT LAWRENCE: Discovery and naming of the River by Jacques Cartier. See AMERICA: A D 1534-1535

SAINT LAZARUS, Knights of.—"Some historians of the order of St. Lazarus have traced its origin to a supposed association of Christians in the first century against the persecution of their Jewish and Pagan enemies. This account is fabulous. It appears certain, however, that in very early times Christian charity founded establishments for the sick. Lazarus became their tutelary saint and the buildings were styled Lazarettos. One of those hospitals was in existence at Jerusalem at the time of the first crusade. It was a religious order, as well as a charitable institution, and followed the rule of St. Augustin. For purposes of defence against the Muselman tyrants, the members of the society became soldiers, and insensibly they formed themselves into distinct bodies of those who attended the sick, and those who mingled with the world. The cure of lepers was their first object, and they not only received lepers into their order, for the benefit of charity, but their grand master was always to be a man who was afflicted with the disorder, the removal whereof formed the purpose of their institution. The cavaliers who were not lepers, and were in a condition to bear arms, were the allies of the Christian kings of Palestine. . . . The habits of those knights is not known; it only appears that the crosses on their breasts were always green, in opposition to those of the knights of St. John, which were white, and the red crosses of the Templars. . . . But neither the names nor the exploits of the knights of St. Lazarus often appear in the history of the Crusades."—C. Mills, *Hist. of the Crusades*, ch. 8, with foot-notes.

SAINT LEGER'S EXPEDITION

SAINT LEGER'S EXPEDITION. See UNITED STATES OF AM A D 1777 (JULY—OCTOBER)

SAINT LOUIS, Missouri: A. D. 1764.—The founding of the city.—"St Louis had arisen out of the transfer of the east bank of the Mississippi to Great Britain [see SEVEN YEARS WAR. THE TREATIES] Rather than live as aliens, under English laws, many French settlers went with Pierre Laclède, across the Mississippi, to a place already nicknamed by them Pain Court, where, in February, 1764, they founded a new town with the name of St Louis, in honor of Louis XV. These people were mostly French Canadians"—S A Drake, *The Making of the Great West*, p 179—See, also, ILLINOIS A D 1765

A. D. 1861.—Events at the outbreak of the rebellion.—The capture of Camp Jackson. See MISSOURI A D 1861 (FEBRUARY—JULY)

A. D. 1864.—General Price's attempt against. See UNITED STATES OF AM A D 1864 (MARCH—OCTOBER ARKANSAS—MISSOURI)

SAINT LOUIS, The Order of.—An order of knighthood instituted in 1693 by Louis XIV of France See FRANCE A D 1693 (JULY)

SAINT MAHÉ, Battle of.—A fierce naval fight, April 24, 1293, off St Mahé, on the coast of Brittany, between English and French fleets, both of which were put aloft without open authority from their respective governments. The French were beaten with a loss of 8,000 men and 180 ships—C H Pearson, *Hist of Eng during the Early and Middle Ages*, v 2, ch 13

SAINT MALO: Abortive English expeditions against. See ENGLAND A D 1758 (JUNE—AUGUST)

SAINT MARK, The winged lion of. See LION OF ST MARK, and VENICE A D 829

SAINT MARKS, Jackson's capture of. See FLORIDA A D 1816-1818

SAINT MICHAEL, Knights of the Order of, in France.—"Louis XI [of France] determined on instituting an order of chivalry himself. It was to be select in its membership, limited in its number, generous in its professions, and he fondly hoped the Garter and Fleece would soon sink into insignificance compared to the Order of Saint Michael. The first brethren were named from the highest families in France, the remaining great feudatories, who had preserved some relics of their hereditary independence, were fixed upon to wear this mark of the suzerain's friendship. But when they came to read the oaths of admission, they found that the Order of St Michael was in reality a bond of stronger obligation than the feudal laws had ever enjoined. It was a solemn association for the prevention of disobedience to the sovereign. . . . The brotherhood of noble knights sank, in the degrading treatment of its founder, into a confederation of spies."—J. White, *Hist of France*, ch. 7.

In Portugal. See PORTUGAL A D. 1095-1825.

SAINT MICHAEL AND SAINT GEORGE, The Order of.—A British Order of Knighthood, founded in 1818, "for the purpose

SAINT PETER'S CHURCH AT ROME.

of bestowing marks of Royal favour on the most meritorious of the Ionians [then under the protection of Great Britain] and Maltese, as well as on British subjects who may have served with distinction in the Ionian Isles or the Mediterranean Sea"—Sir B Burke, *Book of the Orders of Knighthood*, p 107

SAINT OMER: A. D. 1638.—Unsuccessful siege by the French. See NETHERLANDS A D 1635-1638

A. D. 1677.—Taken by Louis XIV. See NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND) A D 1674-1678.

A. D. 1679.—Ceded to France. See NIMQUEN, THE PEACE OF

SAINT PATRICK, The order of.—An order of knighthood instituted in 1783 by George III of England

SAINT PAUL, Republic of. See BRAZIL A D 1531-1641

SAINT PAUL'S SCHOOL. See EDUCATION, RENAISSANCE ENGLAND

SAINT PETER'S CHURCH AT ROME.

—"The first church which existed on or near the site of the present building was the oratory founded in A D 90, by Anacletus, bishop of Rome, who is said to have been ordained by St. Peter himself, and who thus marked the spot where many Christian martyrs had suffered in the circus of Nero, and where St Peter was buried after his crucifixion. In 306 Constantine the Great yielded to the request of Pope Sylvester, and began the erection of a basilica on this spot, labouring with his own hands at the work.

Of the old basilica, the crypt is now the only remnant. Its destruction was first planned by Nicholas V (1450), but was not carried out till the time of Julius II, who in 1506 began the new St Peter's from designs of Bramante. The next Pope, Leo X, obtained a design for a church in the form of a Latin cross from Raphael, which was changed, after his death (on account of expense) to a Greek cross, by Baldassare Peruzzi, who only lived to complete the tribune. Paul III (1534) employed Antonio di Sangallo as an architect, who returned to the design of a Latin cross, but died before he could carry out any of his intentions. Giulio Romano succeeded him and died also. Then the pope, 'being inspired by God,' says Vasari, sent for Michael Angelo, then in his seventy-second year, who continued the work under Julius III., returning to the plan of a Greek cross, enlarging the tribune and transepts, and beginning the dome on a new plan, which he said would 'raise the Pantheon in the air.' . . . The present dome is due to Giacomo della Porta, who brought the great work to a conclusion in 1590, under Sixtus V.

The church was dedicated by Urban VIII, November 18th, 1626, the colonnade added by Alexander VII., 1667, the sacristy by Pius VI., in 1780. The building of the present St Peter's extended altogether over 176 years, and its expenses were so great, that Julius II. and Leo X were obliged to meet them by the sale of indulgences, which led to the Reformation. The expense of the main building alone has been estimated at £10,000,000. The annual expense of repairs is £8,800"—A. J. C. Hare, *Walks in Rome*, ch 15.

ALSO IN: H. Grimm, *Life of Michael Angelo*, ch. 15-16.

SAINT PETERSBURG: The founding of the city. See RUSSIA A D 1703-1718

SAINT PHILIP, FORT, Seizure of. See UNITED STATES A D 1400-1861 (Dec - FEB)

SAINT PRIVAT, Battle of. See FRANCE A D 1870 (JULY - AUGUST)

SAINT QUENTIN Origin See BELGÆ

SAINT QUENTIN, Battle and siege of (1557). See FRANCE A D 1547-1559

Battle of (1871) See FRANCE A D 1870-1871

SAINT SEBASTIAN, Siege and capture of (1813) See SPAIN A D 1812-1814

SAINT SIMON, and Saint Simonism. See SOCIAL MOVEMENTS A D 1817-1825

SAINT STEPHEN, The order of.—The Hungarian national order of knighthood, founded by MATIA IHERESI 1764

SAINT STEPHEN, The Crown of.—The crown of Hungary See HUNGARY A D 972-1114

SAINT STEPHEN'S CHAPEL. See WESTMINSTER PALACE

SAINT THOMAS See WEST INDIES

SAINT THOMAS OF ACRE, The Knights of.—This was a little body of men who had formed themselves into a semi religious order on the model of the Hospitallers. In the third Crusade one William, an English priest, chaplain to Ralph de Diceto, Dean of St Paul's, had devoted himself to the work of burying the dead at Acre, as the Hospitallers had given themselves at first to the work of tending the sick. He had built himself a little chapel there and bought ground for a cemetery like a thorough Londoner of the period he had called it after St Thomas the Martyr, and somehow or other, as his design was better known the family of the martyr seem to have approved of it, the brother in law and sister of Becket became founders and benefactors, and a Hospital of St Thomas the Martyr of Canterbury of Acre, was built in London itself on the site of the house where the martyr was born. They [the knights] had their proper dress and cross according to Favin their habit was white and the cross a full red cross charged with a white scallop, but the existing cartulary of the order describes the habit simply as a mantle with a cross of red and white. The Chronicle of the Teutonic knights, in relating the capture of Acre, places the knights of St Thomas at the head of the 5,000 soldiers whom the king of England had sent to Palestine, and Heriman Corner, who however wrote a century later, mentions them amongst the defenders of Acre. We know from their cartulary that they had lands in Yorkshire, Middlesex, Surrey, and Ireland.—W Stubbs, *Seventeen Lectures on the Study of Medieval and Modern History*, lect 8

SAINT VALERY.—The port, at the mouth of the Somme, from which the fleet of William the Conqueror sailed for England, September 27, A D 1066

SAINT VINCENT, Naval battle of. See ENGLAND A D 1797

SAINTONGE, Origin of the name of. See PICTONES

SAIONES.—"The Saiones were apparently a class of men peculiar to the Ostrogothic monarchy [of Theodoric, in Italy]. More honoured than the Roman licitor (who was but a menial servant of the magistrate), but hardly perhaps rising to the dignity of a sheriff or a marshal,

they were, so to speak, the arms by which Royalty executed its will. If the Goths had to be summoned to battle with the Franks, a Saio carried round the stirring call to arms. If a Pretorian Prefect was abusing his power to take away his neighbour's lands by violence, a Saio was sent to remind him that under Theodoric not even Pretorian Prefects should be allowed to transgress the law. The Saiones seem to have stood in a special relation to the King. They are generally called 'our Saiones,' sometimes 'our brave Saiones,' and the official virtue which is always credited to them (like the 'Sublimity' or the 'Magnificence' of more important personages) is 'Your Devotion.' One duty which was frequently entrusted to the Saio was the 'tutatio' of some wealthy and unwarlike Roman. It often happened that such a person, unable to protect himself against the rude assaults of sturdy Gothic neighbours, appealed to the King for protection. The chief visible sign of the King's protection, and the most effective guarantee of its efficiency was the stout Gothic soldier who as Saio was quartered in the wealthy Roman's house.—T Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders* bk 4, ch 7 (v 3)

SAJO, Battle of the (1241) See HUNGARY A D 1114-1301

SAKKARAH, Necropolis of.—The most ancient and important cemetery of Memphis, Egypt.—A Mariette *Monuments of Upper Egypt* p 86

SAKKARAH, Tablet of.—An important list of Egyptian kings found by M Mariette and now preserved in the Museum of Cairo.—F Lenormant, *Manual of Ancient Hist. of the East*, bk 3 ch 1 (v 1)

SALADIN: The Empire of.—Among the revolutions which attended the breaking up of the empire of the Seljuk Turks was one that brought about the rise to power in Syria and Mesopotamia of a vigorous and capable soldier named Zenghi or Zengui. Zenghi and his son Nouriddin acquired a wide dominion, with its capital, as it enlarged, shifting from Mossoul to Aleppo, from Aleppo to Damascus, and they were the first formidable enemies with whom the Christians of the Crusade settlements in Syria had to contend. The dynasty of sultans which they founded was one of those called Atabeks, or Atabegs, signifying "governors of the prince." Having found an opportunity (A D 1162-1168) to interfere in the affairs of Egypt, where the Fatimite caliphs were still nominally reigning, Nouriddin sent thither one of his most trusted officers, Shiracouh, or Shirkoah, a Koord, and Shiracouh's nephew, Saladin,—then a young man, much addicted to elegant society and the life of pleasure, at Damascus. Shiracouh established his master's authority in Egypt—still leaving the puppet caliph of the Fatimites on his throne—and he was succeeded by Saladin, as the representative of the sultan Nourreddin, and grand vizier of the caliph. But in 1171, the latter, being on his death-bed, was quietly deposed and the sovereignty of the Abbaside caliph of Bagdad was proclaimed. "This great 'coup d'état,' which won Egypt over to the Orthodox Mohammedan sect, and ultimately enabled Saladin to grasp the independent sovereignty of the country, was effected, as an Arab historian quaintly observes, 'so quietly, that not a brace of goats butted over it.'" Saladin had now

developed great talents as a ruler, and great ambitions, as well. On the death of Nouraddin, in 1174, he was prepared to seize the sultan's throne, and succeeded, after a short period of civil war, in making himself master of the whole Atabeg dominion. From that he went on to the conquest of Jerusalem, and the expulsion of the Christians from all Palestine, except Tyre and a small strip of coast. By his defense of that conquest against the crusaders of the Third Crusade, and by the decided superiority of character which he evinced, compared with his Christian antagonists, Richard Cœur de Lion and the rest, Saladin acquired surpassing renown in the western world and became a great figure in history. He died at Damascus, in March, 1193, in his fifty-seventh year. The dynasty which he founded was called the Ayoubite (or Aiyubite) dynasty, from the name of Saladin's father, Ayoub (Job), a native Koord of Davin—W. Besant and E. H. Palmer, *Jerusalem*, ch. 16—"Saladin gave no directions respecting the order of succession, and by this want of foresight prepared the ruin of his empire. One of his sons, Alaziz, who commanded in Egypt, caused himself to be proclaimed sultan of Cairo; another took possession of the sovereignty of Aleppo, and a third of the principality of Amath. Malek-Adel [called Self Eddin, the Sword of Religion, by which latter name, in the corrupted form Saphadin, he was known commonly to the crusaders], the brother of Saladin, assumed the throne of Mesopotamia and the countries in the neighbourhood of the Euphrates. The principal emirs, and all the princes of the race of the Ayoubites, made themselves masters of the cities and provinces of which they held the command. Afdhal [Almelek Alafdbal], eldest son of Saladin, was proclaimed sultan of Damascus. Master of Syria, and of the capital of a vast empire, sovereign of Jerusalem and Palestine, he appeared to have preserved something of the power of his father; but all fell into disorder and confusion." After some years of disorder and of war between the brothers, Malek Adel, or Saphadin, the more capable uncle of the young princes, gathered the reins of power into his hands and reunited most of the provinces of Saladin's empire. On his death, in 1217, the divisions and the disorder reappeared. The Ayoubite dynasty, however, held the throne at Cairo (to the dominion of which Palestine belonged) until 1250, when the last of the line was killed by his Mamelukes. The lesser princes of the divided empire were swept away soon after by the Mongol invasion.—J. F. Michaud, *Hist. of the Crusades*, bks. 9, 12-14.—See, also, JERUSALEM: A. D. 1149-1187.

SALADIN, The Tithe of.—"In England and in France, in order to defray expenses [of the Third Crusade], a tax called the Tithe of Saladin, consisting of a tenth part of all their goods, was levied on every person who did not take the Cross. . . . In every parish the Tithe of Saladin was raised in the presence of a priest, a Templar, a Hospitaller, a king's man, a baron's man and clerk, and a bishop's clerk."—W. Besant and E. H. Palmer, *Jerusalem*, ch. 15.

SALADO, OR GUADACELITO, Battle of (1340). See SPAIN: A. D. 1273-1480.

SALAMANCA, Battle of. See SPAIN: A. D. 1812 (JUNE—AUGUST).

SALAMANCA, University of. See EDUCATION, MEDIEVAL: SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

SALAMIS, Cyprus, Battle of (B. C. 449). See ATHENS: B. C. 480-449. . . . Battle of (B. C. 306). See MACEDONIA: B. C. 310-301.

SALAMIS, Greece: B. C. 610-600.—War of Athens and Megara for possession of the island. See ATHENS: B. C. 610-586.

B. C. 480.—Great battle between Greeks and Persians. See GREECE: B. C. 480.

SALANKAMENT, Battle of (1691). See HUNGARY: A. D. 1683-1699.

SALCES, OR SALSAS: A. D. 1639-1640.—Siege and capture by the French.—Recovery by the Spaniards. See SPAIN: A. D. 1637-1640.

SALEM, Mass.: A. D. 1628.—The first settlement. See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1623-1629 THE DORCHESTER COMPANY.

A. D. 1631-1636.—Ministry and banishment of Roger Williams. See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1636.

A. D. 1692.—The Witchcraft madness. See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1692, and 1692-1693.

SALERNO, Principality of. See ITALY (SOUTHERN): A. D. 800-1016.

SALERNO, School of Medicine. See MEDICAL SCIENCE: 12-17TH CENTURIES.

SALIAN FRANKS, The. See FRANKS: ORIGIN, ETC.

SALIC LAW, The.—"A greatly exaggerated importance has been attributed to the Salic Law. You are acquainted with the reason of this error, you know that at the accession of Philippe le-Long, and during the struggle of Philippe de Valois and Edward III for the crown of France, the Salic law was invoked in order to prevent the succession of women, and that, from that time, it has been celebrated by a crowd of writers as the first source of our public law, as a law always in vigor, as the fundamental law of monarchy. Those who have been the most free from this illusion, as, for example, Montesquieu, have yet experienced, to some degree, its influence, and have spoken of the Salic law with a respect which it is assuredly difficult to feel towards it when we attribute to it only the place that it really holds in our history. . . . I pray you to recall that which I have already told you touching the double origin and the incoherence of the barbarous laws; they were, at once, anterior and posterior to the invasion; at once, German and Germano-Roman: they belonged to two different conditions of society. This character has influenced all the controversies of which the Salic law has been the object; it has given rise to two hypotheses: according to one, this law was compiled in Germany, upon the right bank of the Rhine, long before the conquest, and in the language of the Franks. . . . According to the other hypothesis, the Salic law was, on the contrary, compiled after the conquest, upon the left bank of the Rhine, in Belgium or in Gaul, perhaps in the seventh century, and in Latin. . . . I believe, however, that the traditions which, through so many contradictions and fables, appear in the prefaces and epilogues annexed to the law, . . . indicate that, from the eighth century, it was a general belief, a popular tradition, that the customs of the Salian

Franks were anciently collected. . . We are not obliged to believe that the Salic law, such as we have it, is of a very remote date, nor that it was compiled as recounted, nor even that it was ever written in the German language, but that it was connected with customs collected and transmitted from generation to generation, when the Franks lived about the mouth of the Rhine, and modified, extended, explained, reduced into law, at various times, from that epoch down to the end of the eighth century—this, I think, is the reasonable result to which this discussion should lead.

At the first aspect it is impossible not to be struck with the apparent utter chaos of the law. It treats of all things—of political law, of civil law, of criminal law, of civil procedure, of criminal procedure, of rural jurisdiction, all mixed up together without any distinction or classification. . . When we examine this law more closely, we perceive that it is essentially a penal regulation.

I say nothing of the fragments of political law, civil law, or civil procedure, which are found dispersed through it, nor even of that famous article which orders that 'Salic land shall not fall to woman, and that the inheritance shall devolve exclusively on the males.' No person is now ignorant of its true meaning. . . When, in the fourteenth century, they invoked the Salic law, in order to regulate the succession to the crown, it had certainly been a long time since it had been spoken of, except in remembrance, and upon some great occasion"—F. Guizot, *Hist. of Civilization*, v. 2 (*France*, v. 1), lect. 9.

Also in W. C. Perry, *The Franks*, ch. 10—E. F. Henderson, *Select Hist. Doc's of the Middle Ages*, bk. 2, no. 1.

Applied to the regal succession in France.

—Louis X., surnamed Hutin, king of France, died in 1316, leaving a daughter, Jeanne, and his queen with child. The late king's brother, Philip the Long, became regent, but when the queen bore a son and the child died, this Philip hastened to Rheims, filled the Cathedral with his own followers, and compelled the archbishop to consecrate him King [Philip V.]. Thence he returned to Paris, assembled the citizens, and, in the presence of a great concourse of barons and notables of the realm, declared that no female could succeed to the crown of France. Thus began the so called Salic Law of France, through the determined violence of an unscrupulous man. The lawyers round the throne, seeking to give to the act of might the sanction of right, be thought them of that passage in the law of the Salian Franks which declares 'That no part or heritage of Salic land can fall to a woman', and it is from this that the law obtained the name of 'the Salic Law.'—G. W. Kitchin, *Hist. of France*, v. 1, bk. 3, ch. 11, sect. 1-2—"In this contest [after the death of Louis X., as mentioned above], every way memorable, but especially on account of that which sprung out of it, the exclusion of females from the throne of France was first publicly discussed. . . It may be fairly inferred that the Salic law, as it was called, was not so fixed a principle at that time as has been contended. But however this may be, it received at the accession of Philip the Long a sanction which subsequent events more thoroughly confirmed. Philip himself leaving only three daughters, his brother Charles [IV.] mounted the throne; and upon his death the rule

was so unquestionably established, that his only daughter was excluded by the count of Valois, grandson of Philip the Bold. This prince first took the regency, the queen-dowager being pregnant, and, upon her giving birth to a daughter, was crowned king [Philip of Valois]. No competitor or opponent appeared in France; but one more formidable than any whom France could have produced was awaiting the occasion to prosecute his imagined right with all the resources of valour and genius, and to carry desolation over that great kingdom with as little scruple as if he was preferring a suit before a civil tribunal." This was King Edward III. of England, whose mother Isabel was the sister of the last three French kings, and who claimed through her a right to the French crown.—H. Hallam, *The Middle Ages*, ch. 1, pt. 1—See, also, FRANCE. A. D. 1328-1339.

SALICE, Battle of. See GERMANY. A. D. 1809 (JANUARY—JUNE).

SALICES, Ad, Battle of. See GOTHES (VISIGOTHES) A. D. 378.

SALINÆ.—A Roman town in Britain, celebrated for its salt works and salt baths. Its site is occupied by modern Droitwich.—T. Wright, *Celt. Roman and Saxon*, ch. 5.

SALINAN FAMILY, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES. SALINAN FAMILY.

SALISBURY, Gemot of.—William the Conqueror, while establishing feudalism in England, "broke into its 'most essential attribute, the exclusive dependence of a vassal upon his lord,' by requiring in accordance with the old English practice, that all landowners, mesne tenants as well as tenants in chief, should take the oath of fealty to the King. This was formally decreed at the celebrated Gemot held on Salisbury Plain, on the 1st of August, 1066, at which the Witan and all the landowners of substance in England whose vassals soever they were, attended, to the number, it is reported, of 60,000. The statute, as soon as passed, was carried into immediate effect."—T. P. Taswell-Langmead, *Eng. Const. Hist.*, p. 55.

SALISBURY MINISTRIES, The. See ENGLAND. A. D. 1885, 1885-1886, and 1892-1893.

SALISHAN FAMILY, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES. FLATHEADS.

SALLUVIANS. See SALLYES.

SALON, Origin of the French. See RAMBOUILLET, HOTEL DE.

SALONA, Ancient.—"Amidst the decay of the empire in the third century Dalmatia suffered comparatively little, indeed, Salona probably only reached at that time its greatest prosperity. This, it is true, was occasioned partly by the fact that the regenerator of the Roman state, the emperor Diocletian, was by birth a Dalmatian, and allowed his efforts, aimed at the decapitalising of Rome, to redound chiefly to the benefit of the capital of his native land; he built alongside of it the huge palace from which the modern capital of the province takes the name Spalato, within which it has for the most part found a place, and the temples of which now serve it as cathedral and as baptistery. Diocletian, however, did not make Salona a great city for the first time, but, because it was such, chose it for his private residence; commerce, navigation, and trade must at that time in these waters have

been concentrated chiefly at Aquileia and at Salona, and the city must have been one of the most populous and opulent towns of the west."—T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 8, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: E. A. Freeman, *Subject and Neighbor Lands of Venice*.—T. G. Jackson, *Dalmatia, the Quarnero and Istria*, ch. 1-2 and 10-12 (v. 1-2).

SALONICA.—The modern name of ancient Thessalonica. See THESSALONICA.

SALONIKI, The kingdom of.—The kingdom obtained by Boniface, Marquis of Montferrat, in the partition of the Byzantine Empire after its conquest by the Crusaders, A. D. 1204, comprised the province of Macedonia, with Thessalonica for its capital, and was called the kingdom of Saloniki. Its duration was brief. In 1222 the neighboring Greek despot of Epirus took Thessalonica and conquered the whole kingdom. He then assumed the title of emperor of Thessalonica, in rivalry with the Greek emperors of Nicæa and Trebizond. The title of king of Saloniki was cherished by the family of Montferrat for some generations; but those who claimed it never made good their title by possession of the kingdom.—G. Finlay, *Hist. of Greece from the Conquest by the Crusaders*, ch. 5.—See, also, BYZANTINE EMPIRE: A. D. 1204-1205.

SALOPIAN WARE.—Pottery manufactured by the Romans in Britain from the clay of the Severn valley. Two sorts are found in considerable abundance—one white, the other a light red color.—L. Jewitt, *Gran. Moulds*, p. 164.

SALSBACH, Death of Turenne at (1675). See NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND) A. D. 1674-1678.

SALT, French tax on. See TAILLE AND GABELLE.

SALT LAKE CITY: The founding of (1847). See MORMONISM: A. D. 1846-1848.

SALVADOR. See CENTRAL AMERICA.

SALVATION ARMY, The.—"Some people of to-day seem to have the idea that the Rev. William Booth was Jove, and that the Salvation Army sprang from his brain full-grown and fully armed. Far from it, a boy trained in the Church of England is converted among Wesleyan Methodists, and, believing thoroughly in what he professes, is constrained to feel interested in the salvation of others. He is much moved by some revival services that he hears conducted by the Rev. James Caughey, an American evangelist, and the effect of the straightforward, conversational style of preaching makes an impression upon him that is never forgotten. Through all the years that follow, among all the scenes of his labors as a Methodist minister, he never forgets that simple, open-air preaching, that pushing home of the truth, with its wonderful results, and year after year only increases the conviction that the masses can only be reached by going to them, and never, never saved by waiting until they come to us. Years passed away before William Booth and his wife came to the point where they could step out, shake off traditional methods and means, and begin to carry out evangelistic work on lines forbidden by the churches. . . . 'Nothing succeeds like success,' and when the first results were between three and four thousand souls in four little towns of Cornwall, there was a decided leaning toward them, overpowered, though, at a meeting of the Wesleyan Confer-

ence, which promulgated the strange formula that 'evangelistic movements are unfavorable to Church order.' However, the work was carried on steadily, until that memorable Sunday [July 5th, 1865] on Mile End Waste, East London, from which William Booth consecrated himself to the salvation of the ignorant, and from which he dates all statistics referring to his work as an independent movement in the religious world. From this time forward, without interrupting in the least the open air work, one shelter after another was secured and appropriated for mission work, here a tent or an old stable, there a carpenter's shop, until the movement was strong enough to warrant the lease of 'The Eastern Star,' a notorious beer house, which was used as book store, hall, and classroom. From this place, with its name of good hope, hundreds of souls went forth to make the wilderness blossom like the rose, so far as their humble homes were concerned. Sheds, lofts, alleys, tumble down theatres, well known places of resort or of refuge were preferred as being familiar to the class of men who were to be reached. Such was the Salvation Army in its early years, merely a 'mission,' with no more idea of development into an 'army,' with military rule and nomenclature, than we at the present time have of what may come to us in the next twenty years."—M. B. Booth, *Beneath Two Flags*, ch. 2.—"In 1873 Mrs. Booth, overcoming her own intense reluctance, began to preach. In 1874 and the two following years the work spread to Portsmouth, Chatham, Wellingborough, Hammersmith, Hackney, Leeds, Leicester, Stockton, Middlesbrough, Cardiff, Hartlepool, and other towns, where recent converts of the humblest rank—tinkers, railway guards, navvies—took charge of new stations. In 1876, shaking itself more and more free from the trammels of custom and routine, the Army deliberately utilized the services of women. In 1877 it spread still further. In 1878 it 'attacked' no less than fifty towns, and—more by what we should call 'accident' than by design—assumed the title of the Salvation Army. It also adopted, for good or for evil, the whole vocabulary of military organization, which has caused it to be covered with ridicule, but which may undoubtedly have aided its discipline and helped its progress. In 1879 advance was marked by the imprisonment of three Salvationists—who refused, as always, to pay the alternative fine—for the offence of praying in a country road near a public house, which was regarded as 'obstructing the thoroughfare.' In this year began also the establishment of training homes for the instruction and equipment of the young officers; the printing of the 'War Cry'; the use of uniforms and badges; and the extension of the work to Philadelphia and the United States. In 1880 the United Kingdom was mapped into divisions. In 1881 the work was extended to Australia and the colonies, and so stupendous had become the religious energy of the soldiers that they began to dream of the religious rescue of Europe as well as of Great Britain and its empire-colonies. Since that year its spread, in spite of all opposition, has been steady and continuous, until, in 1890, it excited the attention of the civilized world by that immense scheme of social amelioration into which we shall not here enter particularly. At the present moment [1891] the Army has no less

than 9,349 regular officers, 13,000 voluntary officers, 30 training homes, with 400 cadets, and 2,864 corps scattered over 32 different countries. In England alone it has 1,377 corps, and has held some 160,000 open air meetings. This represents a part of its religious work. Besides this it has in social work 30 rescue homes, 5 shelters, 3 food depots, and many other agencies for good.—F. W. Farrar, *The Salvation Army* (*Harper's Mag.*, May, 1891).—In one of his addresses delivered during his visit to the United States in February, 1895, General Booth said: "We have, with God's help been able to carry our banner and hoist our flag in 45 different countries and colonies, and we are reaching out day by day. We have been able to create and bring into harmonious action, with self supporting and self guiding officers, something like 4,000 separate societies. We have been able to gather together something like 11,000 men and women separated from their earthly affiliations, who have gone forth as leaders of this host." In the same address, General Booth gave the number of the Army newspapers as 27, with a circulation of 50,000,000,—presumably meaning the total issues of a year. Commissioner Railton, of the Salvation Army, writing in 1893, had given more precisely the number 10,645, as that of the men and women officers.—"the men and women," he said, "who gladly bear contempt, abuse, poverty, and suffering of every kind, that they may spend the part of life which still remains to them in proclaiming their Saviour." He gave the number of "Homes, Refugees, Farm Colonies, Shelters and human Elevators" maintained by the Army as 218, and stated that its journals were being published in 14 languages. Mrs. Catherine Booth, who died in 1890, had exercised a great and inspiring influence in its work, and her loss was profoundly felt.

SALYES, OR SALLUVIANS.—The Salyes or Saluvii or Salluvians, named *Salvii Yalli* in Livy's Epitome, "were Ligurians or a mixed race of Celts and Ligurians. They perhaps occupied part of the coast east of Massilia; they certainly extended inland behind that town to the Rhone on the west and to the north as far as the river Druentia (Durance). They occupied the wide plain which you may see from the highest point of the great amphitheatre of Arles (Arles) stretching east from Tarascon and the Rhone as far as the eye can reach." The Salyes were dangerous to Massilia and in 125 B. C. the latter appealed to the Romans, as allies. The latter responded promptly and sent Flaccus, one of the consuls, to deal with the Salyes. He defeated them; but in two or three years they were again in arms, and consul C. Sextius Calvinus was sent against them. "The Salyes were again defeated and their chief city taken, but it is uncertain whether this capital was Arles (Arles) or the place afterwards named *Aquæ Sextiæ* (Aix). . . . The Roman general found in this arid country a pleasant valley well supplied with water from the surrounding hills, and here he established the colony named *Aquæ Sextiæ*." The chiefs of the conquered Salyes took refuge with the Allobroges, and that led to the subjugation of the latter (see *ALLOBROGES*).—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 1, ch. 17 and 21.

SALZBURG, Origin of.—"The foundation of a colony [by Hadrian] at Juvavium, or Salzburg, which received the name of Forum Ha-

driani, attests the vigilance which directed his view from the Rhine to the Salza, and the taste, I would willingly add, which selected for a town to bear his name the most enchanting site in central Europe."—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 66.

SALZBURGERS, The. See *GEORGIA*. A. D. 1734.

SALZWEDEL. See *BRANDENBURG*.

SAM ADAMS REGIMENTS, The. See *BOSTON*: A. D. 1770.

SAMANA, The proposed cession of. See *HATTI*: A. D. 1804-1880.

SAMANIDES OR SAMANIANS, The.—"As the vigour of the Khalifah began to pass away, and effeminate luxury crept imperceptibly into the palaces of Baghdad, the distant lieutenants gradually aspired to independence. At length, in 868 A. D., one Ya' kub-bin Laïs, the son of a braser in Sistan, rose in rebellion, subdued Balkh, Kabul, and Fars, but died on his march to Baghdad. In former days he would have been treated as an audacious rebel against the authority of the Vicar of God, now the degenerate Khalifah appointed his brother 'Amr his lieutenant on the death of Ya' kub [A. D. 877], and allowed him to govern Fars, as the founder of the Saffari, or Brasier, dynasty. Ever fearful of the power of 'Amr, the Khalifah at length instigated a Tatar lord, named Isma'il Samani, to raise an army against the Saffaris, in Khurasan. 'Amr marched against him, and crossed the Oxus, but he was entirely defeated; and laughed heartily at a dog, who ran away with the little pot that was preparing the humble meal of the fallen king. That morning it had taken thirty camels to carry his kitchen retinue. 'Amr was sent to Baghdad, and put to death in 901 A. D. Isma'il, who traced his descent from a Persian noble who had rebelled against Khusrû Parvîz, now founded the Samany [or Samanide] dynasty, which ruled over Khurasan and the north of Persia, with their capital at Bukhara. The Dailami [or Dilemite or Bouide] dynasty ruled in Fars and the south of Persia during the same period. To the Samanians Persia owes the restoration of its nationality, which had been oppressed and trodden under foot by the Arabian conquerors." The Samanide dynasty was overthrown in 998 by the founder of the Gaznevide Empire, which succeeded.—C. R. Markham, *General Sketch of the Hist. of Persia*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: Sir J. Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*, v. 1, ch. 6.—See, also, *TURKS*: A. D. 998-1183.

SAMARAH, Battle of.—This was the battle in which the Roman emperor Julian was killed (June 26, A. D. 363), during the retreat from his ill-starred expedition beyond the Tigris, against the Persians.—G. Rawlinson, *Seventh Great Oriental Monarchy*, ch. 10.

SAMARCAND.—Ancient Maracanda, the capital city of Sogdiana. See *SOGDIANA*; and *BOKHARA*.

6th Century.—Taken from the White Huns by the Turks. See *TURKS*: 6TH CENTURY.

A. D. 1209-1220.—Capital of the Khwarezmian empire. See *KHWAREZM*.

A. D. 1221.—Conquest and destruction by Jingis Khan.—When Jingis Khan, the Mongol conqueror and devastator of Central Asia, invaded the Khwarezmian Empire, Samarkand was

SAMARKAND.

its capital and its most important city "The fugitive Khahrezmian prince had left behind him for the defence 110 000 men—1 c., 60,000 Turks and 50,000 Tadjiks—with twenty elephants." But the Turkish mercenaries deserted in a body and the town was surrendered after a siege of three days. "The flourishing city of Samarkand and the fortress were laid even with the ground, and the inhabitants, stripped of all they possessed, shared the fate of their brethren of Bokhara. Those who had contrived to escape were lured back by false promises, all capable of bearing arms were compulsorily enrolled in the Mongolian army, the artistic gardeners of the place were sent off to the far East, where they were wanted to adorn the future Mongolo-Chinese capital with pleasure-grounds, after the fashion of those of Samarkand, and the celebrated artisans, especially the silk and cotton weavers, were either distributed as clever and useful slaves amongst the wives and relations of Djenghiz, or else carried with him to Khorasan. A few were sent as slaves to his sons Tchagatai and Oktai, who were then marching on Khahrezm. This was the end, in the year 618 (1221), of Samarkand, which Arabian geographers have described as the most brilliant and most flourishing spot on the face of the earth"—A. Vámbéry, *Hist. of Bokhara* ch. 8—"Samarkand was not only the capital of Trans-Oxiana, but also one of the greatest entrepôts of commerce in the world. Three miles in circumference, it was surrounded with a wall having castles at intervals and pierced by twelve iron gates"—H. H. Howorth, *Hist. of the Mongols*, pt. 1, p. 73.

A. D. 1371-1405.—The capital of Timour. See TIMOUR THE CONQUESTOR OF

A. D. 1868. Seizure by the Russians. See RUSSIA. A. D. 1859-1876.

SAMARIA.—SAMARITANS: Early history.—The Kingdom of Israel—Overthrow by the Assyrians. See JEWS KINGDOMS OF ISRAEL AND JUDAH.

Repopulation of the city and district by the Assyrian conqueror.—After the capture of the city of Samaria (B. C. 722) and the deportation of a large part of its inhabitants by the Assyrian conqueror (see as above), "these districts remained for many years in a condition of such desolation that they were overrun with wild beasts. In the meantime King Asarhaddon, whom we suppose to be Asarhaddon II., having reduced afresh several refractory towns about twenty years after the death of Sennacherib, and wishing to inflict on their inhabitants the favour of his punishment of his predecessors, transported large bodies of their heathen populations into these desolated regions. A great number of the settlers in Samaria, the former capital, appear to have come from the Babylonian city of Cuthah, from which arose the name of Cuthaeans, often applied in derision to the Samaritans by the later Jews. Other settlers were sent from Babylon itself, and "from the cities on the west of the Euphrates, Hamath, Ivah, and Sepharvaim."—H. Ewald, *Hist. of Israel*, n. 4, pp. 215-216.

After the Exile.—In the second and third generations after the return of the Jews from exile, there began to be connections formed by marriage with the neighboring peoples. These

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peoples, "particularly the Samaritans, had given up idolatry, and were longing earnestly and truly to take part in the divine service at Jerusalem. They were, in fact, proselytes to the religion of Judaea, and were they always to be sternly repulsed? The principal Judæan families determined to admit the foreigners into the community, and the high priest of that time, either Jehoiakim or his son Ehashib, was ready to carry these wishes into effect. Marriages were therefore contracted with the Samaritans and other neighbouring people." But when Ezra and his party came from Babylon (B. C. 459-458) bringing an access of religious zeal and narrower interpretations of the law, these marriages were condemned, and those who had contracted them were forced to repudiate their foreign wives and the children borne by such. This cruelly fanatical action changed the friendly feeling of the Samaritans to hatred. Their leader, Sanballat, was a man of power, and he began against the restored Judæans a war which drove them from Jerusalem. It was not until Nehemiah came from Babel, with the authority of King Artaxerxes to rebuild the walls, that they recovered the city. "The strict observance of the Law enjoined by Ezra was followed out by Nehemiah, he strengthened the wall of separation between Judæans and Gentiles so securely that it was almost impossible to break through it." Sanballat, whose son-in-law, a priest, had been exiled on account of his Samaritan marriage, now cunningly conceived the plan of undermining the Judæan community, by the help of its own members. How would it be were he to raise a temple to the God of Israel, in rivalry to the one which held sway in Jerusalem? He executed his plan and the Samaritan temple was raised on Mount Gerizim. Thus "the Samaritans had their temple, around which they gathered, they had priests from the house of Aaron, they compared Mount Gerizim . . . to Mount Moriah, they drew the inference from the Book of the Law that God had designed Mount Gerizim as a site for a sanctuary, and they proudly called themselves Israelites. Sanballat and his followers being intent upon attracting a great many Judæans to their community, tempted them with the offer of houses and land, and in every way helped to support them. Those who had been guilty of crime and who feared punishment, were received with open arms by the Samaritans. Out of such elements a new semi-Judæan community or sect was formed. Their home was in the somewhat limited district of Samaria, the centre of which was either the city that gave its name to the province or the town of Shechem. The members of the new community became an active, vigorous, intelligent people, as if Sanballat, the founder, had breathed his spirit into them. . . . They actually tried to argue away the right of the Judæans to exist as a community. They declared that they alone were the descendants of Israel, and they denied the sanctity of Jerusalem and its Temple, affirming that everything achieved by the Judæan people was a debasement of the old Israelitic character. Upon the Judæan side, the hatred against their Samaritan neighbours was equally great. The enmity between Jerusalem and Samaria that existed in the time of the two kingdoms blazed out anew; it no longer bore a political character, but one of a

religious tendency"—H. Graetz, *History of the Jews*, ch. 19-20 (v. 1).—"While the Hebrew writers unanimously represent the Samaritans as the descendants of the Cuthaan colonists introduced by Esarhaddon, a foreign and idolatrous race, their own traditions derive their regular lineage from Ephraim and Manasseh, the sons of Joseph. The remarkable fact, that this people have preserved the book of the Mosaic law in the ruder and more ancient character, while the Jews, after the return from Babylonia, universally adopted the more elegant Chaldean form of letters, strongly confirms the opinion that, although by no means pure and unmingled, the Hebrew blood still predominated in their race. In many other respects, regard for the Sabbath and even for the sabbatic year, and the payment of tithes to their priests, the Samaritans did not fall below their Jewish rivals in attachment to the Mosaic polity. The later events in the history of the kings of Jerusalem show that the expatriation of the ten tribes was by no means complete and permanent. Is it then an unreasonable supposition, that the foreign colonists were lost in the remnant of the Israelitish people, and, though perhaps slowly and imperfectly weaned from their native superstitions, fell by degrees into the habits and beliefs of their adopted country? . . . Whether or not it was the perpetuation of the ancient feud between the two rival kingdoms, from this period [of the return from the captivity in Babylonia] the hostility of the Jews and Samaritans assumed its character of fierce and implacable animosity. No two nations ever hated each other with more unmitigated bitterness"—H. H. Milman, *Hist. of the Jews*, bk. 9.

Change of population by Alexander the Great.—After the submission of Palestine to Alexander the Great (B. C. 332), Samaria "rebelled and murdered the Macedonian governor, Andromachus. Alexander expelled the inhabitants, and planted a Macedonian colony in their room—another heathen element in the motley population of Samaria"—P. Smith, *Hist. of the World Ancient*, v. 3, ch. 34.

Rebuilding of the city by Herod.—One of the measures of King Herod, for strengthening himself outside of Jerusalem, was "the rebuilding of Samaria, which he did (B. C. 25) on a scale of great magnificence and strength, and peopled it partly with his soldiers, partly with the descendants of the old Samaritans, who hoped to see their temple likewise restored." He changed the name of Samaria, however, to Sebaste—the August.—H. H. Milman, *Hist. of the Jews*, bk. 11.

Justinian's War.—The Christian zeal of the Emperor Justinian [A. D. 527-565] induced him to undertake the forcible conversion of all unbelievers in his empire. Among others, the Samaritans of Palestine were offered "the alternative of baptism or rebellion. They chose the latter: under the standard of a desperate leader they rose in arms, and retaliated their wrongs on the lives, the property, and the temples of a defenceless people. The Samaritans were finally subdued by the regular forces of the East; 20,000 were slain, 20,000 were sold by the Arabs to the infidels of Persia and India, and the remains of that unhappy nation atoned for the crime of treason by the sin of hypocrisy. It has been computed that 100,000 Roman subjects were extirpated in the Samaritan war, which con-

verted the once fruitful province into a desolate and smoking wilderness."—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 47.

SAMARKAND. See SAMARICAND.

SAMBUCA, The.—A great military engine, in ancient sieges, was a species of huge covered ladder, supported by two ships lashed together and floated up against the sea wall of the besieged town. The Greeks called it a Sambuca. Mithridates brought one into use when besieging Rhodes, B. C. 88, but with disastrous failure.—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 2, ch. 20.

SAMIAN WARE.—An elegant species of Roman pottery, red in color, which was in great repute among the ancients.

SAMMARINESI, The.—The citizens of San Marino. See SAN MARINO, THE REPUBLIC OF.

SAMNITE WARS, The. See ROME: B. C. 343-290.

SAMNITES, The.—"The Samnite nation [see ITALY ANCIENT], which, at the time of the expulsion of the Tarquins from Rome, had doubtless already been for a considerable period in possession of the hill country which rises between the Apulian and Campanian plains and commands them both, had hitherto found its further advance impeded on the one side by the Daunians, . . . on the other by the Greeks and Etruscans. But the fall of the Etruscan power towards the end of the third, and the decline of the Greek colonies in the course of the fourth century [B. C.], made room for them towards the west and south, and now one Samnite host after another marched down to, and even moved across, the south Italian seas. They first made their appearance in the plain adjoining the bay, with which the name of the Campanians has been associated from the beginning of the fourth century, the Etruscans there were suppressed, and the Greeks were confined within narrower bounds, Capua was wrested from the former [B. C. 424] Cumæ from the latter [B. C. 420]. About the same time, perhaps even earlier, the Lucanians appeared in Magna Græcia . . . Towards the end of the fourth century mention first occurs of the separate confederacy of the Brutii, who had detached themselves from the Lucanians—not, like the other Sabellian stocks, as a colony, but through a quarrel—and had become mixed up with many foreign elements. The Greeks of Lower Italy tried to resist the pressure of the barbarians. . . . But even the union of Magna Græcia no longer availed; for the ruler of Syracuse, Dionysius the Elder, made common cause with the Italians against his countrymen . . . In an incredibly short time the circle of flourishing cities was destroyed or laid desolate. Only a few Greek settlements, such as Neapolis, succeeded with difficulty, and more by means of treaties than by force of arms, in preserving their existence and their nationality. Tarentum alone remained thoroughly independent and powerful. . . . About the period when Veli and the Pomptine plain came into the hands of Rome, the Samnite hordes were already in possession of all Lower Italy, with the exception of a few unconnected Greek colonies, and of the Apulo-Messapian coast."—T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 2, ch. 5.

SAMO, The Kingdom of. See AVARS: 7TH CENTURY.

SAMOA.—Samoa is the native name of the group of twelve volcanic islands in central Polynesia formerly known as the Navigator Islands. Their place on the chart is between the parallels of 13° and 15° south latitude, and 168° and 173° west longitude. The total area of the islands is about 1,700 square miles. The population consists of about 86,000 natives and a few hundred foreigners, English, American and German. The islands are said to have been first visited by the Dutch navigator, Roggewein, in 1722. A Christian mission was first established upon them in 1830, by the London Missionary Society. After some years the trade of the islands became important, and German traders acquired an influence which they seem to have used to bring about a state of civil war between rival kings. The United States, Great Britain and Germany, at length, in 1879, by joint action, intervened, and, after ten years more of disturbed and unsatisfactory government, the affairs of Samoa were finally settled at a conference of the three Powers held in Berlin in 1889. A treaty was signed by which they jointly guarantee the neutrality of the islands, with equal rights of residence, trade and personal protection to the citizens of the three signatory Powers. They recognize the independence of the Samoan Government, and the free right of the natives to elect their chief or king and choose the form of their government. The treaty created a supreme court, with jurisdiction over all questions arising under it. It stopped the alienation of lands by the natives, excepting town lots in Apia, the capital town; and it organized a municipal government for Apia, with an elected council under the presidency of a magistrate appointed by the three Powers. Other articles impose customs duties on foreign importations, and prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors to the natives.—*Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia*, 1888 and 1889.

ALSO IN: *The Statesman's Year-Book*, 1894.—R. L. Stevenson, *A Foot-note to History*.—G. H. Bates, *Some Aspects of the Samoan Question* (*The Century*, April and May, 1889). See, also, POLYNESIA.

SAMOS.—**SAMIANS.**—The island now called Samos, lying close to the coast of Asia Minor, in the part of the Ægean Sea which was anciently known as the Icarian Sea. It is of considerable size, being about eighty miles in circumference. The narrow strait which separates it from the mainland is only about three-fourths of a mile wide. The ancient Samians were early and important members of the Ionian confederacy [see ASIA MINOR: THE GREEK COLONIES] and acquired an early prominence among Greek communities in navigation, commerce, colonizing enterprise and advancement in the arts. Shortly before the Persian wars, in the last half of the sixth century B. C. the island became subject to a profoundly able and ambitious usurper, Polycrates, the most famous of all the Greek "tyrants" of the age, and under whom Samos rose to great power and great splendor of development. Samos was at that time the brilliant centre of all Ionia, as far as the latter was yet untouched by the barbarians. For such a position she was pre-eminently fitted; for nowhere had the national life of the Ionians attained to so many-sided and energetic a development as on this particular island. . . . An unwearied impulse for inven-

tions was implanted in these islanders, and at the same time a manly and adventurous spirit of discovery, stimulated by the dangers of unknown seas. . . . Under Polycrates, Samos had become a perfectly organized piratical state; and no ship could quietly pursue its voyages without having first purchased a safe-conduct from Samos. . . . But Polycrates intended to be something more than a freebooter. After he had annihilated all attempts at resistance, and made his fleet the sole naval power of the Archipelago, he began to take steps for creating a new and lasting establishment. The defenceless places on the coast had to buy security by the regular payment of tribute; under his protection they united into a body, the interests and affairs of which came more and more to find their centre in Samos, which from a piratical state became the federal capital of an extensive and brilliant empire of coasts and islands.—E. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece*, bk. 2, ch. 5 (c. 2).—Two of the great works of Polycrates in Samos, the aqueduct, for which a mountain was tunneled, and the harbor breakwater, were among the wonders of antiquity. The Hieræum, or temple of Here, was a third marvel. After the death of Polycrates, treacherously murdered by the Persians, Samos became subject to Persia. At a later time it came under the sovereignty of Athens, and its subsequent history was full of vicissitudes. It retained considerable importance even to Roman times.

B. C. 440.—Revolt from Athens.—Siege and subjugation. See ATHENS: B. C. 440-437.

B. C. 413.—Overthrow of the oligarchy.—Concession of freedom and alliance by Athens. See GREECE: B. C. 413-412.

B. C. 33-32.—Antony and Cleopatra.—The winter of B. C. 33-32, before the battle of Actium, was passed by Mark Antony at Samos, in company with Cleopatra, the Queen of Egypt. "The delicious little island was crowded with musicians, dancers and stage players; its shores resounded with the wanton strains of the flute and tabret."—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 28.

A. D. 1824.—Defeat of the Turks by the Greeks. See GREECE: A. D. 1821-1829.

SAMOSATA.—See COMMAGENE.

SAMOTHRACE.—A mountainous island in the northern part of the Ægean sea, so elevated that its highest point is over 5,000 feet above the sea level. In ancient times it derived its chief importance from the mysteries of the little understood worship of the Cabiri, of which it seems to have been the chief seat.—G. S. Faber, *Mysteries of the Cabiri*.—"The temple and mysteries of Samothrace formed a point of union for many men from all countries: for a great portion of the world at that time, the temple of Samothrace was like the Caaba of Mecca, the tomb of the prophet at Medina, or the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem. Samothrace and Dodona were to the Pelasgian nations what perhaps Delphi and Delos were to the Hellenic world."—B. G. Niebuhr, *Lect's on the Hist. of Rome*, lect. 1.

SAN. See ZOAN.

SAN ANTONIO, Battle of. See MEXICO: A. D. 1847 (MARCH—SEPTEMBER).

SAN CARLOS, Battle of. See VENEZUELA: A. D. 1829-1836.

SAN DOMINGO, OR HAYTI. See HAYTI.

SAN FRANCISCO: A. D. 1579.—Supposed visit by Drake. See CALIFORNIA: A. D. 1543-1781; and AMERICA: A. D. 1572-1580.

A. D. 1772-1776.—First exploration and naming of the Bay.—Founding of the Mission. See CALIFORNIA: A. D. 1543-1781.

A. D. 1846.—Possession taken by the Americans. See CALIFORNIA: A. D. 1846-1847.

A. D. 1846.—The naming of the Golden Gate.—The great Bay. See GOLDEN GATE.

A. D. 1848.—On the eve of the Gold discoveries. See CALIFORNIA: A. D. 1848-1849.

A. D. 1856.—The Vigilance Committee. See CALIFORNIA: A. D. 1856.

A. D. 1877-1880.—Kearney and the Sand Lot Party. See CALIFORNIA: A. D. 1877-1880.

SAN FRANCISCO, Battle of (1879). See CHILE: A. D. 1833-1884.

SAN JACINTO, Battle of (1836). See TEXAS: A. D. 1824-1836.

SAN JUAN OR NORTHWESTERN WATER-BOUNDARY QUESTION.—The treaty of 1846 which settled the Oregon boundary question left still in dispute the water-boundary between the territory of the United States and Vancouver's Island. Provision for submitting the determination of this San Juan water-boundary question, as it was called, to the Emperor of Germany was made in the Treaty of Washington (see ALABAMA CLAIMS: A. D. 1871). "The Emperor, it appears, referred the arguments on both sides to three experts, Dr. Grimm, Dr. Kiepert, and Dr. Goldschmidt, personages among the most eminent of his subjects in jurisprudence and in science, upon whose report he decided, on the 21st of October, 1872, in the terms of the reference, that the claim of the United States to have the line drawn through the Canal de Haro is most in accordance with the true interpretation of the treaty concluded on the 15th of June, 1846, between Great Britain and the United States. 'This Award,' says the President's Message of December 2, 1872, 'confirms the United States in their claim to the important archipelago of islands lying between the continent and Vancouver's Island, which for more than 26 years . . . Great Britain had contested, and leaves us, for the first time in the history of the United States as a nation, without a question of disputed boundary between our territory and the possessions of Great Britain on this continent.'—C. Cushing, *The Treaty of Washington*, p. 222.—The Haro Archipelago, which formed the subject of dispute, is a group of many islands, mostly small, but containing one of considerable importance, namely the island of San Juan. The combined area of the islands is about 170 square miles. The archipelago is bounded on the north by the Canal de Haro and the Gulf of Georgia, on the east by Rosario Strait, on the west by the Canal de Haro, on the south by the Straits of Fuca. The entrance to the strait called the Canal de Haro is commanded by the Island of San Juan, which has, therefore, been called "the Cronstadt of the Pacific." Its position is such that a few batteries, skillfully placed, would render it almost impregnable." Hence the importance attached to the possession of this island, and especially on the part of Great Britain, looking to the future of British Columbia. By the decision of the Emperor of Germany the entire Archipelago be-

came part of the recognized territory of the United States.—Viscount Milton, *Hist. of the San Juan Water Boundary Question* [to 1869].

SAN MARINO, The Republic of.—"The Republic of San Marino is a survival unique in the political world of Europe. . . . The sovereign independence of San Marino is due to a series of happy accidents which were crystallised into a sentiment. The origin of the State is ascribed to a Dalmatian saint who fled from the early persecutions at Rome and dwelt in a hermitage on Mount Titanus. But it is impossible to believe that there was no earlier population. The mountain is a detached block standing free of the Apennines,—a short twelve miles from the sea coast, easily defensible and commanding a fertile undulating district. The hill-villages must have existed before the towns of the coast. As old as Illyrian pirates were the highland townships of Verrucchio, San Leo, Urbino, Osimo, Loretto, and above all San Marino. Yet, but for the saint and his noble benefactress Felicità, San Marino would have shared the fate of other highland communes. This lady was a Countess Matilda on a small scale. She gave to the young congregation the proprietorship of the mountain, and the lower table land was acquired by subsequent purchase and by the generosity of Pope Æneas Sylvius. But Felicità could not give sovereignty,—she could give no more than she possessed. The sovereignty had rested with the Roman Republic—the Empire—the Goths—the Greeks—the Germans. The Papacy itself had as much claim to San Marino as to anything which it possessed. It was included at all events in the donation of Pepin. In the Pontificate of John XXII the Bishop of Feltro, who claimed the ownership of the town, proposed to sell it, partly because he needed money to restore his church, partly because the Sammarinesi were rebellious subjects,—'not recognising superiors here on earth, and perchance not believing upon a superior in heaven.' Yet the Papacy appears in the 13th century to have accepted a judicial decision as to the sovereign independence of the Republic, and Pius II considerably increased its territory in 1463 at the expense of Sigismund Malatesta. The sovereignty of San Marino is therefore almost as complete a puzzle as that of the mysterious Royaume d'Yvetot. . . . The Malatestas, originally lords of the neighboring upland fortress of Verrucchio would willingly have made the whole ridge the backbone of their State of Rimini. But this very fact secured for the Sammarinesi the constant friendship of the lords of Urbino. . . . Neither power could allow the other to appropriate so invaluable a strategic position. . . . The existing constitution is a living lesson on medieval history. . . . Theoretically, sovereignty in the last resort belongs to the people, and of old this was practically exercised by the Arengo, which thus has some correspondence in meaning and functions to the Florentine Parlamento. The Sammarinesi, however, were wiser than the Florentines. When the increase of population and territory rendered a gathering of the whole people an incompetent engine of legislation, the Arengo was not allowed to remain as a mischievous survival with ill-defined authority at the mercy of the governmental wire-pullers. The prerogatives which were reserved to the Arengo were small but definite. . . . It was after the accession of territory granted by

Pius II. in 1465 that the constitution of the State was fundamentally altered. . . . The people now delegated its sovereignty to the Council, which was raised to 60 members. . . . In 1600 an order of Patricians was established, to which was given one-third of the representation, and the Council now consists of 20 'nobili,' 20 'artisti,' artisans and shopkeepers, and 20 'contadini,' agriculturists. The harmony of the Republic is undisturbed by general elections, for the Council is recruited by co-optation. . . . At the head of the Executive stand the two Captains Regent. To them the statutes assign the sovereign authority and the power of the sword. . . . They draw a small salary, and during their six months of office are free from all State burdens"—E. Armstrong, *A Political Survival* (*Macmillan's Magazine*, Jan., 1891)—"Between this miniature country and its institutions there is a delicious disproportion. The little area of thin soil has for centuries maintained a complicated government. . . . There is a national post-office, there is an army of nine hundred and fifty men and eight officers; there are diplomatic agents in Paris and Montevideo, and consuls in various European cities. Services rendered to the State or to science may be rewarded by knighthood, and so late as 1876 San Marino expressed its gratitude to an English lady for her gift of a statue of liberty, by making her Duchess of Acquaviva. Titles are by no means the most undemocratic part of the republic. On examination it is seen to be in fact an oligarchy."

Yet an oligarchy among yeoman farmers is a very different thing from an oligarchy among merchant princes. San Marino may be compared with colonial Massachusetts. The few voters have always really represented the mass of the people. It has been a singularly united, courageous, honorable, public spirited, and prudent people. Union was possible because it was and is a poor community, in which there were no powerful families to fight and expel each other, or exiles to come back with an enemy's army. The courage of the people is shown by their hospitality to Garibaldi when he was fleeing after his defeat of 1849. An excellent moral fibre was manifested when, in 1868, the Republic refused to receive the gambling establishments which had been made illegal in other countries. The new town-hall is a monument to the enlightened public spirit of the San Marinese, as well as to their taste. That the State is prudent is shown by its distinction, almost unique in Europe, of having no public debt. Other little states in Europe have had similar good qualities, yet have long since been destroyed. Why has San Marino outlived them all? . . . The perpetuation of the government is due in the first place to a singular freedom from any desire to extend its borders. The outlying villages have been added by gift or by their own free will; and when, in 1797, Gen. Bonaparte invited the San Marinose to make their wishes known, 'if any part of the adjacent territory is absolutely necessary to you,' the hard-headed leaders declined 'an enlargement which might in time compromise their liberty.' On the other hand, the poor town had nothing worth plundering, and annexation was so difficult a task that Benedict XIV. said of Cardinal Alberoni's attempt in 1739: 'San Marino is a tough bread-crust; the man who tries to bite it gets his teeth broken.' Nevertheless, even peace-

ful and inoffensive communities were not safe during the last twelve centuries, without powerful protectors. The determining reason for the freedom of San Marino since 1300 has been the friendship of potentates, first of the neighboring Dukes of Urbino, then of the Popes, then of Napoleon, then of Italy. . . . When the kingdom of Italy was formed in 1860, no one cared to erase from the map a state which even the Pope had spared, and in which Europe was interested. Hence the San Marinese retained a situation comparable with that of the native states in India. A 'consolato' of the Italian Government resides in the town; the schools are assimilated to the Italian system, appeals may be had from the courts to the Italian upper courts, and precautions are taken to prevent the harboring of refugee criminals. Yet of the old sovereignty four important incidents are retained. San Marino has a post office, a kind of national plaything, but the rare and beautiful stamps are much prized by collectors, and doubtless the sale helps the coffers of the state. The San Marinese manage, and well manage, their own local affairs, without any annoying interference from an Italian prefect. They owe no military service to Italy, and their own militia is no burden. Above all, they pay no taxes to Italy. If I were an Italian, I should like to be a San Marinese."—A. B. Hart, *The Ancient Commonwealth of San Marino* (*The Nation*, Feb. 1, 1894).

SAN MARTIN, General José de, and the liberation of Chile and Peru. See CHILE: A. D. 1810-1818, and PLAT: A. D. 1820-1826.

SAN MARTINO, Battle of (1859). See ITALY: A. D. 1856-1859.

SAN SALVADOR, Bahamas.—The name given by Columbus to the little island in the Bahama group which he first discovered, and the identity of which is in dispute. See AMERICA: A. D. 1492.

SAN SALVADOR, Central America: A. D. 1821-1871.—Independence of Spain.—Brief annexation to Mexico.—Attempted Federations and their failure. See CENTRAL AMERICA: A. D. 1821-1871.

SAN STEFANO, Treaty of. See TURKS: A. D. 1877-1878, and 1878.

SANCHO I., King of Aragon, A. D. 1063-1094; IV. of Navarre, A. D. 1076-1094. . . . Sancho I., King of Leon and the Asturias, or Oviedo, 955-967. . . . Sancho I., King of Navarre, 905-925. . . . Sancho I., King of Portugal, 1185-1211. . . . Sancho II., King of Castile, 1065-1072. . . . Sancho II. (called The Great), King of Navarre, 970-1035; and I. of Castile, 1026-1035. . . . Sancho II., King of Portugal, 1223-1244. . . . Sancho III., King of Castile, 1157-1158. . . . Sancho III., King of Navarre, 1054-1076. . . . Sancho IV., King of Leon and Castile, 1284-1295. . . . Sancho V., King of Navarre, 1150-1194. . . . Sancho VI., King of Navarre, 1194-1236.

SAND LOT PARTY, The. See CALIFORNIA: A. D. 1877-1880.

SANDEMANIANS.—Robert Sandeman "was a Scotchman who held peculiar religious views: such as—that an intellectual belief would ensure salvation, without faith; and that this intellectual belief was certain to induce Christian virtues. He held these so strongly and urgently that he made a small sect; and in 1764 he came to Connecticut, and founded churches."

at Danbury and at some other places, where his followers were called 'Sandemanians,' and where some traces of them exist still. . . . The followers of Robert Sandeman were nearly all Loyalists [at the time of the American Revolution], and many of them emigrated from Connecticut to New Brunswick."—C. W. Elliott, *The New Eng. Hist.*, v. 2, p. 370.

SANDJAKS, OR SANJAKS. See **BEY**; also **TIMAR**.

SANDJAR, Seljuk Turkish Sultan, A. D. 1116-1157.

SANDWICH ISLANDS, The. See **HAWAIIAN ISLANDS**.

SANGALA.—An ancient city in the Punjab, India, which was the easternmost of all the conquests of Alexander the Great. He took the town by storm (B. C. 326), slaying 17,000 of the inhabitants and taking 70,000 captives.—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 94.

SANHEDRIM, The.—"Beside the priesthood [of the Jewish church], ever since the time of Ezra, there had been insensibly growing a body of scholars, who by the time of Herod had risen to a distinct function of the State. Already under John Hyrcanus there was a judicial body known as the House of Judgment (Beth-Din). To this was given the Macedonian title of Synedrion [or Synhedrion], transformed into the barbarous Hebrew word Sanhedrim, or Sanhedrin."—Dean Stanley, *Lectures on the Hist. of the Jewish Church*, lect. 50.—"The Sanhedrin was the great court of judicature; it judged of all capital offences against the law; it had the power of inflicting punishment by scourging and by death. . . . The Great Sanhedrin was a court of appeal from the inferior Sanhedrins of twenty-three judges established in the other towns. The Sanhedrin was probably confined to its judicial duties—it was a plenary court of justice, and no more—during the reigns of the later Asmonean princes, and during those of Herod the Great and his son Archelaus. . . . When Judæa became a Roman province, the Sanhedrin either, as is more likely, assumed for the first time, or recovered its station as a kind of senate or representative body of the nation. . . . At all events, they seem to have been the channel of intercourse between the Roman rulers and the body of the people. It is the Sanhedrin, under the name of the chief priests, scribes, and elders of the people, who take the lead in all the transactions recorded in the Gospels. Jesus Christ was led before the Sanhedrin, and by them denounced before the tribunal of Pilate."—H. H. Milman, *Hist. of the Jews*, bk. 12.

SANHIKANS, The. See **AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ALGONQUIAN FAMILY**.

SANITARY COMMISSION, and **Christian Commission**, The United States.—"Soon after Mr. Lincoln issued his proclamation [April 15, 1861, at the outbreak of the American Civil War] . . . calling for 75,000 soldiers, many good men and women instituted what they termed 'Soldiers' Aid Societies.' At first the government did not look upon these with approval, under an apprehension that they might interfere with the discipline and efficiency of the armies. Certain physicians and clergymen who had interested themselves in these charitable undertakings perceived how much good could be accomplished by a more extensive and thorough organization. Seeking no remuneration,

they applied to the government to give them recognition and moral support, and, after some difficulty, this being secured, they organized themselves and were recognized as 'the United States Sanitary Commission.' The Rev. Henry W. Bellows, D. D., was its president. Their intention was to aid by their professional advice the medical department of the government service; but soon, the field opening out before them, their operations were greatly enlarged. From being simply an advisory, they became more and more an executive body. . . . The Sanitary Commission now entered on an extraordinary career of usefulness. It ranged itself in affiliation with the government medical bureau. It gathered supporters from all classes of the people. . . . Soon the commission had an independent transportation of its own. It had hospital transports, wagons, ambulances, railroad ambulances, cars. Ingenious men devised for it inventions of better litters, better stretchers, better ambulances. It secured comfortable transportation for the wounded soldier from the battle-field to the hospital. On the railroad it soon had its hospital cars, with kitchen, dispensary, and a surgeon's car in the midst. As its work increased, so did its energies and the singular efficiency of its organization. It divided its services into several departments of duty. (1.) Its preventive service, or sanitary inspection department, had a corps of medical inspectors, who examined thoroughly troops in the field, and reported their condition and needs to its own officers and to the government. It had also a corps of special hospital inspectors, who visited the general hospitals of the army, nearly 300 in number, their reports being confidential, and sent to the surgeon general of the army. (2.) Its department of general relief. This consisted of twelve branches of the general commission, having dépôts in the large towns, each branch having from 150 to 1,200 auxiliaries engaged in obtaining supplies. These were sent to the main dépôt, and there assorted, repacked, and dispatched. One of these branches, the 'Woman's Central Association,' collected stores to the value of over a million of dollars; another, the Northwestern, at Chicago, furnished more than a quarter of a million. Care was taken to have no waste in the distribution. Soldiers of all the states were equally supplied; and even wounded enemies left on the field, or sick and abandoned in the hospitals, were tenderly cared for. (3.) Its department of special relief. This took under its charge soldiers not yet under, or just out of the care of the government; men on sick leave, or found in the streets, or left by their regiments. For such it furnished 'homes.' About 7,500 men were, on an average, thus daily or nightly accommodated. It also had 'lodges' wherein a sick soldier might stay while awaiting his pay from the paymaster general, or, if unable to reach a hospital, might stop for a time. Still more, it had 'Homes for the Wives, Mothers, and Children of Soldiers,' where those visiting the wounded or sick man to minister to his necessities might find protection, defense, food, shelter. It had its 'Feeding Stations,' where a tired and hungry soldier passing by could have a gratuitous meal. On the great military lines these stations were permanently established. On the chief rivers, the Mississippi, the Cumberland, the Potomac, it had 'sanitary

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steamers' for transmitting supplies and transporting the sick and wounded. It established 'agencies' to see that no injustice was done to any soldier; that the soldier, his widow, his orphan, obtained pensions, back pay, bounties, or whatever money was due, that any errors in their papers were properly corrected, and especially that no sharper took advantage of them. It instituted hospital directories by which the friends of a soldier could obtain information without cost as to his place and condition, if within a year he had been an inmate of any hospital. It had such a record of not less than 900,000 names. Whenever permitted to do so, it sent supplies to the United States prisoners of war in confinement at Andersonville, Salisbury, Richmond.

(4) Its department of field relief. The duty of this was to minister to the wounded on the field of battle, to furnish bandages, cordials, nourishment, to give assistance to the surgeons, and to supply any deficiencies it could detect in the field hospitals. It had a chief inspector for the armies of the East, another for the Military Department of the Mississippi, with a competent staff for each. (5) Its auxiliary relief corps. This supplied deficiencies in personal attendance and work in the hospitals, or among the wounded on the field. Between May, 1864, when it was first organized, and January, 1865, it gave its services to more than 75,000 patients. It waited on the sick and wounded, wrote letters for them, gave them stationery, postage stamps, newspapers, and whiled away the heavy hours of suffering by reading magazines and books to them. To the Sanitary Commission the government gave a most earnest support, the people gave it their hearts. They furnished it with more than three millions of dollars in money, of which one million came from the Pacific States, they sent it nine millions' worth of supplies. From fairs held in its interest very large sums were derived. One in New York yielded a million and a quarter of dollars, one in Philadelphia more than a million. In towns comparatively small, there were often collected at such fairs more than twenty thousand dollars. . . . The Christian Commission emulated the noble conduct of the United States Sanitary Commission. It, too, received the recognition and countenance of the government. Its object was to promote the physical and spiritual welfare of soldiers and sailors. Its central office was in Philadelphia, but it had agencies in all the large towns. 'It aided the surgeon, helped the chaplain, followed the armies in their marches, went into the trenches and along the picket line. Wherever there was a sick, a wounded, a dying man, an agent of the Christian Commission was near by.' It gave Christian burial whenever possible, it marked the graves of the dead. It had its religious services, its little extemporized chapels, its prayer-meetings. The American Bible Society gave it Bibles and Testaments, the Tract Society its publications. The government furnished its agents and supplies free transportation, it had the use of the telegraph for its purposes. Steamboat and railroad companies furthered its objects with all their ability. It distributed nearly five millions of dollars in money and supplies."

—J. W. Draper, *Hist. of the American Civil War*, ch. 87 (v. 8).

ALSO IN: L. P. Brockett, *Woman's Work in the Civil War*.—Mrs. M. A. Livermore, *My Story*

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of the War.—K. P. Wormeley, *The Other Side of the War*.—*The Sanitary Commission: its Works and Purposes*.—J. S. Newberry, *The U. S. Sanitary Com. in the Mississippi Valley*.—L. Moss, *Annals of the U. S. Christian Com.*

SANITARY SCIENCE AND LEGISLATION. See MEDICAL SCIENCE. 19TH CENTURY.

SANJAKS, OR SANDJAKS. See BEY, also TIMAR.

SANQUHAR DECLARATION, The.—The Declaration affixed by the Cameronians to the market cross of Sanquhar, in 1680, renouncing allegiance to King Charles II. See SCOTLAND. A. D. 1681-1689.

SANS ARCS, The. See AMERICAN ABO RIGINES. SIOLAN FAMILY.

SANSCULOTTES. See FRANCE: A. D. 1791 (OCTOBER).

SANSCULOTTIDES, of the French Republican Calendar, The. See FRANCE. A. D. 1793 (OCTOBER) THE NEW REPUBLICAN CALENDAR.

SANSKRIT.—The name Sanskrit as applied to the ancient language of the Hindus is an artificial designation for a highly elaborated form of the language originally brought by the Indian branch of the great Aryan race into India. This original tongue soon became modified by contact with the dialects of the aboriginal races who preceded the Aryans, and in this way converted into the peculiar language ('bhasa') of the Aryan immigrants who settled in the neighbourhood of the seven rivers of the Panjab and its outlying districts ('Sapta-Sindhavas'—in Zand 'Hapta Hendu'). The most suitable name for the original language thus moulded into the speech of the Hindus is Hindu i (= Sindhu i), its principal later development being called Hindi, just as the Low German dialect of the Saxons when modified in England was called Anglo-Saxon. But very soon that happened in India which has come to pass in all civilized countries. The spoken language, when once its general form and character had been settled, separated into two lines, the one elaborated by the learned, the other popularized and variously provincialized by the unlearned. In India, however, . . . this separation became more marked, more diversified, and progressively intensified. Hence, the very grammar which with other nations was regarded only as a means to an end, came to be treated by Indian Pandits as the end itself, and was subtilized into an intricate science, fenced around by a bristling barrier of technicalities. The language, too, elaborated 'pari passu' with the grammar, rejected the natural name of Hindu i, or 'the speech of the Hindus,' and adopted an artificial designation, viz. Sanskrita, 'the perfectly constructed speech,' . . . to denote its complete severance from vulgar purposes, and its exclusive dedication to religion and literature, while the name Prakrita—which may mean 'the original' as well as 'the derived' speech—was assigned to the common dialect."—M. Williams, *Indian Wisdom*, introd., p. xviii.

SANTA ANNA, The career of. See MEXICO: A. D. 1820-1826, to 1848-1861, and TEXAS: A. D. 1824-1836.

SANTA HERMANDAD. See HOLY BROTHERHOOD.

SANTA INES, Battle of (1859). See VENEZUELA: A. D. 1829-1886.

SANTA LUCIA.

SANTA LUCIA, Battle of (1848). See ITALY: A. D. 1848-1849.

SANTALS, The. See INDIA: THE ABORIGINAL INHABITANTS.

SANTAREM, Battle of (1184). See PORTUGAL: A. D. 1095-1325.

SANTEES, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: SIOUAN FAMILY.

SANTIAGO, The founding of the city (1541). See CHILE: A. D. 1450-1724.

SANTIAGO, OR ST. JAGO, Knights of the Order of. See CALATRAVA.

SANTONES, The. See PICTONES.

SAPAUDIA.—The early name of Savoy. See BURGUNDIANS: A. D. 443-451.

SAPEIRES, The. See IBERIANS, EASTERN.

SAPIENZA, OR PORTOLONGO, Battle of (1354). See CONSTANTINOPLE: A. D. 1348-1355.

SARACENIC EMPIRE. See MAHOMETAN CONQUEST AND EMPIRE.

SARACENIC SCHOOLS. See EDUCATION, MEDIEVAL: and MEDICAL SCIENCE.

SARACENS, The name.—"From Mecca to the Euphrates, the Arabian tribes were confounded by the Greeks and Latins under the general appellation of Saracens. . . . The name which, used by Ptolemy and Pliny in a more confined, by Ammianus and Procopius in a larger, sense, has been derived, ridiculously, from Sarah, the wife of Abraham, obscurely from the village of Saraka, . . . more plausibly from the Arabic words which signify a thievish character, or Oriental situation. . . . Yet the last and most popular of these etymologies is refuted by Ptolemy (Arabia, p. 2. 18. in Hudson, tom. iv.), who expressly remarks the western and southern position of the Saracens, then an obscure tribe on the borders of Egypt. The appellation cannot, therefore, allude to any national character; and, since it was imposed by strangers, it must be found, not in the Arabic, but in a foreign language."—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 50, and note.—"Dr. Clarke (Travels, v. ii., p. 391) after expressing contemptuous pity for Gibbon's ignorance, derives the word from Zara, Zuara, Sara, the Desert, whence Saraceni, the children of the Desert. De Marliès adopts the derivation from Sarrik, a robber, Hist. des Arabes, vol. 1., p. 36; St. Martin from Scharkoun, or Sharkun, Eastern, vol. xi., p. 55."—H. Milman, note to Gibbon, as above.—The Kadmonites "are undoubtedly what their name expresses, Orientals, Saracens, otherwise 'B'ne Kedem,' or Sons of the East; a name restricted in practice to the east contiguous to Palestine, and comprising only the Arabian nations dwelling between Palestine and the Euphrates. . . . The name Saraceni was in use among the Romans long before Islam, apparently from the time of Trajan's and Hadrian's wars."—H. Ewald, *Hist. of Israel*, introd., sect. 4, with foot-note (v. 1).—In the Middle Ages the term Saracen became common in its application to the Arabs, and, in fact, to the Mahometan races pretty generally. See ROME: A. D. 96-188.

SARAGOSSA: Origin. See CÆSAR-AUGUSTA.

A. D. 543.—Siege by the Franks. See GOTHs (VISIGOTHs): A. D. 507-711.

A. D. 713.—Siege and conquest by the Arab-Moors. See SPAIN: A. D. 711-718.

SARDINIA.

A. D. 778.—Siege by Charlemagne. See SPAIN: A. D. 778.

A. D. 1012-1146.—The seat of a Moorish kingdom. See SPAIN: A. D. 1081-1086.

A. D. 1710.—Defeat of the Spaniards by the Allies. See SPAIN: A. D. 1707-1710.

A. D. 1808.—Fruitless siege by the French. See SPAIN: A. D. 1808 (MAY-SEPTEMBER).

A. D. 1808-1809.—Siege and capture by the French.—Extraordinary defense of the city. See SPAIN: A. D. 1808-1809 (DECEMBER-MARCH).

A. D. 1809.—Siege by the French. See SPAIN: A. D. 1809 (FEBRUARY-JULY).

A. D. 1809.—Battle and Spanish defeat. See SPAIN: A. D. 1809 (FEBRUARY-JUNE).

SARANGIANS.—The name given by Herodotus to a warlike people who dwelt anciently on the shores of the Hamun and in the Valley of the Hilmenid—southwestern Afghanistan. By the later Greeks they were called Zarangians and Drangians; by the Persians Zaraka.

SARATOGA, Burgoyne's surrender at. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1777 (JULY-OCTOBER).

SARATOGA, The proposed State of. See NORTHWEST TERRITORY: A. D. 1784.

SARAWAK. See BORNEO.

SARCEES (TINNEH). See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: BLACKFEET; and ATHAPASCAN.

SARDANAPALUS. See SEMITES: ASSYRIAN EMPIRE.

SARDINIA (The Island): Name and early history.—"The name of the island 'Sardo' is derived with probability from the Phœnician, and describes its resemblance to the human footstep. . . . Diodorus reckons this island among the places to which the Phœnicians sent colonies, after they had enriched themselves by the silver of Spain. . . . What the primitive population of the island was, which the Phœnicians found there when they touched at its southern ports on their way to Spain, whether it had come from the coast of Italy, or Africa, we can only conjecture. In historical times it appears to have been derived from three principal sources,—immigrations from Africa, represented by the traditions of Sardus and Aristæus; from Greece, represented by Iolaus, and from the south and south-east of Spain, represented by Norax. . . . The name Norax has evidently a reference to those singular remains of ancient architecture, the Nuraghi of Sardinia,—stone towers in the form of a truncated cone, with a spiral staircase in the thickness of the wall, which to the number of 3,000 are scattered over the island, chiefly in the southern and western parts. Nothing entirely analogous to these has been found in any other part of the world; but they resemble most the Athalayas [or Talajots] of Minorca, whose population was partly Iberian, partly Libyan. . . . The Carthaginians, at the time when their naval power was at its height, in the sixth and fifth centuries B. C., subdued all the level country, the former inhabitants taking refuge among the mountains, where their manners receded towards barbarism."—J. Kenrick, *Phœnicia*, ch. 4, sect. 8.

A. D. 1017.—Conquest from the Saracens by the Pisans and Genoese. See PISA: ORIGIN OF THE CITY.

SARDINIA.

A. D. 1708.—Taken by the Allies. See SPAIN: A. D. 1707-1710.

A. D. 1713.—Ceded to the Elector of Bavaria with the title of King. See UTRECHT: A. D. 1712-1714.

A. D. 1714.—Exchanged with the emperor for the Upper Palatinate. See UTRECHT: A. D. 1712-1714.

A. D. 1717.—Retaken by Spain. See SPAIN: A. D. 1718-1725.

A. D. 1719.—Given up by Spain and acquired by the Duke of Savoy in exchange for Sicily, giving its name to his kingdom. See SPAIN: A. D. 1718-1725; also ITALY: A. D. 1715-1735.

SARDINIA (The Kingdom): A. D. 1742.—The king joins Austria in the War of the Austrian Succession. See ITALY: A. D. 1741-1743.

A. D. 1743.—Treaty of Worms, with Austria and England. See ITALY: A. D. 1743.

A. D. 1743.—The Bourbon Family Compact against the king. See FRANCE: A. D. 1743 (OCTOBER).

A. D. 1744.—The War of the Austrian Succession: French and Spanish invasion of Piedmont. See ITALY: A. D. 1744.

A. D. 1745.—The War of the Austrian Succession: Overwhelming reverses. See ITALY: A. D. 1745.

A. D. 1746-1747.—The War of the Austrian Succession: The French and Spaniards driven out. See ITALY: A. D. 1746-1747.

A. D. 1748.—Termination and results of the War of the Austrian Succession. See AIX-LA-CHAPELLE: THE CONGRESS.

A. D. 1792.—Annexation of Savoy and Nice to the French Republic. See FRANCE: A. D. 1792 (SEPTEMBER—DECEMBER).

A. D. 1793.—Joined in the Coalition against Revolutionary France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1793 (MARCH—SEPTEMBER).

A. D. 1794.—Passes of the Alps secured by the French. See FRANCE: A. D. 1794-1795 (OCTOBER—MAY).

A. D. 1795.—French victory at Loano. See FRANCE: A. D. 1795 (JUNE—DECEMBER).

A. D. 1796.—Submission to the French under Bonaparte.—Treaty of peace.—Cession of Savoy to the Republic. See FRANCE: A. D. 1796 (APRIL—OCTOBER).

A. D. 1798.—Piedmont taken by the French.—Its sovereignty relinquished by the king. See FRANCE: A. D. 1798-1799 (AUGUST—APRIL).

A. D. 1799.—French evacuation of Piedmont. See FRANCE: A. D. 1799 (APRIL—SEPTEMBER).

A. D. 1800.—Recovery of Piedmont by the French. See FRANCE: A. D. 1800-1801 (MAY—FEBRUARY).

A. D. 1802.—Annexation of part of Piedmont to France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1802 (AUGUST—SEPTEMBER).

A. D. 1814-1815.—The king recovers his kingdom.—Annexation of Genoa.—Cession of part of Savoy to France. See VIENNA, THE CONGRESS OF: also FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (APRIL—JUNE).

A. D. 1815.—Accession to the Holy Alliance. See HOLY ALLIANCE.

A. D. 1820-1821.—Abortive revolutionary rising and war with Austria.—The defeat at Novara. See ITALY: A. D. 1820-1821.

SARMATIA.

A. D. 1831.—Death of Charles Felix.—Accession of Charles Albert. See ITALY: A. D. 1830-1832.

A. D. 1848-1849.—Alliance with insurgent Lombardy and Venetia.—War with Austria.—Defeat.—Abdication of Charles Albert.—Accession of Victor Emmanuel II. See ITALY: A. D. 1848-1849.

A. D. 1855.—In the Alliance of the Crimean War against Russia. See RUSSIA: A. D. 1854-1856.

A. D. 1856-1870.—The great work of Count Cavour and King Victor Emmanuel.—Liberation of the whole Peninsula and creation of the kingdom of Italy. See ITALY: A. D. 1856-1859, to 1867-1870.

SARDIS.—When Cyrus the Great founded the Persian empire by the overthrow of that of the Medes, B. C. 558, his first enterprise of conquest, outside of the Median dominion, was directed against the kingdom of Lydia, then, under its famous king Croesus, dominant in Asia Minor and rapidly increasing in wealth and power. After an indecisive battle, Croesus retired to his capital city, Sardis, which was then the most splendid city of Asia Minor, and was followed by Cyrus, who captured and plundered the town, at the end of a siege of only fourteen days. The fall of Sardis was the fall of the Lydian kingdom, which was absorbed into the great empire of Persia.—G. Rawlinson, *Five Great Monarchies: Persia*, ch. 7.—Fifty-eight years later (about 500 B. C.) at the beginning of the Ionian Revolt, when the Greek cities of Asia Minor attempted to throw off the Persian yoke, Sardis was again plundered and burned by an invading force of Ionians and Athenians.—C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece*, ch. 14.—See, also, PERSIA: B. C. 521-493.

SARGASSO SEA, The. See AMERICA: A. D. 1492.

SARISSA, The. See PHALANX.

SARK, Battle of (1448).—This was a severe defeat inflicted by the Scots upon an English force, invading Scottish territory, under Lord Percy. The English lost 3,000 men and Percy was taken prisoner.—Sir W. Scott, *Hist. of Scotland*, ch. 19.

SARMATIA. — SARMATIANS.—“The Scythians of the time of Herodotus were separated only by the river Tannais [modern Don] from the Sarmatians, who occupied the territory for several days' journey north-east of the Palus Mæotis; on the south, they were divided by the Danube from the section of Thracians called Getæ. Both these nations were nomadic, analogous to the Scythians in habits, military efficiency, and fierceness. Indeed, Herodotus and Hippocrates distinctly intimate that the Sarmatians were nothing but a branch of Scythians, speaking a Scythian dialect, and distinguished from their neighbours on the other side of the Tannais chiefly by this peculiarity,—that the women among them were warriors hardly less daring and expert than the men.”—G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, pt. 2, ch. 17.—The Sarmatians ultimately gave their name to the whole region of northeastern Europe, and some writers have considered them to be, not Scythic or Mongolic in race, but progenitors of the modern Slavonic family. By Sarmatia [Tacitus] seems to have understood what is now Moldavia and Wallachia,

and perhaps part of the south of Russia."—Church and Brodribb, *Geog. Notes to The Germany of Tacitus*.—See SLAVONIC PEOPLES.

SARMATIAN AND MARCOMANNIAN WARS OF MARCUS AURELIUS.—It was during the reign of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus that the inroads of the barbarians along the Danubian frontier of the Roman Empire began to be seriously frequent and bold. "It is represented as a simultaneous, and even a combined attack, of all the races on the northern frontier, who may be ranged under the three national divisions of Germans, Scythians, and Sarmatians; though we may question the fact of an actual league among tribes so many, so various, and so distant." The Marcomanni and the Quadi on the upper Danube, and the Sarmatian tribes on the lower, were the prominent intruders, and the campaigns which Aurelius conducted against them, A. D. 167-180, are generally called either the Marcomannian or the Sarmatian Wars. During these thirteen years, the noblest of all monarchs surrendered repeatedly the philosophic calm which he loved so well, and gave himself to the hateful business of frontier war vainly striving to arrest in its beginning the impending flood of barbaric invasion. Repeatedly, he won the semblance of a peace with the unrelenting foe, and as repeatedly it was broken. He died in his soldier's harness, at Vindobona (Vienna), and happily did not live to witness the peace which Rome, in the end, stooped to buy from the foes she had no more strength to overcome.—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 68.

ALSO IN: P. B. Watson, *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus*, ch. 4-6.—See, also, THUNDERING LEGION.

SARN HELEN, The.—A Roman road running through Wales, called by the Welsh the Sarn Helen, or road of Helen, from a notion that the Empress Helena caused it to be made.—T. Wright, *Celt. Roman and Saxon*, ch. 5.

SARPI, Fra Paolo, and the contest of Venice with the Papacy. See VENICE: A. D. 1606-1607.

SARRE-LOUIS: A. D. 1680.—The founding of the city. See FRANCE: A. D. 1679-1681.

SARUS, Battle of the.—One of the victories of the Emperor Heraclius, A. D. 625, in his war with the Persians.—G. Rawlinson, *Seventh Great Oriental Monarchy*, ch. 24.

SASKATCHEWAN, The district of. See NORTHWEST TERRITORIES OF CANADA.

SASSANIAN DYNASTY.—Artaxerxes I, who resurrected the Persian empire, or called a new Persian empire into existence, A. D. 226, by the overthrow of the Parthian monarchy and the subjection of its dominions, founded a dynasty which took the name of the Sassanian, or the family of the Sassanidae, from one Sasan, who, according to some accounts was the father, according to others a remoter progenitor of Artaxerxes. This second Persian monarchy is, itself, often called the Sassanian, to distinguish it from the earlier Achaemenian Persian empire.—G. Rawlinson, *Seventh Great Oriental Monarchy*.—See, also, PERSIA: B. C. 150-A. D. 226.

SASTEAN FAMILY, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINALS: SASTEAN FAMILY.

SATOLLI, Apostolic Delegate in America. See PAPACY: A. D. 1892.

SATRAP.—SATRAPIES.—Darius Hystaspis "has been well called 'the true founder of the Persian state.' He found the Empire a

crude and heterogeneous mass of ill-assorted elements, hanging loosely together by the single tie of subjection to a common head; he left it a compact and regularly organized body, united on a single well-ordered system, permanently established everywhere. . . . It was the first, and probably the best, instance of that form of government which, taking its name from the Persian word for provincial ruler, is known generally as the system of 'satrapial' administration. Its main principles were, in the first place, the reduction of the whole Empire to a quasi-uniformity by the substitution of one mode of governing for several, secondly, the substitution of fixed and definite burthens on the subject in lieu of variable and uncertain calls; and thirdly, the establishment of a variety of checks and counterpoises among the officials to whom it was necessary that the crown should delegate its powers. . . . The authority instituted by Darius was that of his satraps. He divided the whole Empire into a number of separate governments—a number which must have varied at different times, but which seems never to have fallen short of twenty. Over each government he placed a satrap or supreme civil governor, charged with the collection and transmission of the revenue, the administration of justice, the maintenance of order, and the general supervision of the territory. These satraps were nominated by the king at his pleasure from any class of his subjects, and held office for no definite term, but simply until recalled, being liable to deprivation or death at any moment, without other formality than the presentation of the royal 'firman.' While, however, they remained in office they were despotic—they represented the Great King, and were clothed with a portion of his majesty. . . . They wielded the power of life and death. They assessed the tribute on the several towns and villages within their jurisdiction at their pleasure, and appointed deputies—called sometimes, like themselves, satraps—over cities or districts within their province, whose office was regarded as one of great dignity. . . . Nothing restrained their tyranny but such sense of right as they might happen to possess, and the fear of removal or execution if the voice of complaint reached the monarch."—G. Rawlinson, *Five Great Monarchies: Persia*, ch. 7.

SATTAGYDÆ, The. See GEDROSIANS.

SATURNALIA, The Roman.—"The Saturnalia, first celebrated in Rome at the dedication [of the temple of Saturn, on the southern slope of the Capitoline Hill] . . . extended originally over three, but finally over seven days, during which all social distinctions were ignored; slaves were admitted to equality with their masters; and the chains which the emancipated from slavery used to hang, as thanksgiving, on or below the statue of the god, were taken down to intimate that perfect freedom had been enjoyed by all alike under the thrice-happy Saturnian reign. Varro mentions the practice of sending wax tapers as presents during this festival; and when we remember the other usage of suspending wax masks, during the Saturnalia, in a chapel beside the temple of the beneficent Deity, the analogies between these equalizing fêtes and the modern Carnival become more apparent."—C. I. Hemans, *Historic and Monumental Rome*, ch. 6.

SAUCHIE BURN, Battle of (1455). See SCOTLAND: A. D. 1452-1458.

SAUCY CASTLE. See CHÂTEAU GAILLARD.

SAUK, OR SAC, Indians. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ALGONQUIAN FAMILY, and SACS.

SAULCOURT, Battle of (A. D. 881).—A notable defeat inflicted upon the invading Northmen or Danes in 881 by the French king Louis III., one of the last of the Carolingian line. The battle is commemorated in a song which is one of the earliest specimens of Teutonic verse.—Sir F. Palgrave, *History of Normandy and England*, bk. 1, ch. 4 (v. 1).

SAULT STE. MARIE, The Jesuit mission at. See CANADA. A. D. 1634-1673.

SAULTEUR, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: OJIBWAYS.

SAUMUR: Stormed by the Vendéans. See FRANCE. A. D. 1793 (JUNE).

SAUROMATÆ, The. See SCYTHIANS.

SAVAGE STATION, Battle of. See UNITED STATES OF AM. A. D. 1862 (JUNE—JULY: VIRGINIA).

SAVANNAH: A. D. 1732.—The founding of the city. See GEORGIA. A. D. 1732-1739.

A. D. 1775-1776.—Activity of the Liberty Party. See GEORGIA. A. D. 1775-1777.

A. D. 1778.—Taken and occupied by the British. See UNITED STATES OF AM: A. D. 1778-1779 WAR (CARRIED INTO THE SOUTH).

A. D. 1779.—Unsuccessful attack by the French and Americans. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1779 (SEPTEMBER—OCTOBER).

A. D. 1861.—Threatened by the Union forces, in occupation of the islands at the mouth of the river. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1861 (OCTOBER—DECEMBER: SOUTH CAROLINA—GEORGIA).

A. D. 1862.—Reduction of Fort Pulaski by the national forces, and sealing up of the port. See UNITED STATES OF AM. A. D. 1862 (FEBRUARY—APRIL: GEORGIA—FLORIDA).

A. D. 1864.—Confederate evacuation.—Sherman in possession. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (NOVEMBER—DECEMBER: GEORGIA).

SAVANNAHS, The. See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ALGONQUIAN FAMILY.

SAVENAY, Battle of. See FRANCE. A. D. 1793 (JULY—DECEMBER) THE CIVIL WAR.

SAVERNE: Taken by Duke Bernhard (1636). See GERMANY: A. D. 1634-1639.

SAVERY, Thomas, and the Steam Engine. See STEAM ENGINE.

SAVONA, The Pope at. See PAPACY: A. D. 1808-1814.

SAVONAROLA, in Florence. See FLORENCE: A. D. 1490-1498.

SAVOY AND PIEDMONT: The founding of the Burgundian kingdom in Savoy. See BURGUNDIANS: A. D. 443-451.

11th Century.—The founders of the House of Savoy. See BURGUNDY: A. D. 1032.

11-15th Centuries.—Rise and growth of the dominions of the Savoyard princes, in Italy and the Burgundian territory.—Creation of the duchy.—Assumption of the title of Princes of Piedmont.—“The cradle of the Savoyard power lay in the Burgundian lands immediately bordering upon Italy and stretching on both sides of the Alps. It was to their geographical position,

as holding several great mountain passes, that the Savoyard princes owed their first importance, succeeding therein in some measure to the Burgundian kings themselves. The early stages of the growth of the house are very obscure; and its power does not seem to have formed itself till after the union of Burgundy with the Empire. But it seems plain that, at the end of the 11th century, the Counts of Maurienne, which was their earliest title, held rights of sovereignty in the Burgundian districts of Maurienne, Savoy strictly so called, Tarantaise, and Aosta. . . . The early Savoyard possessions reached to the Lake of Geneva, and spread on both sides of the inland mouth of the Rhone. The power of the Savoyard princes in this region was largely due to their ecclesiastical position as advocates of the abbey of Saint Maurice. Thus their possessions had a most irregular outline, nearly surrounding the lands of Genevois and Faucigny. A state of this shape, like Prussia in a later age and on a greater scale, was, as it were, predestined to make further advances. But for some centuries those advances were made much more largely in Burgundy than in Italy. The original Italian possessions of the House bordered on their Burgundian counties of Maurienne and Aosta, taking in Susa and Turin. This small marchland gave its princes the sounding title of Marquesses in Italy. . . . In the 12th and 13th centuries, the princes of Savoy were still hemmed in, in their own corner of Italy, by princes of equal or greater power, at Montferrat, at Saluzzo, at Iverea, and at Blandrate. And it must be remembered that their position as princes at once Burgundian and Italian was not peculiar to them. . . . The Italian dominions of the family remained for a long while quite secondary to its Burgundian possessions. . . . The main object of Savoyard policy in this region was necessarily the acquisition of the lands of Faucigny and the Genevois. But the final incorporation of those lands did not take place till they were still more completely hemmed in by the Savoyard dominions through the extension of the Savoyard power to the north of the Lake. This began early in the 13th century [1207] by a royal grant of Moudon to Count Thomas of Savoy. Romont was next won, and became the centre of the Savoyard power north of the Lake. Soon after, through the conquests of Peter of Savoy [1263-1268], who was known as the Little Charlemagne and who plays a part in English as well as in Burgundian history, these possessions grew into a large dominion, stretching along a great part of the shores of the Lake of Neuchâtel and reaching as far north as Murten or Morat. . . . This new dominion north of the Lake was, after Peter's reign, held for a short time by a separate branch of the Savoyard princes as Barons of Vaud, but in the middle of the 14th century, their barony came into the direct possession of the elder branch of the house. The lands of Faucigny and the Genevois were thus altogether surrounded by the Savoyard territory. Faucigny had passed to the Dauphins of the Viennois, who were the constant rivals of the Savoyard counts, down to the time of the practical transfer of their dauphiny to France. Soon after that annexation, Savoy obtained Faucigny, with Gex and some other districts beyond the Rhone, in exchange for some small Savoyard possessions within the dauphiny. The long struggle for the

Genevois, the county of Geneva, was ended by its purchase in the beginning of the 15th century [1401]. This left the city of Geneva altogether surrounded by Savoyard territory, a position which before long altogether changed the relations between the Savoyard counts and the city. Hitherto, in the endless struggles between the Genevese counts, bishops, and citizens, the Savoyard counts . . . had often been looked on by the citizens as friends and protectors. Now that they had become immediate neighbours of the city, they began before long to be its most dangerous enemies. The acquisition of the Genevois took place in the reign of the famous Amadeus the Eighth, the first Duke of Savoy, who received that rank by grant of King Sigismund [1417], and who was afterwards the Anti pope Felix [see PAPACY A D 1431-1448]. In his reign the dominions of Savoy, as a power ruling on both sides of the Alps, reached their greatest extent. But the Savoyard power was still pre-eminently Burgundian, and Chambéry was its capital. The continuous Burgundian dominion of the house now reached from the Alps to the Saône, surrounding the lake of Geneva and spreading on both sides of the lake of Neuchâtel. Besides this continuous Burgundian dominion, the House of Savoy had already become possessed [1388] of Nizza, by which their dominions reached to the sea. . . . After the 15th century, the Burgundian history of that house consists of the steps spread over more than 300 years by which this great dominion was lost. The real importance of the house of Savoy in Italy dates from much the same time as the great extension of its power in Burgundy. . . . During the 14th century, among many struggles with the Marquesses of Montferrat and Saluzzo, the Angevin counts of Provence, and the lords of Milan, the Savoyard power in Italy generally increased. . . . Before the end of the reign of Amadeus [the Eighth—1391-1451], the dominions of Savoy stretched as far as the Sesia, taking in Biella, Santhia and Vercelli. Counting Nizza and Aosta as Italian, which they now practically were, the Italian dominions of the House reached from the Alps of Wallis to the sea. But they were nearly cut in two by the dominions of the Marquesses of Montferrat, from whom however the Dukes of Savoy now claimed homage. . . . Amadeus, the first Duke of Savoy, took the title of Count of Piedmont, and afterwards that of Prince. His possessions were now fairly established as a middle state, Italian and Burgundian, in nearly equal proportions."—E. A. Freeman, *Historical Geog. of Europe*, ch. 8, sect. 7.

ALSO IN: A. Gallenga, *Hist. of Piedmont*, v 1, ch. 6-9, v. 2, ch. 1-6.

A. D. 1452-1454.—Alliance with Venice and Naples.—War with Milan and Florence. See MILAN: A. D. 1447-1454.

A. D. 1504-1535.—Struggles with the independent burghers of Geneva.—Loss of the Vidommate. See GENEVA: A. D. 1504-1535.

A. D. 1536-1544.—Conquest by the French and restoration to the Duke by the Treaty of Crespy. See FRANCE: A. D. 1532-1547.

A. D. 1559-1580.—End of the French occupation.—Recovery of his dominions by Emanuel Philibert.—His reconstruction of the state.—Treaties with the Swiss.—War with the Waldenses.—Tolerant Treaty of Cavour.—Settlement of government at Turin.—"The

history of Piedmont begins where the history of Italy terminates. At the Peace of Chateau-Cambresis [see FRANCE: A. D. 1547-1559], in 1559, Piedmont was born again. Under Amadeus VIII. Savoy bade fair to become a State of the very first order. In the course of a century it had sunk to a third-rate power. . . . Piedmont, utterly prostrated by five-and-twenty years of foreign occupation, laid waste by the trampling of all the armies of Europe, required now the work of a constructive genius, and Emanuel Philibert was providentially fitted for the task. No man could better afford to be pacific than the conqueror of St. Quentin [see FRANCE as above]. After the battle of St. Quentin, Emanuel Philibert had France at his discretion. Had his counsels been instantly followed, the Spanish army would have dictated its own terms before or within the walls of Paris.

The reconciliation of France with the hero who had alarmed and humbled her seemed, nevertheless, to be sincere." Under the terms of the treaty, the Duke of Savoy's dominions, occupied by the French, were to be restored to him, except that Turin, Chieri, Chivasso, Pinerolo, and Villanova d' Asti, with part of their territories, "were to be occupied for three years, or until the settlement of the differences between the two Courts, chiefly with regard to the dowry of Louisa of Savoy, mother of Francis I., the original cause of dispute. . . . So long as France insisted on keeping the five above mentioned places, Spain was also empowered to retain Asti and Vercelli." Philip II., however, gave up Vercelli and "contented himself with the occupation of Asti and Santia." The differences with France proved hard of settlement, and it was not until 1574 that "Emanuel Philibert found himself in possession of all his subalpine dominions. No words can describe the meanness and arrogance by which the French aggravated this prolonged usurpation of their neighbour's territories.

Had Emanuel Philibert put himself at the head of one of [the factions which fought in France at this time]. . . . he might have paid back . . . the indignities he had had to endure, but his mission was the restoration of his own State, not the subjugation of his neighbour's. The same moderation and longanimity which enabled Emanuel Philibert to avoid a collision with France, because he deemed it unreasonable, equally distinguished him in his relations with his neighbours of Italy. There was now, alas! no Italy; the country had fallen a prey to the Spanish branch of the House of Austria, and the very existence of Mantua, Parma, Tuscany, etc., was at the mercy of Philip II. . . . This 'most able and most honest of all the princes of his line' was fully aware of the importance of his position as the 'bulwark of Italy,' and felt that on his existence hung the fate of such states in the Peninsula as still aspired to independence. 'I know full well,' he said in a moment of cordial expansion, 'that these foreigners are all bent on the utter destruction of Italy, and that I may be the first immolated; but my full can be indifferent to no Italian state, and least of all to Venice.' Full of these thoughts, he was unwearied in his endeavours to secure the friendship of that republic. . . . The same instinctive dread of the crushing ascendancy of Spain and France, which made Emanuel Philibert cling to the Venetian alliance, equally urged

him to settle, no matter at what cost, the differences with the other old allies of his house—the Swiss. The Pays de Vaud, Gex, Chablais, and Lower Valais were still in the power of the confederates [see SWITZERLAND: A. D. 1531-1648]; and it was not without a murmur that the Duke of Savoy could part with so fair a portion of his forefathers' inheritance; but it was not long ere he learnt to resign all hope of its recovery. A new generation had sprung up in those provinces, amongst whom all loyalty to Savoy had died off. The Bernese had introduced the Reformation into the conquered lands. . . . Political freedom went hand in hand with religious innovation. . . . Geneva was the very head-quarters of reform; it was proud of the appellation of the 'Rome of Calvinism.' . . . Emanuel Philibert, ill-supported by Spain and thwarted by France, laid aside all ideas of an appeal to force, and trusted his cause to negotiation. There was happily division in the enemy's camp; religious difference had set the old forest cantons into opposition with Berne and her Protestant associates. The Duke of Savoy made a treaty at Lucerne (November 11, 1560) with Schwytz, Uri, Unterwald, Zug, Lucerne, Soleure, and even Zurich; and these promised their good offices with their Protestant brethren in behalf of Savoy. Lengthy and somewhat stormy conferences ensued, the result of which was the treaty of Lausanne (October 30, 1564); by the terms of which Berne retained Vaud, and Friburg Romont, and Savoy only recovered Gex and Chablais. At a later period (March 4th, 1569) Valais also came to terms at Thonon; it gave up its own share of Chablais, but remained in possession of Lower Valais. By the recovery of Gex and Chablais Savoy now encompassed Geneva on all sides, and caused that town incessant uneasiness; but the Duke . . . was . . . earnestly bent on peace, and he reassured the Genevese by new treaties, signed at Berne (May 5th, 1570), by which he engaged to give no molestation to Geneva. These same treaties bound Savoy to allow freedom of conscience and worship to those of her subjects who had embraced Protestantism during the Swiss occupation; and we hear, in fact, of no persecutions in the provinces round the Leman in Emanuel Philibert's lifetime; but it is important to inquire how that Prince dealt in these matters with his subjects in general. . . . We hear from several authorities that 'the Piedmontese were more than half Protestants.' The Waldensian ministers reckoned their sectaries at the foot of the Alps at 800,000. . . . The Waldenses considered the prevalence of the new tenets as their own triumph. From 1526 to 1530 they entered into communication with the Reformers, and modified their own creed and worship in accordance with the new ideas, identifying themselves especially with the disciples of Calvin. . . . Their valleys became a refuge for all persecuted sectaries, amongst whom there were turbulent spirits, who stirred up those simple and loyal mountaineers to mutiny and revolt. Although they thus called down upon themselves the enmity of all the foes to Protestantism, these valleys continued nevertheless to be looked upon as a privileged district, and their brethren of other provinces found there a safe haven from the storms which drove them from their homes." In 1559, the Duke issued his edict of Nice, "intended not so much to suppress heresy as to re-

press it." The Waldenses "assumed a mutinous attitude," and "applied for succour to the Huguenot chiefs of the French provinces." Then the Duke sent 4,000 foot and 200 horse into the valleys, under the Count de la Trinita, and a fierce and sanguinary war ensued. "Its horrors were aggravated by foreign combatants, as the ranks of La Trinita were swelled by both French and Spanish marauders; and the Huguenots of France, and even some Protestant volunteers from Germany, fought with the Waldenses. . . . But it was not for the interest of the Duke of Savoy that his subjects should thus tear each other to pieces. After repeated checks La Trinita met with, . . . a covenant was signed at Cavour on the 5th of June, 1561. The Waldenses were allowed full amnesty and the free exercise of their worship within their own territory. . . . Within those same boundaries they consented to the erection of Catholic churches, and bound themselves to a reciprocal toleration of Roman rites. . . . The Treaty of Cavour satisfied neither party. It exposed the Duke to the loud reprimands of Rome, France and Spain, no less than to the bitter invectives of all his clergy . . . ; and, on the other hand the Waldenses . . . again and again placed themselves in opposition to the authorities deputed to rule over them. . . . In his leniency towards the sectaries of the valleys, Emanuel Philibert was actuated by other motives besides the promptings of a naturally generous soul. . . . His great schemes for the regeneration of the country could only find their development in a few years of profound peace. . . . Whatever may be thought of the discontent to which his heavy taxes gave rise among the people, or his stern manners among the nobles, it is a beautiful consoling fact that the establishment of despotism in Piedmont did not cost a single drop of blood, that the prince subdued and disciplined his people by no other means than the firmness of his iron will. . . . The great work for which Piedmont will be eternally indebted to the memory of this great prince was the nationalization of the State. He established the seat of government at Turin, recalled to that city the senate which had been first convoked at Carignano, and the university which had been provisionally opened at Mondovi. Turin, whose bishop had been raised to metropolitan honours in 1515, had enjoyed comparative security under the French, who never lost possession of it from 1536 to 1562. It dates its real greatness and importance from Emanuel Philibert's reign, when the population . . . rose to 17,000 souls. . . . It was not without great bitterness that the transalpine provinces of Savoy submitted to the change, and saw the dignity and ascendancy of a sovereign state depart from them." Emanuel Philibert died in 1580, and was succeeded by his son, Charles Emanuel.—A. Gallenga, *Hist. of Piedmont*, v. 3, ch. 1.

A. D. 1580-1713.—Vicissitudes of a century and a quarter.—Profitable infidelities in war.—The Duke wins Sicily and the title of King.—Emanuel Philibert, by his "well-timed policy of peace, . . . was enabled to leave his duchy immensely strengthened to his son Charles Emanuel (1580-1630). The new duke was much more active in his policy. His marriage with a daughter of Philip II. bound him to the side of Spain and he supported the cause of the League

in France. With the help of the Catholic party he seized the vacant marquise of Saluzzo, and thus involved himself in a long quarrel with Henry IV. In 1601 the peace of Lyons confirmed the duke in the possession of Saluzzo, in exchange for which he ceded Bresse on the Rhone frontier to Henry. All attempts made to recover Geneva for Savoy proved unsuccessful. Before his death the restless Charles Emmanuel brought forward another claim to the marquise of Montferrat. This had been held since 1533 by the dukes of Mantua, whose male line became extinct in 1627. The duke did not live to see the settlement of the Mantuan succession, but his son, Victor Amadeus I., obtained great part of Montferrat by the treaty of Cherasco (1631). Richelieu had now acquired Pinerolo and Casale for France and this effected a complete change in the policy of Savoy. Victor Amadeus was married to Christine a daughter of Henry IV. and he and his successor remained till nearly the end of the century as faithful to France as his predecessors had been to Spain. Charles Emmanuel II., who succeeded as a minor on the early death of his father, was at first under the guardianship of his mother, and when he came of age remained in the closest alliance with Louis XIV. His great object was to secure the Italian position which Savoy had assumed, by the acquisition of Genoa. But the maritime republic made a successful resistance both to open attack and to treacherous plots. Victor Amadeus II., who became duke in 1675, was married to a daughter of Philip of Orleans. But Louis XIV. had begun to treat Savoy less as an ally than as a dependency, and the duke, weary of French domination, broke off the old connexion, and in 1690 joined the League of Augsburg against Louis. His defection was well timed and successful, for the treaty of Ryswick (1697) gave him the great fortresses of Pinerolo and Casale, which had so long dominated his duchy. In the war of the Spanish succession he first supported Louis and afterwards turned against him. His faithlessness was rewarded in the peace of Utrecht (1713) with the island of Sicily and the title of king. Within a few years, however, he was compelled to exchange Sicily for Sardinia.—R. Lodge, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, ch. 12, sect. 9.—See ITALY: A. D. 1701-1713, and UTRICHT: A. D. 1712-1714.

A. D. 1592.—French invasion of the Vaudois. See FRANCE: A. D. 1591-1593.

A. D. 1597-1598.—Invasion by the French.—Peace with France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1593-1598.

A. D. 1600.—French invasion.—Cession of territory to France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1599-1610.

A. D. 1602-1603.—Abortive attempt upon Geneva.—Treaty of St. Julien with that city. See GENEVA: A. D. 1602-1603.

A. D. 1620-1626.—The Valtelline War.—Alliance with France.—Unsuccessful attempt against Genoa. See FRANCE: A. D. 1624-1626.

A. D. 1627-1631.—War over the succession to the duchy of Mantua.—French invasion.—Extension of territory. See ITALY: A. D. 1627-1631.

A. D. 1635.—Alliance with France against Spain. See GERMANY: A. D. 1634-1639.

A. D. 1635-1659.—Alliance with France against Spain.—Civil war and foreign war.

Sieges of Turin.—Territory restored. See ITALY: A. D. 1635-1659.

A. D. 1655.—Second persecution of the Waldenses. See WALDENSES: A. D. 1655.

A. D. 1690.—Joins the Grand Alliance against France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1689-1690.

A. D. 1690-1691.—Overrun by the armies of France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1689-1691.

A. D. 1691.—Toleration granted to the Vaudois. See WALDENSES: A. D. 1691.

A. D. 1693.—French victory at Marsaglia. See FRANCE: A. D. 1693 (OCTOBER).

A. D. 1695-1696.—Desertion of the Grand Alliance by the Duke.—Treaty with France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1695-1696.

A. D. 1713.—Acquisition of Sicily from Spain. See FRECHT: A. D. 1712-1714.

A. D. 1717-1719.—Sicily exchanged by the Duke for Sardinia, with the title of King. See SPAIN: A. D. 1713-1725, also ITALY: A. D. 1715-1735.

A. D. 1792.—Savoy annexed to the French Republic. See FRANCE: A. D. 1792 (SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER).

A. D. 1796.—Savoy ceded by Sardinia to France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1796 (APRIL-OCTOBER).

A. D. 1798.—Piedmont taken by the French.—Its sovereignty relinquished by the King of Sardinia. See FRANCE: A. D. 1798-1799 (AUGUST-APRIL).

A. D. 1815.—Cession of a part of Savoy to France. See VIENNA: THE CONGRESS OF.

A. D. 1860.—Final cession of Savoy to France. See ITALY: A. D. 1859-1861.

SAVOY CONFERENCE, THE. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1861 (APRIL-JULY).

SAWAD, THE.—The name Sawad is given by the Arab writers to the whole fertile tract between the Euphrates and the Desert, from Hit to the Persian Gulf.—G. Rawlinson, *Seventh Great Oriental Monarchy*, ch. 26, foot note.—See MAHOMEDAN CONQUEST: A. D. 632-651.

SAXA RUBRA, Battle of (A. D. 312). See ROME: A. D. 303-323.

SAXE-COBURG, SAXE-GOTHA, SAXE-WEIMAR, etc. See SAXONY: A. D. 1180-1553, and WEIMAR.

SAXON HEPTARCHY. See ENGLAND: 7TH CENTURY.

SAXON SHORE, Count of the (Comes Littoris Saxonici).—The title of the Roman officer who had military command of the coast of Britain, between the Wash and the Isle of Wight, which was most exposed to the ravages of the Saxons. See BRITAIN: A. D. 323-337.

SAXONS, THE.—In the reign of Caracalla [A. D. 212-217] Rome first heard of the Goths and Alemanni; a little more than half a century later the Franks appear, and about the same time the Saxons, who had been named and placed geographically by Ptolemy [A. D. 130-160], make their first mark in history. They are found employed in naval and piratical expeditions on the coasts of Gaul in A. D. 287. Whatever degree of antiquity we may be inclined to ascribe to the names of these nations, and there is no need to put a precise limit to it, it can scarcely be supposed that they sprang from insignificance and obscurity to strength and power

in a moment. It is far more probable that under the names of Frank and Saxon in the fourth century had been sunk the many better known earlier names of tribes who occupied the same seats.

The Cherusci, the Marsi, the Dulgibini and the Chauci may have been comprehended under the name of Saxons. . . . Whilst the nations on the Lower Rhine were all becoming Franks, those between the Rhine and the Oder were becoming Saxons; the name implied as yet no common organisation, at the most only an occasional combination for attack or defence."

—W. Stubbs, *Const. Hist. of Eng., ch. 3 (v. 1)*.—"The hypothesis respecting the Saxons is as follows: The name Saxon was to the Kelts of Britain what German was to those of Gaul. Or, if not, what Suevi was—a name somewhat more specific. It probably applied to the Germans of the sea-coast, and the water-systems of the Lower Rhine, Weser, Lower Elbe, and Eyder; to Low Germans on the Rhine, to Frisians and Saxons on the Elbe, and to North Frisians on the Eyder. All the Angles were Saxons, but all the Saxons were not Angles. The reasoning in favour of this view is as follows:—That Saxon was a Britannie term is underlined. The Welsh and Gaels call us Saxons at the present moment. The Romans would take their name for certain Germans as they found it with the Britons. The Britons and Romans using the same name would be as two to one in favour of the Keltic name taking ground. It would be Roman and Keltic against a German name single-handed. The only question is whether the name Saxon was exclusively Britannie (Keltic), i. e., not German also.

. . . I think, upon the whole, that Saxon was a word like 'Greek,' i. e., a term which, in the language of the Hellenes, was so very special, partial, and unimportant, as to have been practically a foreign term, or, at least, anything but a native name; whilst in that of the Romans it was one of general and widely extended import. Hence, mutatis mutandis, it is the insignificant Saxones of the neck of the Cimbric Chersonese, and the three Saxon islands, first mentioned by Ptolemy, who are the analogues of the equally unimportant Græci of Epirus; and these it was whose name eventually comprised populations as different as the Angles, and the Saxons of Saxony, even as the name Græcus in the mouth of a Roman comprised Dorians, Æolians, Macedonians, Athenians, Rhodians, &c. In this way the name was German; but its extended import was Keltic and Roman."—R. G. Latham, *The Germany of Tacitus: Epilegomena*, sect. 48.—See, also, GERMANY: THE NATIONAL NAMES; and ANGLES AND JUTES.

The sea-rovers of the 5th century.—"At the end of a long letter, written by Sidonius [Apollinaris, Bishop, at Clermont, in Auvergne, A. D. 471-488] to his friend Nammatius [an officer of the Channel fleet of the Romans, then chiefly occupied in watching and warding off the Saxon pirates], after dull compliments and duller banter, we suddenly find flashed upon us this life-like picture, by a contemporary hand, of the brothers and cousins of the men, if not of the very men themselves who had fought at Aylesford, under Hengest and Horsa, or who were slowly winning the kingdom of the South Saxons: 'Behold, when I was on the point of concluding this epistle in which I have already chattered on too long, a messenger has suddenly

arrived from Saintonge with whom I have spent some hours in conversing about you and your doings, and who constantly affirms that you have just sounded your trumpet on board the fleet, and that with the duties of a sailor and a soldier combined you are roaming along the winding shores of the Ocean, looking out for the curved pinnares of the Saxons. When you see the rowers of that nation you may at once make up your mind that every one of them is an arch-pirate, with such wonderful unanimity do all at once command, obey, teach, and learn their one chosen business of brigandage. For this reason I ought to warn you to be more than ever on your guard in this warfare. Your enemy is the most truculent of all enemies. Unexpectedly he attacks, when expected he escapes, he despises those who seek to block his path, he overthrows those who are off their guard, he always succeeds in cutting off the enemy whom he follows, while he never fails when he desires to effect his own escape. Moreover, to these men, a shipwreck is capital practice rather than an object of terror. The dangers of the deep are to them, not casual acquaintances, but intimate friends. For since a tempest throws the invaded off their guard, and prevents the invaders from being descried from afar, they hail with joy the crash of waves on the rocks, which gives them their best chance of escaping from other enemies than the elements. Then again, before they raise the deep-biting anchor from the hostile soil, and set sail from the Continent for their own country, their custom is to collect the crowd of their prisoners together, by a mockery of equity to make them cast lots which of them shall undergo the iniquitous sentence of death, and then at the moment of departure to slay every tenth man so selected by crucifixion, a practice which is the more lamentable because it arises from a superstitious notion that they will thus ensure for themselves a safe return. Purifying themselves as they consider by such sacrifices, polluting themselves as we deem by such deeds of sacrilege, they think the foul murders they thus commit are acts of worship to their gods, and they glory in extorting cries of agony instead of ransoms from these doomed victims."—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*, bk. 3, ch. 3.

A. D. 451.—At the Battle of Chalons.—In the allied army of Romans and barbarians which count Aetius brought together to encounter the Hun, Attila, on the great and terrible battlefield of Chalons, July, 451, there is mention of the "Saxones." "How came our fathers thither; they, whose homes were in the long sandy levels of Holstein? As has been already pointed out, the national migration of the Angles and Saxons to our own island had already commenced, perhaps in part determined by the impulse northward of Attila's own subjects. Possibly, like the Northmen, their successors, the Saxons may have invaded both sides of the English Channel at once, and may on this occasion have been standing in arms to defend against their old foe some newly-won possessions in Normandy or Picardy."—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*, bk. 2, ch. 3.

A. D. 477-527.—Conquests in Britain. See ENGLAND: A. D. 477-527.

A. D. 528-729.—Struggles against the Frank dominion, before Charlemagne. See GERMANY: A. D. 481-768.

A. D. 772-804.—Conquest by Charlemagne.—"In the time of Charlemagne, the possessions of this great league [the Saxons] were very extensive, stretching, at one point, from the banks of the Rhine nearly to the Oder, and on the other hand, from the North Sea to the confines of Hesse and Thuringia. Warlike in their habits, vigorous in body, active and impatient in mind, their geographical situation, operating together with their state of barbarism, rendered them pirates, extending the predatory excursions, common to all the northern tribes, to the sea as well as to the land. . . . They held from an early period, greater part of the islands scattered round the mouths of the German rivers, and, soon beginning to extend their dominion, they captured, at different times, all those on the coast of France and in the British sea. Not contented, however, with this peculiar and more appropriate mode of warfare, the Saxons who remained on land, while their fellow countrymen were sweeping the ocean, constantly turned their arms against the adjacent continental countries, especially after the conquest of Britain had, in a manner, separated their people, and satisfied to the utmost their maritime cupidity in that direction. Surpassing all nations, except the early Huns, in fierceness, idolaters of the most bloody rites, insatiable of plunder, and persevering in the purpose of rapine to a degree which no other nation ever knew, they were the pest and scourge of the north. Happily for Europe, their government consisted of a multitude of chiefs and their society of a multitude of independent tribes linked together by some bond that we do not at present know, but which was not strong enough to produce unity and continuity of design. Thus they had proceeded from age to age, accomplishing great things by desultory and individual efforts, but up to the time of Charlemagne, no vast and comprehensive mind, like that of Attila, had arisen amongst them, to combine all the tribes under the sway of one monarch, and to direct all their energies to one great object. It was for neighbouring kings, however, to remember that such a chief might every day appear. . . . Such was the state of the Saxons at the reunion of the French [or Frank] monarchy under Charlemagne, and it would seem that the first step he proposed to himself, as an opening to all his great designs, was completely to subdue a people which every day ravaged his frontier provinces, and continually threatened the very existence of the nations around."—G. P. R. James, *Hist. of Charlemagne*, bk. 3.—For generations before Charlemagne—from the period, in fact, of the sons of Clovis, early in the sixth century—the Frank kings had claimed supremacy over the Saxons and counted them among the tributaries of their Austrasian or German monarchy. Repeatedly, too, the Saxons had been forced to submit themselves and acknowledge the yoke, in terms, while they repudiated it in fact. When Charlemagne took in hand the conquest of this stubborn and barbarous people, he seems to have found the task as arduous as though nothing had been done in it before him. His first expedition into their country was undertaken in 772, when he advanced with fire and sword from the Rhine at Mayence to the Diemel in the Hessian country. It was on this occasion that he destroyed, near the head-waters of the Lippe, the famous national idol and fane

of the Saxons called the Irminsul or Herminsaule—supposed to be connected with the memory of Hermann, the Cheruscan patriot chief who destroyed the Roman legions of Varus. The campaign resulted in the submission of the Saxons, with a surrender of hostages to guarantee it. But in 774 they were again in arms, and the next summer Charlemagne swept their country to beyond the Weser with the besom of destruction. Once more they yielded and gave hostages, who were taken to Frank monasteries and made Christians of. But the peace did not last a twelvemonth, and there was another great campaign in 776, which so terrified the turbulent heathen that they accepted baptism in large numbers and a wholesale conversion took place at Paderborn in May, 777. But a chief had risen at last among the Saxons who could unite them, and who would not kneel to Charlemagne nor bow his head to the waters of baptism. This was Wittekind, a Westphalian brother in law of the king of the Dances and friend of the Frisian king, Ratbod. While Charlemagne was in Spain, in 778, Wittekind roused his countrymen to a rising which cleared their land of crosses, churches, priests and Frank castles at one sweep. From that time until 785 there were campaigns every year, with terrible carnage and destruction in the Saxon country and industrious baptising of the submissive. At Badenfeld, at Bockholz, near Zutphen, and at Detmold there were fierce battles in which the Saxons suffered most, but at Sonnenthal on the Weser (the Dachtelfeld), in 782, the Franks were fearfully beaten and slaughtered. Charlemagne took a barbarous vengeance for this reverse by beheading no less than 4,500 Saxon prisoners at Verdun, on the Aller. Three years later, the country of the Saxons having been made, for the most part, a famine smitten desert, they gave up the struggle. Even Wittekind accepted Christianity, became a monk—a missionary—a canonized saint—and disappeared otherwise from history. According to legend, the blood of more than 200,000 Saxons had "changed the very color of the soil, and the brown clay of the Saxon period gave way to the red earth of Westphalia." For seven years the Saxons were submissive and fought in Charlemagne's armies against other foes. Then there was a last despairing attempt to break the conqueror's yoke, and another long war of twelve years' duration. It ended in the practical annihilation of the Saxons as a distinct people in Germany. Many thousands of them were transplanted to other regions in Gaul and elsewhere, others escaped to Denmark and were absorbed into the great rising naval and military power of the Northmen. The survivors on their own soil were stripped of their possessions. "The Saxon war was conducted with almost unparalleled ferocity."—J. I. Mombert, *Hist. of Charles the Great*, bk. 2, ch. 8-4.

ALSO IN: P. Godwin, *Hist. of France: Ancient Gaul*, ch. 18-17.

SAXONS OF BAYEUX.—"The district of Bayeux, occupied by a Saxon colony in the latest days of the old Roman Empire, occupied again by a Scandinavian colony as the result of its conquest by Rolf [or Rollo, the Northman], has retained to this day a character which distinguishes it from every other Romance-speaking portion of the Continent. The Saxons of Bayeux preserved

their name and their distinct existence under the Frankish dominion; we can hardly doubt that the Scandinavian settlers found some parts at least of the district still Teutonic, and that nearness of blood and speech exercised over them the same influence which the same causes exercised over the Scandinavian settlers in England. Danes and Saxons coalesced into one Teutonic people, and they retained their Teutonic language and character long after Rouen had become, in speech at least, no less French than Paris. With their old Teutonic speech, the second body of settlers seem to have largely retained their old Teutonic religion, and we shall presently find Bayeux the centre of a heathen and Danish party in the Duchy, in opposition to Rouen, the centre of the new speech and the new creed. The blood of the inhabitants of the Bessin must be composed of nearly the same elements, mingled in nearly the same proportions, as the blood of the inhabitants of the Danish districts of England."—E. A. Freeman, *Hist. of the Norman Conquest of England*, ch. 4.

SAXONY: The old Duchy.—"The great duchy of Saxony [as it existed under the Carolingian empire and after the separation of Germany from France] consisted of three main divisions, Westphalia, Engern or Angria, and Eastphalia. Thuringia to the south-east, and the Frisian lands to the north-west, may be looked on as in some sort appendages to the Saxon duchy. The duchy was also capable of any amount of extension towards the east, and the lands gradually won from the Wends on this side were all looked on as additions made to the Saxon territory. But the great Saxon duchy was broken up at the fall of Henry the Lion [A. D. 1191]. The archiepiscopal Electors of Köln received the title of Dukes of Westphalia and Engern. But in the greater part of those districts the grant remained merely nominal, though the ducal title, with a small actual Westphalian duchy, remained to the electorate till the end. From these lands the Saxon name may be looked on as having altogether passed away. The name of Saxony, as a geographical expression, claved to the Eastphalian remnant of the old duchy, and to Thuringia and the Slavonic conquests to the east. In the later division of Germany these lands formed the two circles of Upper and Lower Saxony; and it was within their limits that the various states arose which have kept on the Saxon name to our own time. From the descendants of Henry the Lion himself, and from the allodial lands which they kept, the Saxon name passed away, except so far as they became part of the Lower-Saxon circle. They held their place as princes of the Empire, no longer as Dukes of Saxony, but as Dukes of Brunswick, a house which gave Rome one Emperor and England a dynasty of kings. After some of the usual divisions, two Brunswick principalities finally took their place on the map, those of Lüneburg and Wolfenbüttel, the latter having the town of Brunswick for its capital. The Lüneburg duchy grew. Late in the seventeenth century it was raised to the electoral rank, and early in the next century it was finally enlarged by the acquisition of the bishoprics of Bremen and Verden. Thus was formed the Electorate, and afterwards Kingdom, of Hannover, while the simple ducal title remained with the Brunswick

princes of the other line."—E. A. Freeman, *Hist. Geog. of Europe*, ch. 8, sect. 1.—See, also, GERMANY: A. D. 843-982.

A. D. 911-1024.—The Imperial House. See GERMANY: A. D. 911-936; 936-973; and 973-1122.

A. D. 1073-1075.—Revolt against Henry IV.—The Saxons were still unreconciled to the transfer of the imperial dignity from their own ducal family to the House of Franconia, when the third of the Franconian emperors, Henry IV., came to the throne while still a boy. His long minority encouraged them to a habit of independent feeling, while his rash and injudicious measures when he grew to manhood provoked their raging enmity. They were still a turbulent, wild people, and he undertook to force the yoke of the empire on their necks, by means of garrisoned fortresses and castles, distributed through their land. The garrisons were insolent, the people were not meek, and in 1073 a furious revolt broke out. "All Saxony," says a chronicler, 'revolted, as one man, from the king,' and marched, 80,000 strong, to the Hartzburg, a stately citadel near Goslar, which the king had built for a residence upon a commanding height. After useless negotiations, Henry made a narrow escape by flight. When he then summoned his princes around him, no one came; and here and there it began to be said that he must be entirely abandoned and another monarch chosen. In this extremity, the cities alone remained faithful to the emperor, who for some time lay sick almost to death in his loyal city of Worms." Henry's energy, and the great abilities which he possessed, enabled him to recover his command of resources and to bring a strong army into the field against the Saxons, in the early summer of 1075. They offered submission and he might have restored peace to his country in an honorable way; but his headstrong passions demanded revenge. "After a march of extraordinary rapidity, he fell suddenly upon the Saxons and their allies, the Thuringians, on the meadows of the Unstrutt, at Langensalza, near Hohenburg. His army drawn up in an order resembling that which Otto the Great had formed on the Lech [against the Hungarians], obtained, after a fierce hand-to-hand fight of nine hours, a bloody victory. When the Saxons finally yielded and fled, the battle became a massacre. . . . It is asserted that of the foot-soldiers, who composed the mass of the Saxon army of 80,000, hardly any escaped; though of the noblemen, who had swift horses, few were slain. But it was a battle of Germans with Germans, and on the very evening of the struggle, the lamentations over so many slain by kindred hands could not be suppressed in the emperor's own camp. Yet for the time the spirit of Saxon independence was crushed. Henry was really master of all Germany, and seemed to have established the imperial throne again." But little more than a year afterwards, Henry, under the ban of the great Pope Gregory VII., with whom he had quarrelled, was again deserted by his subjects. Again he recovered his footing and maintained a civil war until his own son deposed him, in 1106. The next year he died.—C. T. Lewis, *Hist. of Germany*, bk. 2, ch. 7, sect. 13-20.

ALSO IN: W. Menzel, *Hist. of Germany*, ch. 142.—See, also, GERMANY: A. D. 973-1122.

A. D. 1125-1152.—The origin of the electorate. See GERMANY: A. D. 1125-1173.

A. D. 1178-1183.—The dissolution of the old duchy.—In an account given elsewhere of the origin of the Guelph and Ghibelline parties and their names (see GUELPHS AND Ghibellines), the circumstances under which Henry the Proud, in 1138, was stripped of the duchy of Saxony, and the duchy of Bavaria, have been briefly related. This Duke Henry the Proud died soon after that event, leaving a son who acquired the name of Henry the Lion. The Emperor Conrad, whose hostility to the father had been the cause of his ruin, now restored to the son, Henry the Lion, his duchy of Saxony, but required him to renounce the Bavarian duchy. But Conrad, dying in 1152, was succeeded on the imperial throne by his nephew, Frederick Barbarossa, who entertained a friendly feeling for the young Duke of Saxony, and who restored to him, in 1156, the whole of his father's forfeited possessions, Bavaria included. By his own warlike energies, Henry the Lion extended his dominions still further, making a conquest of the Obotrites, one of the tribes of heathen Slaves or Wends who occupied the Mecklenburg region on the Baltic. He was, now, the most powerful of the princes of the Germanic empire, and one of the most powerful in Europe. But he used his power haughtily and arbitrarily and raised up many enemies against himself. At length there arose a quarrel between the Emperor and Duke Henry, which the latter embittered by abruptly quitting the emperor's army, in Italy, with all his troops, at a time when (A. D. 1175) the latter was almost ruined by the desertion. From that moment Henry the Lion was marked, as his father had been, for ruin. Accusations were brought against him in the diet; he was repeatedly summoned to appear and meet them, and he obstinately refused to obey the summons. At length, A. D. 1178, he was formally declared to be a rebel to the state, and the "imperial ban" was solemnly pronounced against him. "This sentence placed Henry without the pale of the laws, and his person and his states were at the mercy of every one who had the power of injuring them. The archbishop of Cologne, his ancient enemy, had the ban promulgated throughout Saxony, and at his command Godfrey, Duke of Brabant; Philip, Count of Flanders; Otho, Count of Guelders; Thierry, Lord of Cleves; William of Juliers, with the Lords of Bonn, Senef, Berg, and many others, levied forces, and joining the archbishop, entered Westphalia, which they overran and laid waste, before he was aware of their intentions." This was the beginning of a long struggle, in which Henry made a gallant resistance; but the odds were too heavily against him. His friends and supporters gradually fell away, his dominions were lost, one by one, and in 1183 he took refuge in England, at the court of Henry II., whose daughter Matilda he had married. After an exile of three years he was permitted to return to Germany and his alodial estates in Saxony were restored to him. The imperial fiefs were divided. The archbishop of Cologne received the greater part of Westphalia, and Angria. Bernard, Count of Anhalt, got the remainder of the old Saxon duchy, with its ducal title. When Henry the Lion died, in 1195, the alodial possessions that he had recovered were divided between his three sons.—Sir A. Halliday, *Annals of the House of Hanover*, bk. 4 (v. 1).—Fifty years afterwards

these were converted into imperial fiefs and became the two duchies of the house of Brunswick.—Lüneburg and Wolfenbüttel, afterwards Hanover and Brunswick—the princes of which represented the old house of Saxony and inherited the name of Guelph.

ALSO IN: H. Hallam, *The Middle Ages*, ch. 5.—See, also, SAXONY: THE OLD DUCHY; GERMANY: A. D. 1138-1238; ITALY: A. D. 1174-1183.

A. D. 1180-1553.—The later Duchy and Electorate.—The House of Wettin.—Its Ernestine and Albertine lines, and their many branches.—"When Henry the Lion was deprived of the Duchy of Saxony in 1180, it [reduced to a small district around Lauenberg] was given to Bernhard, the youngest son of Albert the Bear, Elector of Brandenburg, and it continued with his descendants in the male line till 1422, when it was sold by the Emperor Sigismund to Frederick, surnamed the Warlike, Margrave of Misnia, descended in the female line from the Landgraves of Thuringen."—Sir A. Halliday, *Annals of the House of Hanover*, v. 1, p. 426.—This line has been known as the House of Wettin, taking that name from Dedo, count of Wettin, who was the first margrave of Misnia, or Meissen; being invested with the dignity in 1048. "The Wettin line of Saxon princes, the same that yet endures [1855], known by sight to every English creature (for the high individual, Prince Albert, is of it), had been lucky enough to combine in itself, by inheritance, by good management, chiefly by inheritance and mere force of survival, all the Three separate portions and divided dignities of that country: the Thüringen Landgraviate, the Meissen Markgraviate, and the ancient Duchy and Electorate of Saxony; and to become very great among the Princes of the German Empire. . . . Through the earlier portion of the 15th century, this Saxon House might fairly reckon itself the greatest in Germany, till Austria, till Brandenburg gradually rose to overshadow it. Law of primogeniture could never be accepted in that country; nothing but divisions, red divisions, coalescings, splittings, and never-ending readjustments and collisions were prevalent in consequence; to which cause, first of all, the loss of the race by Saxony may be ascribed." In 1464, Frederick II. was succeeded by his two sons, Ernest and Albert. These princes governed their country conjointly for upwards of 20 years, but then made a partition from which began the separation of the Ernestine and Albertine lines that continued ever afterwards in the House of Saxony. "Ernest, the elder of those two . . . boys, became Kurfürst (Elector); and got for inheritance, besides the 'inalienable properties' which lie round Wittenberg, . . . the better or Thuringian side of the Saxon country—that is, the Weimar, Gotha, Altenburg, &c. Principalities:—while the other youth, Albert, had to take the 'Osterland (Easternland), with part of Meissen,' what we may in general imagine to be (for no German Dryasdust will do you the kindness to say precisely) the eastern region of what is Saxony in our day. These Albertines, with an inferior territory, had, as their main towns, Leipzig and Dresden, a Residenz-Schloss (or sublime enough Ducal Palace) in each city, Leipzig as yet the grander and more common one. There, at Leipzig chiefly, I say, lived the angriest younger or Albertine Line. . . . As for Ernest,

the elder, he and his lived chiefly at Wittenberg, as I perceive; there or in the neighbourhood was their high Schloss; distinguished among palaces. But they had Weimar, they had Altenburg, Gotha, Coburg,—above all, they had the Wartburg, one of the most distinguished Strong Houses any Duke could live in, if he were of frugal and heroic turn . . . Ernst's son was Frederick the Wise, successor in the Kur (Electorship) and paternal lands; which, as Frederick did not marry and there was only one other brother, were not further divided on this occasion. Frederick the Wise, born in 1463, was that ever-memorable Kurfirst who saved Luther from the Diet of Worms in 1521 [see PAPACY: A. D. 1521-1522] . . . He died in 1525, and was succeeded by his brother, John the Steadfast. . . . He also was a wise and eminently Protestant man. He struggled very faithfully for the good Cause, during his term of sovereignty, died in 1532 (14 years before Luther), having held the Electorate only seven years. His son was Johann Friedrich, the Magnanimous by epithet (der Grossmüthige), under whom the Line underwent sad destinies, lost the Electorship, lost much; and split itself after him into innumerable branches, who are all of a small type ever since. In the Albertine Line, Albert's eldest son, "successor in the eastern properties and residences, was Duke George of Saxony,—called 'of Saxony,' as all those Dukes, big and little, were and still are,—Herzog Georg von Sachsen—of whom, to make him memorable, it is enough to say that he was Luther's Duke George! Yes, this is he with whom Luther had such wrangling and jangling. . . . He was strong for the old religion, while his cousins went so valiantly ahead for the new. . . . George's brother, Henry, succeeded, lived only for two years, in which time all went to Protestantism in the eastern parts of Saxony, as in the western. This Henry's eldest son, and first successor, was Moritz, the 'Maurice' known in English Protestant books; who, in the Schmalkaldic League and War, played such a questionable game with his Protestant cousin, of the elder or Ernestine Line,—quite ousting said cousin, by superior jockeyship, and reducing his Line and him to the second rank ever since [see GERMANY: A. D. 1546-1552]. This cousin was Johann Friedrich the Magnanimous . . . whom we left above waiting for that catastrophe. . . . Duke Moritz got the Electorship transferred to himself; Electorship, with Wittenberg and the 'inalienable lands and dignities.' . . . Moritz kept his Electorship, and, by cunning jockeying, his Protestantism too; got his Albertine or junior Line pushed into the place of the Ernestine or first; in which dishonourably acquired position it continues to this day [1855]; performing ever since the chief part in Saxony, as Electors, and now as Kings of Saxony. . . . The Ernestine, or honourable Protestant line is ever since in a secondary, diminished, and as it were, disintegrated state, a live broken small; nothing now but a series of small Dukes, Weimar, Gotha, Coburg, and the like, in the Thuringian region, who, on mere genealogical grounds, put Sachsen to their name: Sachsen-Coburg, Sachsen-Weimar, &c. [Anglicised, Saxe-Coburg, etc.].—T. Carlyle, *The Princessraub (Essays, v. 6)*.

ALSO IN: F. Shoberl, *Historical Account of the House of Saxony*.

A. D. 1500-1512.—Formation of the Circles of Saxony and Upper Saxony. See GERMANY: A. D. 1498-1519.

A. D. 1516-1546.—The Reformation. See PAPACY: A. D. 1516-1517, to 1517-1521, 1521-1522, 1522-1525, 1525-1529, 1530-1531; also, GERMANY: A. D. 1530-1532, and after.

A. D. 1525.—The Lutheran doctrines and system formally established in the electorate. See PAPACY: A. D. 1522-1525.

A. D. 1539.—Succession of a Protestant prince. See GERMANY: A. D. 1533-1546.

A. D. 1546-1547.—Treachery of Maurice of Saxony.—Transfer of the electorate to him. See GERMANY: A. D. 1546-1552.

A. D. 1619.—Adhesion of the Elector to the Emperor Ferdinand, against Frederick of Bohemia and the Evangelical Union. See GERMANY: A. D. 1618-1620.

A. D. 1631.—Ignoble trepidations of the Elector.—His final alliance with Gustavus Adolphus.—The battle of Breitenfeld. See GERMANY: A. D. 1631.

A. D. 1631-1632.—The Elector and his army in Bohemia. See GERMANY: A. D. 1631-1632.

A. D. 1633.—Standing aloof from the Union of Heilbronn. See GERMANY: A. D. 1632-1634.

A. D. 1634.—Desertion of the Protestant cause.—The Elector's alliance with the Emperor. See GERMANY: A. D. 1634-1639.

A. D. 1645.—Forced to a treaty of neutrality with the Swedes and French. See GERMANY: A. D. 1640-1645.

A. D. 1648.—The Peace of Westphalia. See GERMANY: A. D. 1648.

A. D. 1686.—The League of Augsburg. See GERMANY: A. D. 1686.

A. D. 1697-1698.—The crown of Poland secured by the Elector. See POLAND: A. D. 1696-1698.

A. D. 1706.—Invasion by Charles XII. of Sweden.—Renunciation of the Polish crown by the Elector Augustus. See SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN): A. D. 1701-1707.

A. D. 1733.—Election of Augustus III. to the Polish throne, enforced by Russia and Austria. See POLAND: A. D. 1732-1733.

A. D. 1740.—The War of the Austrian Succession: Claims of the Elector upon Austrian territory. See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1740 (OCTOBER).

A. D. 1741.—The War of the Austrian Succession: Alliance against Austria. See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1741 (AUGUST—NOVEMBER).

A. D. 1745.—The War of the Austrian Succession: Alliance with Austria.—Subjugation by Prussia.—The Peace of Dresden. See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1744-1745.

A. D. 1755.—Intrigues with Austria and Russia against Prussia.—Causes of the Seven Years War. See GERMANY: A. D. 1755-1756.

A. D. 1756.—Swift subjugation by Frederick of Prussia. See GERMANY: A. D. 1756.

A. D. 1759-1760.—Occupied by the Austrians.—Mostly recovered by Frederick. See GERMANY: A. D. 1759 (JULY—NOVEMBER); and 1760.

A. D. 1763.—The end and results of the Seven Years War.—The electorate restored. See SEVEN YEARS WAR: THE TREATIES.

A. D. 1806.—The Elector, deserting Prussia, becomes the subject-ally of Napoleon, and

is made a king. See GERMANY: A. D. 1806 (OCTOBER—DECEMBER).

A. D. 1807.—Acquisition by the king of the grand duchy of Warsaw. See GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (JUNE—JULY).

A. D. 1809.—Risings against the French. See GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (APRIL—JULY).

A. D. 1813.—Occupied by the Allies.—Regained by the French.—Humiliating submission of the king to Napoleon.—French victory at Dresden and defeat at Leipsic.—Desertion from Napoleon's army by the Saxons.—The king a prisoner in the hands of the Allies.—French surrender of Dresden. See GERMANY: A. D. 1812-1813, to 1813 (OCTOBER—DECEMBER).

A. D. 1814-1815.—The Saxon question in the Congress of Vienna.—The king restored, with half of his dominions lost. See VIENNA, THE CONGRESS OF.

A. D. 1817.—Accession to the Holy Alliance. See HOLY ALLIANCE.

A. D. 1848 (MARCH).—Revolutionary outbreak.—Concessions to the people. See GERMANY: A. D. 1848 (MARCH).

A. D. 1849.—Insurrection suppressed by Prussian troops. See GERMANY: A. D. 1848-1850.

A. D. 1866.—The Seven Weeks War.—Indemnity to Prussia.—Union with the North German Confederation. See GERMANY: A. D. 1866.

A. D. 1870-1871.—Embraced in the new German Empire. See GERMANY: A. D. 1870 (SEPTEMBER—DECEMBER), 1871 (JANUARY); and 1871 (APRIL).

SAXONY The English titular Dukedom of. See WALES, PRINCE OF.

SCALDIS, The.—The ancient name of the river Scheldt.

SCALDS, OR SKALDS, The.—"Before the introduction or general diffusion of writing, it is evident that a class of men whose sole occupation was to commit to memory and preserve the laws, usages, precedents, and details of all those civil affairs and rights, and to whose fidelity in relating former transactions implicit confidence could be given, must of necessity have existed in society—must have been in every

locality. . . . This class [among the Scandinavian peoples of the North of Europe] were the Scalds—the men who were the living books, to be referred to in every case of law or property in which the past had to be applied to the present. Before the introduction of Christianity, and with Christianity the use of written documents, and the diffusion, by the church establishment, of writing in every locality, the scald must have been among the pagan landowners what the parish priest and his written record were in the older Christianised countries of Europe. . . . The scalds in these Christianised countries were merely a class of wandering troubadours, poets, story tellers, minnesingers. . . . The scalds of the north disappeared at once when Christian priests were established through the country. They were superseded in their utility by men of education, who knew the art of writing, and the country had no feudal barons to maintain such a class for amusement only. We hear little of the scalds after the first half of the 12th century."—S. Laing, *The Heimskringla: Preliminary Dissertation*, ch. 1.—"At the dawn of historical times we find the scalds practising their art everywhere in the North. . . . The oldest Norwegian scalds, like 'Starkad' and 'Brage the Old,' are enveloped in mythic darkness, but already, in the time of Harald Fairhair (872-930), the song smiths of the Scandinavian North appear as thoroughly historical personages. In Iceland the art of poetry was held in high honor, and it was cultivated not only by the professional scalds, but also by others when the occasion presented itself. . . . When the Iclander had arrived at the age of maturity, he longed to travel in foreign lands. As a scald he would then visit foreign kings and other noblemen, where he would receive a most hearty welcome. . . . These Icelandic scalds became a very significant factor in the literary development of the North during the greater part of the middle ages."—F. W. Horn, *Hist. of the Literature of the Scandinavian North*, pt. 1, ch. 1.

SCALIGERI, The, or Della Scala Family. See VERONA: A. D. 1260-1338; also, MILAN: A. D. 1277-1447.

SCAMANDER, The. See TROJA.

SCANDERBEG'S WAR WITH THE TURKS. See ALBANIAN: A. D. 1448-1467.

SCANDINAVIAN STATES.

Early history.—"Those who lean implicitly on the chief props supplied by the Old Norse literature for the early history and genealogy of the North lean on very unsafe supports. The fact is, we must treat these genealogies and these continuous histories as compilations made up from isolated and detached traditions—epics in which some individual or some battle was described, and in which the links and the connections between the pieces have been supplied according to the ingenuity of the compilers; in which the arrangement and chronology are to a large extent arbitrary; and in which it has been a great temptation to transfer the deeds of one hero to another of the same name. Under these circumstances what is a modern historian to do? In the first place he must take the contemporary chronicles—Frank, English, and Irish—

as his supreme guides, and not allow their statements to be perverted by the false or delusive testimony of the sagas, and where the two are at issue, sacrifice the latter without scruple, while in those cases where we have no contemporary and independent evidence then to construct as best we can our story from the glimmers of light that have reached us."—H. H. Howorth, *Early Hist. of Sweden* (*Royal Hist. Soc., Transactions*, v. 9).

Their relationships in language and blood.—"Scandinavia is not a very convenient word. Norway and Sweden it suits; because, in Norway and Sweden, the geographical boundaries coincide with the phenomena of language and blood. But Denmark is not only divided from them by water, but is in actual contact with Germany. More than this, it is connected with

the Empire: Holstein being German and Imperial, Sleswick partly German though not Imperial. . . . Generically, a Scandinavian is a German. Of the great German stock there are two divisions—the Scandinavian or Norse, and the Teutonic or German Proper. Of the Germans Proper, the nearest congeners to the Scandinavians are the Frisians; and, after them, the Saxons. . . . At present the languages of Sweden and Denmark, though mutually intelligible, are treated as distinct: the real differences being exaggerated by differences of orthography, and by the use on the part of the Swedes of the ordinary Italian alphabet, whilst the Danes prefer the old German black-letter. The literary Norwegian is Danish rather than Swedish. Meanwhile, the old language, the mother tongue, is the common property of all, and so is the old literature with its Edda and Sagas, though the Norwegians are the chief heroes of it. The language in which it is embodied is preserved with but little alteration in Iceland, so that it may fairly be called Icelandic, though the Norwegians denominate it Old Norse [see NORMANS—NORTHMEN A. D. 960-1100]. The histories of the three countries are alike in their general character though different in detail. Denmark, when we have got away from the heroic age into the dawn of the true historical period, is definitely separated from Germany in the parts about the Eyder—perhaps by the river itself. It is Pagan and Anti-Imperial, the Danes being, in the eyes of the Carolingians, little better than the hated Saxons. Nor is it ever an integral part of the Empire, though Danish and German alliances are common. They end in Holstein being Danish, and in its encroaching on Sleswick and largely influencing the kingdom in general. As being most in contact with the civilization of the South, Denmark encroaches on Sweden, and, for a long time, holds Skaane and other Swedish districts. Indeed, it is always a check upon the ambition of its northern neighbour. Before, then, that Sweden becomes one and indivisible, the Danes have to be ejected from its southern provinces. Norway, too, when dynastic alliances begin and when kingdoms become consolidated, is united with Denmark. . . . In the way of language the Scandinavians are Germans—the term being taken in its wider and more general sense. Whether the blood coincide with the language is another question; nor is it an easy one. The one point upon which most ethnologists agree, is the doctrine that, in Norway and Sweden (at least), or in the parts north of the Baltic, the Germans are by no means aboriginal; the real aborigines having been congeners of either the Laps or the Fins, who, at a time anterior to the German immigrations, covered the whole land from the North Cape to the Naze in Norway, and from Tornea to Ystad in Sweden. Towards these aborigines the newer occupants comported themselves much as the Angles of England comported themselves towards the Britons. At the same time, in both Britain and Scandinavia the extent to which the two populations intermarried or kept separate is doubtful. It may be added that, in both countries, there are extreme opinions on each side of the question.”—R. G. Latham, *The Nationalities of Europe*, v. 2, ch. 37.—See, also, *GOths, ORIGIN OF THE*.

ALSO IN: A. Lefèvre, *Race and Language*, p. 286.

8-9th Centuries.—Explorations, ravages and conquests of the Vikings. See NORMANS.—NORTHMEN.

8-11th Centuries.—Formation of the Three Kingdoms.—“At the end of the 8th century, . . . within the two Scandinavian peninsulas, the three Scandinavian nations were fast forming. A number of kindred tribes were settling down into the kingdoms of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, which, sometimes separate, sometimes united, have existed ever since. Of these three, Denmark, the only one which had a frontier towards the Empire, was naturally the first to play a part in general European history. In the course of the 10th century, under the half-mythical Gorm, and his successors Harold and Sven, the Danish kingdom itself, as distinguished from other lands held in aftertimes by its kings, reached nearly its full historical extent in the two peninsulas and the islands between them. Halland and Skane or Scania, it must always be remembered, are from the beginning at least as Danish as Zealand and Jutland. The Eider remained the frontier towards the Empire, save during part of the 10th and 11th centuries, when the Danish frontier withdrew to the Dannewerk, and the land between the two boundaries formed the Danish March of the Empire. Under Cnut the old frontier was restored. The name of Northmen, which the Franks used in a laxer way for the Scandinavian nations generally, was confined to the people of Norway. These were formed into a single kingdom under Harold Harfaga late in the 9th century. The Norwegian realm of that day stretched far beyond the bounds of the later Norway, having an indefinite extension over tributary Finnish tribes as far as the White Sea. The central part of the eastern side of the northern peninsula, between Denmark to the south and the Finnish nations to the north, was held by two Scandinavian settlements which grew into the Swedish kingdom. These were those of the Swedes strictly so called, and of the Geatas or Gauts. This last name has naturally been confounded with that of the Goths, and has given the title of ‘King of the Goths’ to the princes of Sweden. Gothland, east and west, lay on each side of Lake Wenern. Swithiod or Svealand, Sweden proper, lay on both sides of the great arm of the sea whose entrance is guarded by the modern capital. The union of Svealand and Gothland made up the kingdom of Sweden. Its early boundaries towards both Denmark and Norway were fluctuating. Wermeland, immediately to the north of Lake Wenern, and Jamteland farther to the north, were long a debatable land. At the beginning of the 12th century Wermeland passed finally to Sweden, and Jamteland for several ages to Norway. Bleking again, at the south-east corner of the Peninsula, was a debatable land between Sweden and Denmark which passed to Denmark. For a land thus bounded the natural course of extension by land lay to the north, along the west coast of the Gulf of Bothnia. In the course of the 11th century at the latest, Sweden began to spread itself in that direction over Helsingland. Sweden had thus a better opportunity than Denmark and Norway for extension of her own borders by land. Meanwhile Denmark and Norway, looking to the west, had their great time of Oceanic conquest and colonization in the 9th and 10th centuries.”

—E. A. Freeman, *Historical Geog. of Europe*, ch. 11, sect. 1.—“Till about the year of Grace 860 there were no kings in Norway, nothing but numerous jarls,—essentially kinglets,—each presiding over a kind of republican or parliamentary little territory, generally striving each to be on some terms of human neighbourhood with those about him, but, in spite of ‘Fylke Things’ (Folk Things)—little parish parliaments—and small combinations of these, which had gradually formed themselves, often reduced to the unhappy state of quarrel with them. Harald Haarfagr was the first to put an end to this state of things, and become memorable and profitable to his country by uniting it under one head and making a kingdom of it; which it has continued to be ever since. His father, Halfdan the Black, had already begun this rough but salutary process, but it was Harald the Fairhaired, his son, who conspicuously carried it on and completed it. Harald’s birth-year, death year, and chronology in general, are known only by inference and computation, but, by the latest reckoning, he died about the year 933 of our era, a man of 83. The business of conquest lasted Harald about twelve years (A. D. 860-872?), in which he subdued also the Vikings of the out-islands, Orkneys, Shetlands, Hebrides, and Man. Sixty more years were given him to consolidate and regulate what he had conquered, which he did with great judgment, industry, and success. His reign altogether is counted to have been of over 70 years. . . . These were the times of Norse colonization, proud Norsemen flying into other lands, to freer scenes,—to Iceland, to the Farøe Islands, which were hitherto quite vacant (tenanted only by some mournful hermit, Irish Christian fakir, or so); still more copiously to the Orkney and Shetland Isles, the Hebrides and other countries where Norse squatters and settlers already were. Settlement of Iceland, we say, settlement of the Farøe Islands, and, by far the notablest of all, settlement of Normandy by Rolf the Ganger (A. D. 876?)”—T Carlyle, *The Early Kings of Norway*, ch. 1.

9th Century.—Introduction of Christianity. See CHRISTIANITY: 9-11TH CENTURIES

A. D. 1018-1397.—The empire of Canute and its dissolution.—Disturbed state of the Three Kingdoms.—The Folkungas in Sweden.—Rise of Denmark.—The reign of Queen Margaret and the Union of Calmar.—“A Northern Empire . . . for a time seemed possible when Canute the Great arose. King by inheritance of England [see ENGLAND: A. D. 979-1016, and 1016-1042] and of Denmark, he was able by successful war to add almost the whole of Norway to his dominions. The definite incorporation of Sleswig under treaty with the Emperor Conrad, and the submission of the Wendish tribes, appeared to open for him a way on to the continent. . . . Had men with like capacity succeeded to his throne, the world might have beheld an Empire of the North as well as of the East and West. But the kingdoms of the great Danish monarch fell asunder on his death and his successors sink again into insignificance. Another century passes before a bright page illumines their obscure annals. The names of Waldemar the Great [1157-1182], of Canute VI. [1182-1202] and Waldemar the Victorious [1202-1241] his sons, are then found attracting the attention of Europe. Again their kingdom

seemed about to raise itself to be a continental power. They sallied forth from their peninsula, they again conquered the Wends, the southern shores of the Baltic, even as far as Courland and Esthonia, were made to tremble at the Danish arms. . . . But the greatness was again but temporary. Waldemar the Victorious, surprised and made a prisoner in Germany, beheld his empire returning to its fragments. Regaining his liberty he tried to regain his power, but a disastrous battle at Bornhöved in 1227 gave a death-blow to his ambition. An alliance of the petty princes who feared his greatness prevailed against him, and Denmark relapsed again into decline. Many causes now contributed to the downfall of the kingdom. By the fatal policy of Waldemar it was divided among his sons. . . . While anarchy increased within the country, new enemies arose around it. The Norwegians in a war that lasted for long years harassed it. The necessities of Christopher obliged him to pledge Scania, Halland, and Bleking to Sweden. A formidable foe too was now appearing in the Hanseatic League [see HANSA TOWNS], whose rise had followed upon the fall of Waldemar’s power. The rich cities of Lübeck and Hamburg had seized the opportunity to assert their freedom. . . . Harassed by foreign enemies and by strife with his own nobles, Christopher [the Second, who came to the throne in 1319] at last was driven from his kingdom. A count of Holstein, known as the Black Geert, became for fourteen years the virtual sovereign, and imposed upon the country his nephew, Waldemar III, the heir of the rebellious house of Sleswig, as a titular King. Dismembered and in anarchy, the country had sunk low, and it was not until the assassination of Black Geert, in 1340, that any hope appeared of its recovery.” In Sweden the national history had its real beginning, perhaps, in the days of St Eric, who reigned from 1155 to 1160. “In this reign the spread of Christianity became the spread of power. Eric . . . earned his title from his definite establishment of the new faith. . . . The remaining sovereigns of his line can hardly be said to have contributed much towards the advancement of their country, and it was reserved for a new dynasty to carry on the work of the earlier kings. A powerful family had risen near the throne, and, retaining the old tribal rank of Jarls, had filled almost the position of mayors of the palace. The death of Eric Ericson without children removed the last obstacle to their ambition. The infant son of Birger Jarl was elected to the vacant throne, and the transfer of the royal title to the family [known as the Folkungas] that had long held royal power seemed as natural to the Swedes as it had done earlier to the Franks. As regent for his child, Birger upheld and added to the greatness of his country; he became the conspicuous figure of the 13th century in the North; he is the founder of Stockholm, the conqueror of the Finns, the protector of the exiled princes of Russia, the mediator in differences between Norway and Denmark. His accepted descendants however did not equal their unaccepted sire. The conquest of Finland was indeed completed by Torkel Knutson at the close of the 13th century, and shed some lustre upon the reign of King Birger, but the quarrels of succeeding princes among themselves disgraced and distracted the country.” In Norway “the conquests of Harald

Harfager had secured the crown to a long line of his descendants; but the strife of these descendants among themselves, and the contests which were provoked by the attempts of successive sovereigns, with imprudent zeal, to enforce the doctrines of Christianity upon unwilling subjects, distracted and weakened the kingdom. A prey to anarchy, it fell also a prey to its neighbours. In the 10th century it belonged for a time to Denmark, Sweden joined later in dismembering it, and Canute the Great was able to call himself its King. These were times indeed in which conquests and annexations were often more rapid than lasting, and a King of Norway soon reigned in his turn over Denmark. Yet there is no doubt that the Norwegians suffered more than they inflicted, and were from the first the weakest of the three nations. Wars, foreign and domestic, that have now no interest, exhausted the country, the plague of 1348 deprived it of at least one half its population. Its decline had been marked, upon the extinction of its royal dynasty in 1319, by the election of Swedish princes to fill its throne, and after the reign of two stranger Kings it sank for ever from the list of independent kingdoms. Drifting through anarchy and discord the three kingdoms had sunk low. Denmark was first to raise herself from the abasement, and the reign of a fourth Waldemar not only restored her strength but gave her a pre-eminence which she retained until the days of Gustavus Adolphus. The new sovereign, a younger son of Christopher II., was raised to the throne in 1340, and no competitor, now that Black Geert was dead, appeared to dispute it with him. Waldemar gave up, on the one hand, his claims to Scania, Halland, and Bleking (which he afterwards reclaimed and repossessed), as well as the distant possessions in Esthonia, while he bought back Jutland and the Isles, on the other. "The isle of Gothland, and Wisby its rich capital, the centre of the Hanseatic trade within the Baltic, were plundered and annexed [1361], giving the title thenceforward of King of the Goths to the Danish monarchs. This success indeed was paid for by the bitter enmity of the Hansa, and by a war in which the pride of Denmark was humbled to the dust beneath the power of the combined cities. Copenhagen was pillaged [1362], and peace was only made by a treaty [1363] which confirmed all former privileges to the conquerors, which gave them for fifteen years possession of the better part of Scania and its revenues, and which humbly promised that the election of all sovereigns of Denmark should thenceforth be submitted for their approval. Yet Waldemar has left behind him the reputation of a prudent and successful prince, and his policy prepared the way for the greatness of his successors. At his death in 1375 two daughters, on behalf of their children, became claimants for his throne. The youngest, Margaret, had married Hako, King of Norway, the son of a deposed King of Sweden [the last of the Folkungas, or Folkungers]; and the attractive prospect of a union between the two kingdoms, supported by her own prudent and conciliatory measures, secured the election of her son Olaf. As regent for her child, who soon by the death of his father became King of Norway as well as of Denmark, she showed the wisdom of a ruler, and won the affections of her subjects; and when the death of Olaf himself oc-

curred in 1387 she was rewarded in both kingdoms by the formal possession of the sceptres which she had already shown herself well able to hold. Mistress in Denmark and in Norway, she prepared to add Sweden to her dominions. Since the banishment of the Folkungas, Albert Duke of Mecklenburg had reigned as King. But Sweden preferred Margaret, and she easily expelled Albert from the throne, defeating him and making him a prisoner, in 1389. A few years later, "her nephew, Eric, long since accepted in Denmark and in Norway as her successor, and titularly King, was now [1397] at a solemn meeting of the states at Calmar crowned Sovereign of the Three Kingdoms. At a later meeting the Union, since known as that of Calmar, was formally voted, and the great work of her life was achieved."—C. F. Johnstone, *Historical Abstracts*, ch. 1.

ALSO IN E. G. Geyer, *Hist. of the Swedes*, v. 1, ch. 3-5.

14-15th Centuries.—Power and influence of the Hanseatic League. See HANSA TOWNS.

A. D. 1397-1527.—Under the Union of Calmar until its dissolution.—The brutality of Christian II. and his overthrow.—Gustavus Vasa and his elevation to the throne of Sweden.—The introduction of the Reformation.—The most noteworthy articles of the Union of Calmar, by which Norway, Sweden and Denmark were united together, in 1397, under the Danish queen Margaret, were the following: "That the right of electing a sovereign should be exercised in common by the three kingdoms, that a son of the reigning king, if there were any, should be preferred, that each kingdom should be governed by its own laws, and that all should combine for the common defence. But this confederacy, which seemed calculated to promote the power and tranquility of Scandinavia, proved the source of much discontent and jealousy and of several bloody wars. Margaret was succeeded on her death in 1412 by Eric of Pomerania, the son of her niece. Eric's reign was turbulent. In 1438 the Danes, and in the following year the Swedes, renounced their allegiance; and Eric fled to the island of Gothland, where he exercised piracy till his death. The Danes elected in Eric's stead Christopher of Bavaria, son of his sister Catharine: . . . but after Christopher's death in 1448 the union was dissolved. The Danes now elected for their king Count Christian of Oldenburg; while the Swedes chose Charles Knutson. But in the following year Charles was compelled to resign Norway to Denmark, and in 1457 he lost Sweden itself through an insurrection led by the Archbishop of Upsala. Christian I. of Denmark was chosen in his place and crowned at Upsala, June 19th; and in the following year all the councillors of the three kingdoms, assembled at Skara, recognised Christian's son John as his successor. Christian I. became a powerful monarch by inheriting Schleswig and Holstein from his uncle. He had, however, to contend for a long period with Charles Knutson for the throne of Sweden, and after Charles's death in 1470, with Sten Sture, of a noble family in Dalecarlia, to whom Charles, with the approbation of the Swedes, had left the administration of the kingdom. In October 1471 a battle was fought on the Brunkeberg, a height now enclosed in the city of Stockholm, in which the Danish King was defeated, though he

continued to hold the southern provinces of Sweden. Christian died in 1481 and was succeeded by his son John. The Swedes in 1483 acknowledged the supremacy of Denmark by renewing the Union of Calmar; yet . . . John could never firmly establish himself in that country. . . . King John of Denmark died in 1513. . . . It was during the reign of Christian II. [his son and successor] that Denmark first began to have any extensive connections with the rest of Europe. In the year of his accession, he allied himself with the Wendish, or north-eastern towns of the Hanseatic League, whose metropolis was Lübeck, and he subsequently formed alliances with Russia, France, England, and Scotland, with the view of obtaining their aid in his contemplated reduction of Sweden. . . . In 1517 Trolle [Archbishop of Upsala] had levied open war against the administrator, Sten Sture, in which Christian supported him with his fleet; but Sten Sture succeeded in capturing Trolle. . . . In the next year (1518) Christian again appeared near Stockholm with a fleet and army, in which were 2,000 French sent by Francis I. Christian was defeated by Sten Sture in a battle near Bränkirkra. The Archbishop of Upsala having proceeded to Rome to complain of Sten Sture, the Pope erected in Denmark an ecclesiastical tribunal, which deposed the administrator and his party, and laid all Sweden under an interdict. This proceeding, however, served to pave the way for the acceptance in Sweden of the Lutheran reformation, though it afforded Christian II a pretence for getting up a sort of crusade against that country. . . . Early in 1520 . . . Sture was defeated and wounded in a battle fought on the ice of Lake Asunden, near Bogesund in West Gothland. . . . Sten Sture, in spite of his wound, hastened to the defence of Stockholm, but expired on the way in his sledge on Malar Lake, February 3rd 1520. The Swedes were defeated in a second battle near Upsala, after which a treaty was concluded to the effect that Christian should reign in Sweden, agreeably to the Union of Calmar, but on condition of granting an entire amnesty. Christian now proceeded to Stockholm, and in October was admitted into that city by Sture's widow, who held the command. Christian at first behaved in the most friendly manner . . . ; yet he had no sooner received the crown than he took the most inhuman vengeance on his confiding subjects. . . . The city was abandoned to be plundered by the soldiers like a place taken by storm. Orders were despatched to Finland to proceed in a similar manner; while the King's progress through the southern provinces was everywhere marked by the erection of gallowses. These cruelties . . . occasioned insurrections in all his dominions. That in Sweden was led by Gustavus Ericson, . . . a young man remarkable alike by his origin, connections, talent and courage; whose family, for what reason is unknown, afterwards assumed the name of Vasa, which was borne neither by himself nor by his forefathers. Gustavus, who had been a hostage in Christian's hands, had escaped from his captivity, in 1519, taking refuge at Lübeck. In May, 1520, he secretly entered Sweden, remaining in concealment. A few months later his father perished, among the victims of the Danish tyrant, and Gustavus fled to Dalecarlia, "a district noted for its love of freedom and hatred

of the Danes. Here he worked in peasant's clothes, for daily wages, in hourly danger from his pursuers, from whom he had many narrow escapes. . . . The news of Christian's inhumanity procured Gustavus Vasa many followers; he was elected as their leader by a great assembly of the people at Mora, and found himself at the head of 5,000 men, out of whom he made good soldiers, although they were wretchedly armed. In June, 1521, he invested Stockholm; but the siege, for want of proper artillery and engineering skill, was protracted two years. During this period his command was legally confirmed in a Herrendag, or assembly of the nobles, at Wadstena, August 24th 1521; the crown was proffered to him, which he declined, but accepted the office of Regent. The Danes were now by degrees almost entirely expelled from Sweden; and Christian II., so far from being able to relieve Stockholm, found himself in danger of losing the Danish crown, which he did, in fact, in 1523, through a revolution that placed on the throne his uncle, Duke Frederick of Holstein. "The Union of Calmar was now entirely dissolved. The Norwegians claimed to exercise the right of election like the Danes, and when Frederick called upon the Swedish States to recognise his title in conformity with the Union, they replied that it was their intention to elect Gustavus Ericson for their king, which was accordingly done at the Diet of Strengnäs, June 7th 1523. Three weeks after Stockholm surrendered to Gustavus." The dethroned Christian II escaped to the Netherlands, where he found means to equip an expedition with which he invaded Norway, in 1531. It left him a prisoner in the hands of the Danes, who locked him up in the castle of Sonderburg until his death, which did not occur until 1559. "Meanwhile, in Sweden, Gustavus was consolidating his power, partly by moderation and mildness, partly by examples of necessary severity. He put himself at the head of the Reformation, as Frederick I. also did in Denmark. Luther's doctrines had been first introduced into Sweden in 1519, by two brothers, Olaus and Lawrence Petri, who had studied under the great apostle of reform at Wittenberg. The Petris soon attracted the attention of Gustavus, who gave them his protection, and entered himself into correspondence with Luther. . . . As in other parts of Europe, the nobles were induced to join the movement from the prospect of sharing the spoils of the church; and in a great Diet at Westerås in 1527, the Reformation was introduced."—T. H. Dyer, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, bk. 4, ch. 4 (p. 2).

ALSO IN: P. B. Watson, *The Swedish Revolution under Gustavus Vasa*.—A. Alberg, *Gustavus Vasa and his Stirring Times*.

(Denmark and Norway): A. D. 1523.—Accession of Frederick I.

(Sweden): A. D. 1523-1604.—The reigns of Gustavus Vasa and his sons.—Wars with Russia and Denmark.—The Baltic question.—Prince Sigismund elected king of Poland and his consequent loss of the Swedish crown.—Resulting hostilities.—"Gustavus Vasa, the founder of his dynasty, was not a very religious man. He had determined to make Sweden a Lutheran country for two main reasons: first, because he wanted the lands of the Church, both in order to enrich the crown and also to attach the nobles to his cause; secondly, because, as he

said, the 'priests were all unionists in Sweden'—that is, they all wished to maintain the union of the three Scandinavian kingdoms which he had broken, and they were, therefore, irreconcilably hostile to his dynasty. Three other great services were rendered to Sweden by Gustavus I.: (1) at the Diet of Westerås, in 1544, the hereditary character of the monarchy was definitely declared. This was a great victory over the nobles, who in nearly all the Northern and Eastern Kingdoms of Europe—and in Sweden itself at a later time—succeeded in erecting an oligarchy, which oppressed the peasants and crippled the activity of the State. (2) Again, by his consistent favouring of the middle classes, and his conclusion of commercial treaties with Russia, France, and the Netherlands, he became the founder of Swedish commerce, and dealt a serious blow at the Baltic supremacy of the Hanseatic League. (3) And lastly, he appears as the founder of that policy of territorial aggression (toward the South and East), which, however we may judge of its morality in this age of peace, was certainly looked upon then as the prime duty of all Kings, and which in the case of Sweden was the direct path toward the great part which she was destined to play in the 17th century. His first enemy was Russia, a recently consolidated State, already bordering on the half-Polish province of Livonia and the Swedish province of Finland, already extending her flanks to the Caucasus and the Don on the south and to the White Sea on the north. . . . The wars of Ivan the Terrible (1534-84) for Finland and Livonia were unsuccessful, and the chief interest which they possess for us is that in 1561, the year after the death of Gustavus I., his son Eric acquired for Sweden the province of Esthonia, which appears to have previously fluctuated between dependence on Denmark and on Russia. This was the first of the so called 'Baltic provinces' of Sweden, herewith began the exclusion of Russia from the 'Dominium Maris Baltici.' But this possession brought Eric face to face with Poland, a country which was disputing with Russia the possession of Livonia. Poland, under the last of the great Jaghellon line, was already displaying the fatal tendency to anarchy which at last devoured her. . . . Poland turned for help to the King of Denmark, in whom Eric, with keen insight, recognised the most dangerous foe for Sweden. In 1563 Eric concluded peace with Russia, and the nations of the North began to assume their natural relation to each other. The Baltic question rapidly became an European one. English sympathies were with Sweden and Russia; Spain and the Emperor as naturally took the other side, and suggested to the King of Denmark, Frederick II. (1559-1588), that he should ask for the hand of Mary Stuart; to counteract which King Eric indulged in an elaborate flirtation with Elizabeth. The powers of North Germany took sides in the war (1565), but the war itself produced but little result. The able Eric displayed symptoms of insanity and was extremely unpopular with the Swedish nobles, and Denmark was as yet too powerful an enemy for Sweden to overthrow. In 1567 Eric was deposed by a revolution, the fruit of which was reaped by his brother John. When the great Gustavus I. was dying, and could no longer speak, he made a sign that he wished to write, and wrote half a

sentence of warning to his people: 'Rather die a hundred times than abandon the Gospel. . . . Then his hand failed, and he dropped back dead. He was not, I have said, a particularly religious man, but he marked out the true path for Sweden. Now in 1567 a certain reaction set in: many of the nobles, who had felt the yoke of Gustavus heavy and of Eric heavier, seemed ready to drift back to Catholicism, and John's reign (1567-1590) was one of reaction in many ways. John never openly went over to Catholicism, but he cast off all the Lutheranism that he dared to cast off. He made peace with Denmark and war with Russia; thereby he allowed the former country to develop her trade and foreign relations enormously and rapidly, and made the task of his successors doubly hard. Above all, he originated, by his marriage with Catherine Jaghellon, the disastrous connexion with Poland. That unhappy country, 'the fatal byword for all years to come' of genuine anarchy, had just closed its period of prosperity. The last of the Jaghellon Kings died in 1572, and the elected King, Stephen Bathori, died in 1586. Ivan the Terrible sought the crown of Poland. John of Sweden, on the other hand, saw an opening for the House of Vasa. His son Sigismund was, by dint of bribes and intrigue, elected King of Poland. But he had to become a Catholic. . . . The union of Sweden with Poland, which would necessarily follow, if Sigismund succeeded his father on the Swedish throne, would be almost certainly a Catholic union. . . . Sweden was still a free country, in the sense of being governed in a parliamentary way with the consent of the four estates, Nobles, Clergy, Citizens, and Peasants. Whatever the Riddarhus might think upon the subject, the three non-noble estates were red hot Protestants and would have no Catholic king. Even the nobles were only induced to consent to Sigismund becoming King of Poland without forfeiting his right to succeed in Sweden, by the grant of extravagant privileges, practically so great, had they been observed, as to emasculate the Vasa monarchy. Luckily the people had a deliverer at hand. Charles, Duke of Sudermania, the youngest of the sons of Gustavus I., lived wholly in the best traditions of his father's policy. He might be relied upon to head an insurrection, if necessary. Even before John's death in 1590 murmurs began to be heard that he had been an usurper—was his son necessarily the heir? These murmurs increased, when in 1593, after waiting three years, Sigismund came home to claim his kingdom, with a present of 20,000 crowns from the Pope in his pocket, 'to defray the cost of the restoration of Catholicism in Sweden.' Duke Charles had already prepared his plans when the King arrived; there seems little doubt that he was playing a game, and for the crown. We are not concerned with his motives, it is sufficient to know that they corresponded with the interests of his country. In 1593, just before Sigismund had landed, Charles had been chosen Regent and President of the Council of State. . . . When Sigismund went back to Poland at the end of the year 1594, he could not prevent Charles being chosen to administer the kingdom in his absence, and Diet after Diet subsequently confirmed the power of the Regent. The peasants of Dalecarlia, the great province of the centre, which had first

come forward to the support of Gustavus I. in 1520, sent up a petition to the effect that there ought to be only one king in Sweden, and that Sigismund had forfeited the crown. Charles himself had been unwilling to lead a revolution, until it became apparent that Sigismund was massing troops and raising money in Poland for an attack upon his native land. In 1597 the civil war may be said to have begun, in the following year Sigismund landed (with only 5,000 Polish troops) and was utterly defeated near Linköping (on September 25, 1598). On the next day a treaty was concluded by which Sigismund was acknowledged as King, but promised to send away his foreign troops and maintain Protestantism. It was obviously a mere effort to gain time, and in the following year on failing to keep the condition, which he never had the remotest intention of keeping, he was formally deposed (July, 1599). The contest, however, was by no means over, and it led to that perpetual hostility between Sweden and Poland which played such an important part in the history of Northern Europe in the 17th century. . . . In 1604 Charles was solemnly crowned King that was the second birthday of the Vasa monarchy; the crown was entailed upon his eldest son, Gustavus Adolphus, and his descendants, being Protestants, and the descendants of Sigismund were forever excluded. "Every prince who should deviate from the Confession of Augsburg should ipso facto lose the crown. Anyone who should attempt to effect any change of religion should be declared an enemy and a traitor. Sweden should never be united with another kingdom under one crown; the King must live in Sweden."—C. R. L. Fletcher, *Gustavus Adolphus*, introd.

ALSO IN: E. G. Geijer, *Hist. of the Swedes*, v. 1, ch. 9-14.

(Denmark and Norway): A. D. 1534.—Accession of Christian III.

(Denmark and Norway): A. D. 1559.—Accession of Frederick II.

(Denmark and Norway): A. D. 1588.—Accession of Christian IV.

(Sweden): A. D. 1611.—Accession of Gustavus Adolphus.

(Sweden): A. D. 1611-1629.—The Danish, Russian and Polish wars of Gustavus Adolphus.—On the death of Charles in 1611 his son, Gustavus Adolphus, did not immediately assume the title of king. "Sweden remained without a sovereign for two months, for, according to the will of the deceased king, the queen and his nephew (Duke John), with six councillors of state, were to rule till the wishes of the people could be made known in the customary manner. After an interregnum of two months, the Diet opened at Nyköping. . . . Duke John was the son of Sigismund, King of Poland, had been brought up in Sweden, and might be considered as having some just claim to the throne. The queen-mother and Duke John laid down the tutelage and the regency. . . . Nine days later the young king, in the presence of the representatives of the estates of Sweden, received the reins of government. . . . He was then in the first month of his 18th year. He took charge of the kingdom when it was in a critical condition. Since the death of Gustavus Vasa, his grandfather, a period of more than 50 years, Sweden had not enjoyed a single year of peace. In that

long space of time, there had been constant dissensions and violence. . . . Sweden was much constrained and embarrassed by her boundaries, and by the jealousies and hostile feelings of her neighbours on the north and the south. Denmark and Norway were united in a kind of dual government under the same king, and both alike were opposed to the growth of Swedish power, and were in continual dispute with her in respect to territory, as well as to the naval and commercial uses of the adjacent seas. Those provinces in the south which are now the most productive and valuable of Sweden, then belonged to Denmark, or were in dispute between the two countries. On the east, Russia and Poland embarrassed and threatened her." During the first year of his reign Gustavus devoted his energies to the war with Denmark. He fought at a disadvantage. His resources were unequal to those of the Danes. His capital, Stockholm, was once attacked by a Danish fleet and in serious peril. But he secured an advantageous peace in the spring of 1613. "Sweden renounced some of its conquests and pretensions, and the Danes gave up to Sweden the city of Calmar on the Baltic, and at the end of six years were to surrender to Sweden its city of Elfsborg on the North Sea, the latter agreeing to pay to the Danes 1,000,000 thalers for the surrender. . . . At the death of Charles IX, and the ascension of Gustavus to the throne, Sweden was in a state of war with Russia, and was so to continue for several years; though hostilities were not all the time prosecuted with vigor, and were some of the time practically suspended. . . . The Swedes held possession of a large area of what is now Russian territory, as well as important towns and fortresses. The extensive country of Finland, which makes to-day so important a province of Russia, had been united with Sweden nearly five centuries, as it continued to be nearly two hundred years longer. But towns and territory, also a long distance within the lines of the Russian population, were then in the power of the Swedish forces. The troubles and dissensions relative to the succession, and extreme dislike to the Poles, had caused a numerous party to seek a Swedish prince for its sovereign, and to this end had sent an embassy to Stockholm near the date of the death of Charles IX. Finding that the young Gustavus had acceded to the crown of his father, this Russian party desired to secure for the Russian throne Charles Philip, a younger brother of Gustavus. The Swedish king did not show eagerness to bring this plan to success; but, the war being terminated with Denmark, he was resolved to draw what advantage he could from the weakened condition of Russia, to the advancement and security of the interests of Sweden. In July, 1618, the Russians chose for czar Michael Romanoff, then sixteen years of age. . . . Gustavus proceeded to push military operations with as much vigor as possible. . . . For four years more the war between these two countries continued; . . . the advantages being generally on the side of the Swedes, though they were not always successful in important sieges. Finally, through the mediation of English agents, terms of peace were agreed upon. "The treaty was signed February, 1617. Russia yielded to Sweden a large breadth of territory, shutting herself out from the Baltic; the land where St.

Petersburg now stands becoming Swedish territory. . . . The next important work in hand was to deal with Poland. . . . At the death of Charles IX. an armistice had been signed, which was to continue until July, 1612. This was thrice extended, the last time to January, 1616. The latter date had not been reached when the Polish partisans began to intrigue actively in Sweden, and those Swedes who still adhered to the religion and the dynastic rights of Sigismund could not be otherwise than secretly or openly stirred. Sigismund was not only supported by the power of Poland, and by his strong show of legal title to the Swedish crown, but there were strong influences on his side in European high political and religious quarters. He was united to the house of Hapsburg by the bonds of relationship as well as of theology. Philip III of Spain, and he who afterwards became Ferdinand II. of Austria, were his brothers-in-law. Sigismund came then to the resolution to make war for the possession of Sweden. He was promised enrolment of troops in Germany, the Spaniards had engaged to arm a fleet in his support, and the estates of Poland were to furnish their quota. . . . Efforts were made to stir up revolt against Gustavus in his own kingdom, and he promptly declared war. "During the year 1617 hostilities were prosecuted on both sides with much vigor, and loss of life. Towns and strong positions were taken, and invasions and sudden attacks were made on both sides, the advantages being generally with the Swedes, though not decisive. During the winter of 1618 the Poles invaded Livonia and Esthonia, carrying pillage and fire in their march, and then retiring." Gustavus would not allow his generals to retaliate. "We wish not," he said, "to war against the peasant, whom we had rather protect than ruin." In 1618 there was an armistice, with peace negotiations which failed, and the war began anew. In August, 1621, Gustavus laid siege to Riga with a strong fleet and army, and met with an obstinate resistance, but the place was surrendered to him at the end of nearly six weeks. Again the belligerents agreed to an armistice, and "the year 1624 is declared by the Swedish historians to have been the only one in which Gustavus Adolphus was able to devote all his labors and cares to the interior administration of his country. In the following year the war was renewed. The third campaign of the Swedish king against Poland was terminated by the completion of the conquest of Livonia and the possession of Courland assured to him Riga, the object of his special care." The decisive battle of the campaign was fought at Wallhof, January 7, 1626. The king of Sweden then "resolved to transport the theatre of war from the banks of the Duna to those of the Vistula, to attack Poland at the heart, and approach Germany. Here commences that part of the war of Poland which is called also the war of Prussia. . . . He [Gustavus] realized the need of a port in Eastern Prussia; and the elector of Brandenburg, his brother-in-law, was invested with that duchy under the suzerainty of Poland. Gustavus did not allow these considerations to arrest his course. . . . June 26 the king arrived before Pillau, and possessed himself of that city without much resistance, the garrison being small. . . . Braunsberg capitulated June 30. July 1, Flanenberg surrendered, and Elbing on the 6th,

which was followed by Marlenberg on the 8th; the last a well-fortified city. Many towns of less importance were likewise soon captured. Gustavus rapidly pushed aside all resistance, and soon reached the frontiers of Pomerania." In the engagements of the campaign of 1627 the king was twice wounded—once by a musket-ball in the groin, and the second time by a ball that entered near the neck and lodged at the upper corner of the right shoulder-blade. In June, 1629, "there was a heated engagement at Stum, in which Gustavus ran great danger, his force being inferior to the enemy." In September of that year "an armistice was concluded for six years between the belligerent kingdoms. Five cities which had been conquered by Swedish arms were given up to Poland, and three others delivered to the elector of Brandenburg, to be held during the armistice. Gustavus was to continue to occupy Pillau and three other towns of some importance. Liberty of conscience was to be accorded to Protestants and Catholics, and commerce was declared free between the two nations"—J. L. Stevens, *Hist. of Gustavus Adolphus*, ch 3 and 7.

ALSO IN B. Chapman, *Hist. of Gustavus Adolphus*, ch 2-4.—See, also, POLAND. A. D. 1590-1648.

(Denmark): A. D. 1625-1630.—The Protestant Alliance.—Engagement of King Christian IV. in the Thirty Years War.—The Treaty of Lübeck. See GERMANY: A. D. 1624-1626, and 1627-1629.

(Denmark): A. D. 1627.—The country overrun by Wallenstein. See GERMANY: A. D. 1627-1629.

(Sweden): A. D. 1628.—Gustavus Adolphus' first interference in the war in Germany.—The relief of Stralsund. See GERMANY: A. D. 1627-1629.

(Sweden): A. D. 1630-1632.—The campaigns of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany.—His death. See GERMANY: A. D. 1630-1631, to 1631-1632.

(Sweden): A. D. 1631.—Treaty of Bärwalde with France. See GERMANY: A. D. 1631 (JANUARY).

(Sweden): A. D. 1632.—Full powers given to Oxenstiern in Germany. See GERMANY: A. D. 1632-1634.

(Sweden): A. D. 1638-1640.—The planting of a colony in America, on the Delaware. See DELAWARE. A. D. 1638-1640.

(Sweden): A. D. 1640-1645.—Campaigns of Baner and Torstenson in Germany. See GERMANY: A. D. 1640-1645.

A. D. 1643-1645.—War between Sweden and Denmark.—Torstenson's conquest of Holstein and Schleswig.—The Peace of Bromsebro. See GERMANY: A. D. 1640-1645.

(Sweden): A. D. 1644-1697.—Reign and abdication of Queen Christina.—Wars of Charles X. and Charles XI. with Poland and Denmark and in Germany.—Establishment of absolutism.—"Christina, the only child and successor of Gustavus Adolphus, had been brought up by her aunt, Katerina, the Princess Palatine, until the death of the latter in 1639, and in the year 1644, when she reached the age of eighteen, the regency was absolved, and she began to rule in her own name. She had inherited much of her father's talent, and was perhaps the most learned and accomplished woman of her time. She had

received the education of a man. . . . She had great taste for the fine arts and for the pursuits of science; but while she encouraged scientific men at her court, she also spent money too recklessly in rewarding artistic merit of all kinds. . . . As a dangerous drawback to her many splendid qualities, she had all the waywardness, caprice, restlessness of mind, fickleness and love of display for which her beautiful mother, Maria Eleonora of Brandenburg, had been noted. She lavished crown lands and the money of the state upon favourites. . . . In the meanwhile the national Estates had been split up into parties, the aristocrats being led by Axel Oxenstjerna, and the democrats, with whom the queen sided, by Johan Skytte. The clergy struggled to maintain their independence under the oppressive patronage of the nobles, and the peasants agitated to recover some of the power which the great Gustavus Vasa had granted them, but which his successors had by degrees taken from them. The kingdom was in a ferment, and a civil war seemed to be unavoidable. The council urged upon the queen to marry, and her cousin, Karl Gustaf of the Palatinat, entreated her to fulfil the promise which she had given him in earlier years of choosing him for her husband. At length . . . she proposed him for her successor. After much opposition, Karl Gustaf was declared successor to the throne in the event of the queen having no children of her own. The few years of Christina's reign after her solemn coronation were disquieted by continued dissensions in the diet, attempts at revolts, and by a general distress, which was greatly increased by her profuse wastefulness and her reckless squandering of the property of the crown. As early as the year 1648 she had conceived the idea of abdicating, but, being hindered by her old friends and councillors, she deferred carrying out her wishes till 1654. In that year the abdication was formally accomplished, and she left the country at once, travelling through Europe. In 1655 she renounced Protestantism and entered the Roman Catholic Church. "At the death [1660] of her cousin and successor, Karl X Gustaf, as he was called by the Swedes, and who is known to us as Charles X., she returned to Sweden and claimed the crown for herself, but neither then, nor in 1667, when she renewed her pretensions, would the council encourage her hopes, and, after a final attempt to gain the vacant throne of Poland in 1668, she gave up all schemes of ever reigning again, and retired to Rome, where she died in 1689 at the age of sixty-three. . . . The short reign of Charles X., from 1655 to 1660, was a time of great disorder and unquiet in Sweden. . . . He resolved to engage the people in active war. . . . The ill-timed demand of the Polish king, Johan Kasimir, to be proclaimed the true heir to Christina's throne, drew the first attack upon Poland. Charles X. was born to be a soldier and a conqueror, and the success and rapidity with which he overran all Poland, and crushed the Polish army in a three days' engagement at Warsaw in 1656, showed that he was a worthy pupil and successor of his uncle, the great Gustavus Adolphus. But it was easier for him to make conquests than to keep them, and when the Russians, in their jealousy of the increasing power of Sweden, took part in the war, and began to attack Livonia and Esthonia, while an imperial army advanced into

Poland to assist the Poles, who, infuriated at the excesses of the Swedish soldiers, had risen en masse against them, Charles saw the expediency of retreating; and, leaving only a few detachments of troops to watch his enemies, he turned upon Denmark. This war, which was closed by the peace signed at Roeskilde in 1658, enriched Sweden at the expense of Denmark, and gave to the former the old provinces of Skaania, Halland and Bleking, by which the Swedish monarchy obtained natural and well defined boundaries. The success of this first Danish war, in which Denmark for a time lay crushed under the power of the Swedish king, emboldened him to renew his attacks, and between 1658 and 1660 Charles X. made war five times on the Danish monarch; more than once laid siege to Copenhagen, and, under his able captain, Wrangel, nearly destroyed the Danish fleet. At the close of 1659, when it seemed as if Denmark must be wholly subjugated by Sweden, the English and Dutch, alarmed at the ambition of the Swedish king, sent an allied fleet into the Cattegat to operate with the Danes. Charles, checked in his operations, was preparing to carry the war into Norway, when he died suddenly, in the winter of 1660, and peace was made by the treaty of Oliva. "By the early death of Charles X., Sweden was again brought under the rule of a regency, for his son and successor, Charles XI., was only four years old when he became king. Every department of the government was left to suffer from mismanagement, the army and navy were neglected, the defences of the frontiers fell into decay, and the public servants were unable to procure their pay. To relieve the great want of money, the regency accepted subsidies, or payments of money from foreign states to maintain peace towards them, and hired out troops to serve in other countries. In this state of things the young king grew up without receiving any very careful education. Charles was declared of age in his 18th year. He was not left long in the enjoyment of mere exercises of amusement, for in 1674 Louis XIV. of France, in conformity with the treaty which the regents had concluded with him, called upon the young Swedish king to help him in the war which he was carrying on against the German princes [see NETHERLANDS A. D. 1674-1678]. Charles sent an army into Germany, which advanced without opposition into the heart of Brandenburg, but before these forces could form a junction with the French troops then encamped in the Rhineland, the Elector came upon them unawares at Fehrbellin [June 18, 1675] and defeated them. The losses of the Swedes on this occasion were not great, but the result of their defeat was to give encouragement to the old rivals of Sweden; and early in 1675 both Holland and Denmark declared war against the Swedish king, who, finding that he had been left by the regency almost without army, navy, or money, resolved for the future to take the management of public affairs entirely into his own hands." When he "began the war by a sea engagement with the enemy off Oeland, he found that his ships of war had suffered as much as the land-defences from the long-continued neglect of his regents. The Danes, under their great admiral, Niels Juel, and supported by a Dutch squadron, beat the Swedish fleet, many of whose ships were burnt or sunk. This defeat was atoned for by a victory on land,

gained by Charles himself in 1676, over the Danes on the snow-covered hills around the town of Lund. Success was not won without heavy cost, for after a most sanguinary fight, continued from daybreak till night, King Charles, although master of the field, found that more than half his men had been killed. The Danes, who had suffered fully as much, were forced to retreat, leaving Lund in the hands of the Swedes, and although they several times repeated the attempt, they failed in recovering the province of Skaania, which was the great object of their ambition. In Germany the fortune of war did not favor the Swedes, although they fought gallantly under their general, Otto Königsmark. [Stettin was surrendered after a long siege in 1677, and Stralsund in 1678] and Charles XI was glad to enter into negotiations for taking part in the general peace which France was urging upon all the leading powers of Europe, and which was signed at the palace of St Germain, in 1679, by the representatives of the respective princes. Sweden recovered the whole of Pomerania, which had been occupied during the war by Austria and Brandenburg, and all Swedish and Danish conquests were mutually renounced. At the close of this war Charles XI began in good earnest to put his kingdom in order. By sternly reclaiming crown lands which had been wantonly alienated by former rulers, and by compelling other restitutions, Charles broke the power of the nobles, and so humbled the National Estates that they "proclaimed him in a diet held in 1693, to be an absolute sovereign king, 'who had the power and right to rule his kingdom as he pleased.'" He attained an absolutism in fact, which was practically unlimited. He died in 1697, leaving three children, the eldest of whom, who succeeded him, was the extraordinary Charles XII—E C Otté, *Scandinavian History*, ch 21.

ALSO IN H Tuttle, *Hist of Prussia to 1740*, ch 5—T H Dyer, *Hist of Modern Europe*, bk 5, ch 2 and 4 (v B)—G B Malleon, *Battle-Fields of Germany*, ch 8—See, also, BRANDENBURG A D 1640-1688.

(Sweden): A. D. 1646-1648.—Last campaigns of the Thirty Years War in Germany. See GERMANY A D 1646-1648.

(Denmark and Norway): A. D. 1648.—Accession of Frederick III.

(Sweden) A. D. 1648.—The Peace of Westphalia—Acquisition of part of Pomerania and other German territory. See GERMANY A D 1648.

(Sweden): A. D. 1655.—Conquest of the Delaware colony by the Dutch. See DELAWARE A D 1640-1656.

(Sweden): A. D. 1668.—Triple Alliance with Holland and England against Louis XIV. See NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND) A D 1668.

(Denmark and Norway): A. D. 1670.—Accession of Christian V.

(Denmark): A. D. 1674-1679.—In the coalition to resist Louis XIV. See NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND): A. D. 1672-1674, and 1674-1678, also, NINEGUEN, PEACE OF.

(Sweden): A. D. 1686.—The League of Augsburg against Louis XIV. See GERMANY A D 1686.

(Sweden): A. D. 1697.—Accession of Charles XII.

A. D. 1697.—The Peace of Ryswick. See FRANCE: A. D. 1697.

(Sweden): A. D. 1697-1700.—The conspiracy of three sovereigns against Charles XII. and how he met it.—First campaigns of the young king, in Denmark and Russia.—"Charles XII, at his accession to the throne, found himself the absolute and undisturbed master, not only of Sweden and Finland, but also of Livonia, Carelia, Ingria, Wismar, Viborg, the Islands of Rügen and Oesel, and the finest part of Pomerania, together with the duchy of Bremen and Verden,—all of them the conquests of his ancestors. The beginning of the king's reign gave no very favorable idea of his character. It was imagined that he had been more ambitious of obtaining the supreme power than worthy of possessing it. True it is, he had no dangerous passion, but his conduct discovered nothing but the sallies of youth and the freaks of obstinacy. He seemed to be equally proud and lazy. The ambassadors who resided at his court took him even for a person of mean capacity, and represented him as such to their respective masters. The Swedes entertained the same opinion of him: nobody knew his real character: he did not even know it himself, until the storm that suddenly arose in the North gave him an opportunity of displaying his great talents, which had hitherto lain concealed. Three powerful princes, taking the advantage of his youth, conspired his ruin almost at the same time. The first was his own cousin, Frederick IV, king of Denmark; the second, Augustus, elector of Saxony and King of Poland; Peter the Great, czar of Muscovy, was the third, and most dangerous. The founder of the Russian empire was ambitious of being a conqueror. Besides, he wanted a port on the east side of the Baltic, to facilitate the execution of all his schemes. He wanted the province of Ingria, which lies to the northeast of Livonia. The Swedes were in possession of it, and from them he resolved to take it by force. His predecessors had had claims upon Ingria, Esthonia, and Livonia, and the present seemed a favorable opportunity for reviving these claims, which had lain buried for a hundred years, and had been cancelled by the sanction of treaties. He therefore made a league with the King of Poland, to wrest from young Charles XII all the territories that are bounded by the Gulf of Finland, the Baltic Sea, Poland, and Muscovy. The news of these preparations struck the Swedes with consternation, and alarmed the council." But the effect on the young King was instantly and strangely sobering. He assumed the responsibilities of the situation at once, and took into his own hands the preparations for war. From that moment "he entered on a new course of life, from which he never afterwards deviated in one single instance. Full of the idea of Alexander and Caesar, he proposed to imitate those two conquerors in every thing but their vices. No longer did he indulge himself in magnificence, sports, and recreations, he reduced his table to the most rigid frugality. He had formerly been fond of gayety and dress; but from that time he was never clad otherwise than as a common soldier. He was supposed to have entertained a passion for a lady of his court; whether there was any foundation for this supposition does not appear; certain it is, he ever

after renounced all commerce with women, not only for fear of being governed by them, but likewise to set an example of continence to his soldiers. . . . He likewise determined to abstain from wine during the rest of his life. . . . He began by assuring the Duke of Holstein, his brother-in-law, of a speedy assistance. Eight thousand men were immediately sent into Pomerania, a province bordering upon Holstein, in order to enable the duke to make head against the Danes. The duke indeed had need of them. His dominions were already laid waste, the castle of Gottorp taken, and the city of Tönningen pressed by an obstinate siege, to which the King of Denmark had come in person. . . . This spark began to throw the empire into a flame. On the one side, the Saxon troops of the King of Poland, those of Brandenburg Wolfenbüttel, and Hesse Cassel, advanced to join the Danes. On the other, the King of Sweden's 8,000 men, the troops of Hanover and Zell, and three Dutch regiments, came to the assistance of the duke. While the little country of Holstein was thus the theatre of war, two squadrons, the one from England and the other from Holland, appeared in the Baltic. They joined the young King of Sweden, who seemed to be in danger of being crushed. . . . Charles set out for his first campaign on the 8th day of May, new style, in the year 1700, and left Stockholm, whither he never returned. . . . His fleet consisted of three and forty vessels. . . . He joined the squadrons of the allies," and made a descent upon Copenhagen. The city surrendered to escape bombardment, and in less than six weeks Charles had extorted from the Danish King a treaty of peace, negotiated at Travendahl, which indemnified the Duke of Holstein for all the expenses of the war and delivered him from oppression. For himself, Charles asked nothing. "Exactly at the same time, the King of Poland invested Riga, the capital of Livonia; and the czar was advancing on the east at the head of nearly 100,000 men." Riga was defended with great skill and determination, and Augustus was easily persuaded to abandon the siege on the remonstrance of the Dutch, who had much merchandise in the town. "The only thing that Charles had now to do towards the finishing of his first campaign, was to march against his rival in glory, Peter Alexiovitch." Peter had appeared before Narva on the 1st of October, at the head of 80,000 men, mostly undisciplined barbarians, "some armed with arrows, and others with clubs. Few of them had guns; none of them had ever seen a regular siege; and there was not one good cannoner in the whole army. . . . Narva was almost without fortifications. Baron Horn, who commanded there, had not 1,000 regular troops; and yet this immense army could not reduce it in six weeks. It was now the 15th of November, when the czar learned that the King of Sweden had crossed the sea with 200 transports, and was advancing to the relief of Narva. The Swedes were not above 20,000 strong." But the czar was not confident. He had another army marching to his support, and he left the camp at Narva to hasten its movements. Charles' motions were too quick for him. He reached Narva on the 8th of November, after a forced march, with a vanguard of only 8,000 men, and at once, without waiting for the remainder of his army to come up, he stormed

the Russian intrenchments. "The Swedes advanced with fixed bayonets, having a furious shower of snow on their backs, which drove full in the face of the enemy." The victory was complete. "The Swedes had not lost above 600 men. Eight thousand Muscovites had been killed in their intrenchments; many were drowned; many had crossed the river," and 80,000 who held a part of the camp at nightfall, surrendered next morning. When czar Peter, who was pressing the march of his 40,000 men, received news of the disaster at Narva, he turned homeward, and set himself seriously to the work of drilling and disciplining his troops. "The Swedes," he said phlegmatically, "will teach us to beat them."—*Voltaire, Hist. of Charles XII, King of Sweden, bk. 1-2.*

(Denmark and Norway): A. D. 1699.—Accession of Frederick IV.

(Sweden): A. D. 1701-1707.—Invasion and subjugation of Poland and Saxony by Charles XII.—Deposition of Augustus from the Polish throne.—Charles at the summit of his career.—"Whilst Peter, abandoning all the provinces he had invaded, retreated to his own dominions, and employed himself in training his undisciplined serfs, Charles prepared to take the field against his only remaining adversary, the King of Poland. Leaving Narva, where he passed the winter, he entered Livonia, and appeared in the neighbourhood of Riga, the very place which the Poles and Saxons had in vain besieged. Dreading the storm that now approached, Augustus had entered into a closer alliance with the czar; and at an interview which took place at Birsén, a small town in Lithuania, it was agreed that each should furnish the other with a body of 50,000 mercenaries, to be paid by Russia. . . . The Saxon army, having failed in their attempt on Riga, endeavoured to prevent the Swedes from crossing the Dvina; but the passage was effected under cover of a thick cloud of smoke from the burning of wet straw, and by means of large boats with high wooden parapets along the sides, to protect the soldiers from the fire of the enemy, who were driven from their intrenchments with the loss of 2,000 killed and 1,500 prisoners. Charles immediately advanced to Mittau, the capital of Courland, the garrison of which, with all the other towns and forts in the duchy, surrendered at discretion. He next passed into Lithuania, conquering wherever he came, and driving 20,000 Russians before him with the utmost precipitation. On reaching Birsén, it gave him no little satisfaction, as he himself confessed, to enter in triumph the very town where, only a few months before, Augustus and the czar had plotted his destruction. It was here that he formed the daring project of dethroning the King of Poland by means of his own subjects, whose notions of liberty could not tolerate the measures of a despotic government. . . . The fate of Augustus, already desperate, was here consummated by the treachery of the primate Radziewski, who caused it to be immediately notified to all the palatines, that no alternative remained but to submit to the will of the conqueror. The deserted monarch resolved to defend his crown by force of arms; the two kings met near Clissau (July 18, 1702), where after a bloody battle fortune again declared for the Swedes. Charles halted not a moment on the field of victory, but marched rapidly to Cracow

in pursuit of his antagonist. That city was taken without firing a shot, and taxed with a contribution of 100,000 rix-dollars. The fugitive prince obtained an unexpected respite of six weeks, his indefatigable rival having had his thigh-bone fractured by an accidental fall from his horse. The interval was spent in hostile preparations, but the recovery of Charles overturned all the schemes of his enemies, and the decisive battle of Pultusk (May 1, 1708) completed the humiliation of the unfortunate Augustus. At the instigation of the faithless cardinal, the diet at Warsaw declared (February 14, 1704) that the Elector of Saxony was incapable of wearing the crown, which was soon after bestowed on Stanislaus Leczinski, the young palatine of Posnania. Count Piper strongly urged his royal master to assume the sovereignty himself. But the splendours of a diadem had few charms in the eyes of a conqueror who confessed that he felt much more pleasure in bestowing thrones upon others than in winning them for himself. Having thus succeeded in his favourite project, Charles resumed his march to complete the entire conquest of the kingdom. Every where had fortune crowned the bold expeditions of this adventurous prince. Whilst his generals and armies were pursuing their career from province to province, he had himself opened a passage for his victorious troops into Saxony and the imperial dominions. His ships, now masters of the Baltic, were employed in transporting to Sweden the prisoners taken in the wars. Denmark, bound up by the treaty of Travendhal, was prevented from offering any active interference, the Russians were kept in check towards the east by a detachment of 30,000 Swedes, so that the whole region was kept in awe by the sword of the conqueror, from the German Ocean almost to the mouth of the Borysthene, and even to the gates of Moscow. The Czar Peter in the mean time, having earned Narva by assault, and captured several towns and fortresses in Livonia, held a conference with Augustus at Grodno, where the two sovereigns concerted their plans for attacking the Scandinavian invaders in their new conquests, with a combined army of 60,000 men, under Prince Menzikoff and General Schullenberg. Had the fate of the contest depended on numerical superiority alone, Charles must have been crushed before the overwhelming power of his enemies, but his courage and good fortune prevailed over every disadvantage. The scattered hordes of Muscovy were overthrown with so great celerity, that one detachment after another was routed before they learned the defeat of their companions. Schullenberg, with all his experience and reputation, was not more successful, having been completely beaten by Renschild, the Parmenio of the northern Alexander, in a sanguinary action (Feb 12, 1706), at the small town of Travenstadt, near Punitz, a place already fatal to the cause of Augustus. . . . The reduction of Saxony, which Charles next invaded, obliged Augustus to implore peace on any terms. The conditions exacted by the victor were, that he should renounce for ever the crown of Poland; acknowledge Stanislaus as lawful king; and dissolve his treaty of alliance with Russia. The inflexible temper of Charles was not likely to mitigate the severity of these demands, but their rigour was increased in consequence of the defeat of General Meyerfeld, near

Kalisch, by Prince Menzikoff—the first advantage which the Muscovites had gained over the Swedes in a pitched battle. . . . The numerous victories of Charles, and the arbitrary manner in which he had deposed the King of Poland, filled all Europe with astonishment. Some states entertained apprehensions of his power, while others prepared to solicit his friendship. France, harassed by expensive wars in Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands, courted his alliance with an ardour proportioned to the distressing state of her affairs. Offended at the declaration issued against him by the diet of Ratisbon, and resenting an indignity offered to Baron de Stralheim, his envoy at Vienna, he magnified these trivial affronts into an occasion of quarrelling with the emperor, who was obliged to succumb, and among other mortifying concessions, to grant his Lutheran subjects in Silesia the free exercise of their religious liberties as secured by the treaties of Westphalia. . . . The ambitious prince was now in the zenith of his glory, he had experienced no reverse, nor met with any interruption to his victories. The romantic extravagance of his views increased with his success. One year, he thought, will suffice for the conquest of Russia. The court of Rome was next to feel his vengeance, as the pope had dared to oppose the concession of religious liberty to the Silesian Protestants. No enterprise at that time appeared impossible to him.—A. Crichton, *Scandinavia, Ancient and Modern*, v. 2, ch. 3.

ALSO IN S A Dunham, *Hist. of Poland*, pp. 219-221 — T H Dyer, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, bk 5, ch 5 (p. 3).

(Sweden): A. D. 1707-1718.—Charles XII. in Russia.—His ruinous defeat at Pultowa.—His refuge among the Turks.—His fruitless intrigues.—His return to Sweden.—His death. —“From Saxony, Charles marched back into Poland [September, 1707], where Peter was making some ineffectual efforts to revive the party of Augustus. Peter retired before his rival, who had, however, the satisfaction of defeating an army of 20,000 Russians [at Golowstschin, in the spring of 1708], strongly intrenched. Intoxicated by success, he rejected the czar's offers of peace, declaring that he would treat at Moscow; and without forming any systematic plan of operations, he crossed the frontiers, resolved on the destruction of that ancient city. Peter prevented the advance of the Swedes, on the direct line, by destroying the roads and desolating the country. Charles, after having endured great privations, turned off towards the Ukraine, whither he had been invited by Mazeppa, the chief of the Cossacks, who, disgusted by the conduct of the czar, had resolved to throw off his allegiance. In spite of all the obstacles that nature and the enemy could throw in his way, Charles reached the place of rendezvous; but he had the mortification to find Mazeppa appear in his camp as a fugitive rather than an ally, for the czar had discovered his treason, and disconcerted his schemes by the punishment of his associates. A still greater misfortune to the Swedes was the loss of the convoy and the ruin of the reinforcement they had expected from Livonia. General Lewenhaupt, to whose care it was entrusted, had been forced into three general engagements by the Russians; and though he had eminently distinguished himself by his courage and conduct, he was forced to set fire to his

wagons to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. Undaunted by these misfortunes, Charles continued the campaign even in the depth of a winter so severe that 2,000 men were at once frozen to death almost in his presence. At length he laid siege to Pultowa, a fortified city on the frontiers of the Ukraine, which contained one of the czar's principal magazines. The garrison was numerous and the resistance obstinate; Charles himself was dangerously wounded in the heel whilst viewing the works; and while he was still confined to his tent he learned that Peter was advancing with a numerous army to raise the siege. Leaving 7,000 men to guard the works, Charles ordered his soldiers to march and meet the enemy, while he accompanied them in a litter (July 8, 1709). The desperate charge of the Swedes broke the Russian cavalry, but the infantry stood firm, and gave the horse an opportunity of rallying in the rear. In the meantime the czar's artillery made dreadful havoc in the Swedish line; and Charles, who had been forced to abandon his cannon in his forced marches, in vain contended against this formidable disadvantage. After a dreadful combat of more than two hours' duration, the Swedish army was irretrievably ruined; 8,000 of their best troops were left dead on the field, 6,000 were taken prisoners, and about 12,000 of the fugitives were soon after forced to surrender on the banks of the Dnieper, from want of boats to cross the river. Charles, accompanied by about 300 of his guards, escaped to Bender, a Turkish town in Bessarabia, abandoning all his treasures to his rival, including the rich spoils of Poland and Saxony. Few victories have ever had such important consequences as that which the czar won at Pultowa; in one fatal day Charles lost the fruits of nine years' victories; the veteran army that had been the terror of Europe was completely ruined; those who escaped from the fatal field were taken prisoners, but they found a fate scarcely better than death; for they were transported by the czar to colonize the wilds of Siberia; the elector of Saxony re-entered Poland and drove Stanislaus from the throne; the kings of Denmark and Prussia revived old claims on the Swedish provinces, while the victorious Peter invaded not only Livonia and Ingria, but a great part of Finland. Indeed, but for the interference of the German emperor and the maritime powers, the Swedish monarchy would have been rent in pieces. Charles, in his exile, formed a new plan for the destruction of his hated rival; he instigated the Turks to attempt the conquest of Russia, and flattered himself that he might yet enter Moscow at the head of a Mohammedan army. The bribes which Peter lavishly bestowed on the counsellors of the sultan, for a time frustrated these intrigues; but Charles, through his friend Poniatowski, informed the sultan of his vizier's corruption, and procured the deposition of that minister. . . . The czar made the most vigorous preparations for the new war by which he was menaced (A. D. 1711). The Turkish vizier, on the other hand, assembled all the forces of the Ottoman Empire in the plains of Adrianople. Demetrius Cantemir, the hospodar of Moldavia, believing that a favourable opportunity presented itself for delivering his country from the Mohammedan yoke, invited the czar to his aid; and the Russians, rapidly advancing, reached the northern banks of the Pruth, near

Yassi, the Moldavian capital. Here the Russians found that the promises of Prince Cantemir were illusory," and they were soon so enveloped by the forces of the Turks that there seemed to be no escape for them. But the czarina, Catherine — the Livonian peasant woman whom Peter had made his wife — gathered up her jewels and all the money she could find in camp, and sent them as a gift to the vizier, whereby he was induced to open negotiations. "A treaty [known as the Treaty of the Pruth] was concluded on terms which, though severe [requiring the Russians to give up Azof], were more favourable than Peter, under the circumstances, could reasonably have hoped; the Russians retired in safety, and Charles reached the Turkish camp, only to learn the downfall of all his expectations. A new series of intrigues in the court of Constantinople led to the appointment of a new vizier; but this minister was little inclined to gratify the king of Sweden; on the contrary, warned by the fate of his predecessors, he resolved to remove him from the Ottoman empire (A. D. 1713). Charles continued to linger; even after he had received a letter of dismissal from the sultan's own hand, he resolved to remain, and when a resolution was taken to send him away by force, he determined, with his few attendants, to dare the whole strength of the Turkish empire. After a fierce resistance, he was captured and conveyed a prisoner to Adrianople. . . . Another revolution in the divan revived the hopes of Charles, and induced him to remain in Turkey, when his return to the North would probably have restored him to his former eminence. The Swedes, under General Steenbock, gained one of the most brilliant victories that had been obtained during the war, over the united forces of the Danes and Saxons, at Gadebusch [November 20, 1712], in the duchy of Mecklenburg; but the conqueror sullied his fame by burning the defenceless town of Altona [January 19, 1713] an outrage which excited the indignation of all Europe." He soon after met with reverses and was compelled to surrender his whole army. "The czar in the meantime pushed forward his conquests on the side of Finland; and the glory of his reign appeared to be consummated by a naval victory obtained over the Swedes near the island of Oeland. . . . Charles heard of his rival's progress unmoved; but when he learned that the Swedish senate intended to make his sister regent and to make peace with Russia and Denmark, he announced his intention of returning home." He traversed Europe incognito, making the journey of 1,100 miles, mostly on horseback, in seventeen days, "and towards the close of the year [1714] reached Stralsund, the capital of Swedish Pomerania. Charles, at the opening of the next campaign, found himself surrounded with enemies (A. D. 1715). Stralsund itself was besieged by the united armies of the Prussians, Danes, and Saxons, while the Russian fleet, which now rode triumphant in the Baltic, threatened a descent upon Sweden. After an obstinate defence, in which the Swedish monarch displayed all his accustomed bravery, Stralsund was forced to capitulate, Charles having previously escaped in a small vessel to his native shores. All Europe believed the Swedish monarch undone; it was supposed he could no longer defend his own dominions, when, to the inexpressible astonishment of every one, it

was announced that he had invaded Norway. His attention, however, was less engaged by the war than by the gigantic intrigues of his new favourite, Goertz, who, taking advantage of a coolness between the Russians and the other enemies of Sweden, proposed that Peter and Charles should unite in strict amity, and dictate the law to Europe. While the negotiations were yet in progress, Charles invaded Norway a second time, and invested the castle of Fredericks hall in the very depth of winter. But while engaged in viewing the works he was struck by a cannon ball, and was dead before any of his attendants came to his assistance [December 11, 1718]. The Swedish senate showed little grief for the loss of the warlike king. The crown was conferred upon the late king's sister but she soon resigned it to her husband, the prince of Hesse.—W. C. Taylor, *Student's Manual of Modern History*, ch. 7, sect. 6.

ALSO IN E. Schuyler, *Peter the Great*, ch. 53-56 and 61-66 (r. 2).—Sir E. S. Creasy, *Hist. of the Ottoman Turks*, ch. 18.

(Sweden): A. D. 1719.—Accession of Ulrica Eleonora.

(Sweden): A. D. 1719-1721.—Constitutional changes.—Treaties of Peace ending the Great Northern War.—Swedish cessions of Territory.—An assembly of the States was summoned in February [1719] and completely altered the constitution. Sweden was declared an elective kingdom and the government was vested in a council of 24 members, divided into eight colleges, who were invested with a power so absolute that their elected queen was reduced to a mere shadow. In short the ancient oligarchy was restored and Sweden became the prey of a few noble families.

In November a treaty was signed at Stockholm between Sweden and Great Britain, by which the Duchies of Bremen and Verden were ceded to George I. [as Elector of Hanover] in consideration of a payment of one million rix dollars. By another treaty in January 1720, George engaged to support Sweden against Denmark and Russia, and to pay a yearly subsidy of \$300,000 during the war. About the same time an armistice was concluded with Poland till a definitive treaty should be arranged on the basis of the Peace of Oliva. Augustus was to be recognised as King of Poland, but Stanislaus was to retain the royal title during his life, and to receive from Augustus a million rix dollars. Both parties were to unite to check the preponderance of the Czar whose troops excited great discontent and suspicion by their continued presence in Poland. On February 1st a peace was concluded with Prussia under the mediation of France and Great Britain. The principal articles of this treaty were that Sweden ceded to Prussia, Stettin, the Islands of Wolin and Usedom, and all the tract between the Oder and Peene, together with the towns of Damm and Golnau beyond the Oder. The King of Prussia, on his side, engaged not to assist the Czar, and to pay two million rix dollars to the Queen of Sweden. The terms of a peace between Sweden and Denmark were more difficult of arrangement. . . . By the Treaty of Stockholm, June 12th 1720, the King of Denmark restored to Sweden, Wismar, Stralsund, Rügen, and all that he held in Pomerania, Sweden paying 600,000 rix-dollars and renouncing the freedom of the Sound. Thus the only

territorial acquisition that Denmark made by the war was the greater part of the Duchy of Schleswig, the possession of which was guaranteed to her by England and France. Sweden and Russia were now the only Powers that remained at war.

At length, through the mediation of France, conferences were opened in May 1721, and the Peace of Nystad was signed September 10th.

The only portion of his conquests that [Peter] relinquished was Finland with the exception of a part of Carelia, but as, by his treaty with Augustus II., at the beginning of the war he had promised to restore Livonia to Poland if he conquered it, he paid the Crown of Sweden \$2,000,000 in order to evade this engagement by alleging that he had purchased that province.—T. H. Dyer, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, bk. 5 ch. 7 (v. 3).

ALSO IN F. C. Schlosser, *Hist. of the 18th Century period 1 div 1, ch. 2, sect. 3*.

(Sweden): A. D. 1720.—Accession of Frederick of Hesse-Cassel, husband of Ulrica Eleonora.

(Sweden): A. D. 1720-1792.—Wars with Russia and Prussia.—Humiliating powerlessness of the king.—The parties of the Hats and the Caps.—A constitutional Revolution.—Assassination of Gustavus III.—Ulrica Eleonora, the sister of Charles XII., resigned the crown in 1720 in favor of her husband, Prince of Hesse who became king under the title of Frederick I. His reign witnessed the conquest of Finland and the cession (1743) of a part of that province to Russia (see Russia: A. D. 1740-1762). On his death in 1751 Adolphus Frederick, bishop of Lubeck and administrator of Holstein, was raised to the throne. 'Though his personal qualities commanded respect his reign was disastrous one. He had the folly to join the coalition of Russia, Poland, Austria, and France against the king of Prussia. Twenty thousand Swedes were marched into Pomerania, on the pretext of enforcing the conditions of the treaty of Westphalia, but with the view of recovering the districts which had been ceded to Prussia after the death of Charles XII. They reduced Usedom and Wolin, with the fortresses on the coast, but this success was owing to the absence of the Prussians. When in 1758, Schwall, the general of Frederic the Great was at liberty to march with 30,000 men into Pomerania, he recovered the places which had been lost, and forced the invaders to retire under the cannon of Stralsund. The accession of the czar Peter was still more favourable to Frederic. An enthusiastic admirer of that prince, he soon concluded a treaty with him. Sweden was forced to follow the example, and things remained, at the peace of Hubertsburg, in the same condition as before the war. Scarcely was Sweden at harmony with her formidable enemy, when she became agitated by internal commotions. We have alluded to the limitations set to the royal authority after the death of Charles XII., and to the discontent it engendered in the breasts of the Swedish monarchs. While they strove to emancipate themselves from the shackles imposed upon them, the diet was no less anxious to render them more enslaved. That diet, consisting of four orders, the nobles, the clergy, the burghers, and the peasants, was often the scene of tumultuous proceedings: it was rarely tranquil; yet it enjoyed the supreme legislative authority. It was also cor-

rupt; for impoverished nobles and needy tradesmen had a voice, no less than the wealthiest members. All new laws, all ordinances, were signed by the king; yet he had no power of refusal; he was the mere registrar-general. . . . The king had sometimes refused to sign ordinances which he judged dangerous to the common weal: in 1756 an act was passed, that in future a stamp might be used in lieu of the sign-manual, whenever he should again refuse. More intolerable than all this was the manner in which the diet insisted on regulating the most trifling details of the royal household. This interference was resented by some of the members, belonging to what was called the 'Hat' party, who may be termed the Tories of Sweden. Opposed to these were the 'Caps,' who were for shackling the crown with new restrictions, and of whom the leaders were undoubtedly in the pay of Russia. . . . As Russia was the secret soul of the Caps, so France endeavoured to support the Hats, whenever the courts of St. Petersburg and St. Germain were hostile to each other. Stockholm therefore was an arena in which the two powers struggled for the ascendancy. Gustavus III., who succeeded his father Adolphus Frederic in 1771, was able with the help of French money and influence, and by winning to his support the burgher cavalry of the capital, to overawe the party of the Caps, and to impose a new constitution upon the country. The new constitution "conferred considerable powers on the sovereign, enabled him to make peace, or declare war, without the consent of the diet; but he could make no new law, or alter any already made, without its concurrence; and he was bound to ask, though not always to follow, the advice of his senate in matters of graver import. The form of the constitution was not much altered; and the four orders of deputies still remained. On the whole, it was a liberal constitution. If this revolution was agreeable to the Swedes themselves, it was odious to Catherine II., who saw Russian influence annihilated by it." The bad feeling between the two governments which followed led to war, in 1787, when Russia was engaged at the same time in hostilities with the Turks. The war was unpopular in Sweden, and Gustavus was frustrated in his ambitious designs on Finland. Peace was made in 1790, each party restoring its conquests, "so that things remained exactly as they were before the war." On the 16th March, 1792, Gustavus III. was assassinated, being shot at a masquerade ball, by one Ankerstrom, whose motives have remained always a mystery. Suspicion attached to others, the king's brother included, but nothing to justify it is proved. The murdered king was succeeded by his son Gustavus IV., who had but just passed the age of three years.—S. A. Dunham, *Hist. of Denmark, Sweden and Norway*, bk. 3, ch. 4 (v. 3).

(Denmark and Norway): A. D. 1730.—Accession of Christian VI.

(Denmark and Norway): A. D. 1746.—Accession of Frederick V.

(Sweden): A. D. 1751.—Accession of Adolphus Frederick.

(Denmark and Norway): A. D. 1766.—Accession of Christian VII.

(Sweden): A. D. 1771.—Accession of Gustavus III.

(Sweden): A. D. 1792.—Accession of Gustavus Adolphus.

(Sweden): A. D. 1795.—Peace with France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1794-1795 (OCTOBER—MAY).

A. D. 1801-1802.—The Northern Maritime League.—English bombardment of Copenhagen and summary extortion of peace. See FRANCE: A. D. 1801-1802.

(Sweden): A. D. 1805.—Joined in the Third Coalition against France. See FRANCE: A. D. 1805 (JANUARY—APRIL).

(Sweden): A. D. 1806.—In the Russo-Prussian alliance against Napoleon. See GERMANY: A. D. 1806-1807.

A. D. 1807-1810.—Northern fruits of the conspiracy of the two Emperors at Tilsit.—Bombardment of Copenhagen and seizure of the Danish Fleet by the English.—War of Russia and Denmark with Sweden, and conquest of Finland.—Deposition of the Swedish king.—On the 7th of July, 1807, Napoleon and Alexander I. of Russia, meeting on a raft, moored in the river Nieman, arranged the terms of the famous Treaty of Tilsit—see GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (JUNE—JULY). "There were secret articles in this Treaty of Tilsit in which England had a vital interest. These secret articles are not to be found in any collection of State Papers; but Napoleon's diplomatists have given a sufficient account of them to enable us to speak of them with assurance. Napoleon would not part with Constantinople; but he not only gave up Turkey as a whole to be dealt with as Alexander pleased, but agreed to unite his efforts with Alexander to wrest from the Porte all its provinces but Roumelia, if within three months she had not made terms satisfactory to Alexander. In requital for this, if England did not before the 1st of November make terms satisfactory to Napoleon, on the requisition of Russia, the two Emperors were to require of Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal, to close their ports against the English, and were to unite their forces in war against Great Britain. . . . In the month of May, the Duke of Portland had had an audience of the Prince of Wales at Carlton House, at which he had heard a piece of news from the Prince which it deeply concerned him, as Prime Minister, to know. The Prince Regent of Portugal had sent secret information that Napoleon wanted to invade our shores with the Portuguese and Danish fleets. The Portuguese had been refused. It was for us to see to the Danish. Mr. Canning lost no time in seeing to it: and while the Emperors were consulting at Tilsit, he was actively engaged in disabling Denmark from injuring us. When he had confidential information of the secret articles of the Tilsit Treaty, his proceedings were hastened, and they were made as peremptory as the occasion required. He endured great blame for a long time on account of this peremptoriness; and he could not justify himself because the government were pledged to secrecy. . . . Mr. Jackson, who had been for some years our envoy at the Court of Berlin, was sent to Kiel, to require of the Crown Prince (then at Kiel), who was known to be under intimidation by Napoleon, that the Danish navy should be delivered over to England, to be taken care of in British ports, and restored at the end of the war. The Crown Prince refused, with the indignation which was to be expected. . . . Mr. Jackson had been escorted, when he went forth on his mission, by 20 ships of the line, 49

frigates and other assistant vessels, and a fleet of transports, conveying 27,000 land troops. Admiral Gambier commanded the naval, and Lord Cathcart the military expedition. These forces had been got ready within a month, with great ability, and under perfect secrecy; and before the final orders were given, ministers had such information of the secret articles of the Treaty of Tilsit as left them no hesitation whatever about seizing the Danish fleet, if it was not lent quietly. . . . When, therefore, Mr. Jackson was indignantly dismissed by the Crown Prince, no time was to be lost in seizing the fleet. . . . On the 15th [of August] the forces were landed at Wedbeck, for their march upon Copenhagen, and the fleet worked up before the city. Once more, an attempt was made to avoid extremities. . . . The Crown Prince replied by a proclamation, amounting to a declaration of war. . . . And now the affair was decided. There could be no doubt as to what the end must be. . . . By the 1st of September, however, Stralsund was occupied by the French; and part of the British force was detached to watch them; and this proved that it would have been fatal to lose time. By the 8th of September, all was over; the Danish navy and arsenal were surrendered. One fourth of the buildings of the city were by that time destroyed; and in one street 500 persons were killed by the bombardment. . . . Efforts were made to conciliate the Danes after all was over; but, as was very natural, in vain. . . . Almost as soon as the news of the achievement reached England, the victors brought the Danish fleet into Portsmouth harbour. One of the most painful features of the case is the confiscation which ensued, because the surrender was not made quietly. At the moment of the attack, there were Danish merchantmen in our waters, with cargoes worth £2,000,000. These we took possession of; and, of course, of the navy which we had carried off."—H. Martineau, *Hist. of Eng.*, 1800-1815, bk. 2, ch. 1.—In fulfilment of the agreements of the Treaty of Tilsit, early in August, 1807, "a show was made by Russia of offering her mediation to Great Britain for the conclusion of a general peace; but as Mr. Canning required, as a pledge of the sincerity of the Czar, a frank communication of the secret articles at Tilsit, the proposal fell to the ground." Its failure was made certain by the action of England in taking possession by force of the Danish fleet. On the 5th of November, upon the peremptory demand of Napoleon, war was accordingly declared against Great Britain by the Czar. "Denmark had concluded (Oct. 16) an alliance, offensive and defensive, with France, and Sweden was now summoned by Russia to join the Continental League. But the King, faithful to his engagements [with England], resolutely refused submission; on which war was declared against him early in 1808, and an overwhelming force poured into Finland, the seizure of which by Russia had been agreed on at Tilsit."—*Epitome of Alison's Hist. of Europe*, sects. 455-456 (ch. 51, v. 11, of complete work).—"In November, 1808, Finland was virtually given up to Alexander; and Sweden was thus deprived of her great granary, and destined to ruin. England had of late aided her vigorously, driving the Russian navy into port, and blockading them there; and sending Sir John Moore, with 10,000 men, in May, when

France, Russia, and Denmark, were all advancing to crush the gallant Swedes. Sir John Moore found the King in what he thought a very wild state of mind, proposing conquests, when he had not forces enough for defensive operations. All agreement in their views was found to be impossible: the King resented the Englishman's caution; Sir John Moore thought the King so nearly mad that he made off in disguise from Stockholm, and brought back his troops, which had never been landed. . . . After the relinquishment of Finland, the Swedish people found they could endure no more. Besides Finland, they had lost Pomerania: they were reduced to want; they were thinned by pestilence as well as by war; but the King's ruling idea was to continue the conflict to the last. . . . As the only way to preserve their existence, his subjects gently deposed him, and put the administration of affairs into the hands of his aged uncle, the Duke of Sudermania. The poor King was arrested on the 13th of March, 1809, as he was setting out for his country seat, . . . and placed in imprisonment for a short time. His uncle, at first called Regent, was soon made King. . . . Peace was made with Russia in September, 1809, and with France in the following January. Pomerania was restored to Sweden, but not Finland; and she had to make great sacrifices. . . . She was compelled to bear her part in the Continental System of Napoleon, and to shut her ports against all communications with England."—H. Martineau, *Hist. of Eng.*, 1800-1815, bk. 2, ch. 1.—"The invasion by the Tzar Alexander I. in 1808 led to the complete separation of Finland and the other Swedish lands east of the gulf of Bothnia from the Swedish crown. Finland was conquered and annexed by the conqueror; but it was annexed after a fashion in which one may suppose that no other conquered land ever was annexed. In fact one may doubt whether 'annexed' is the right word. Since 1809 the crowns of Russia and Finland are necessarily worn by the same person; the Russian and the Finnish nation have necessarily the same sovereign. But Finland is not incorporated with Russia; in everything but the common sovereign Russia and Finland are countries foreign to one another. And when we speak of the crown and the nation of Finland, we speak of a crown and a nation which were called into being by the will of the conqueror himself. . . . The conqueror had possession of part of the Swedish dominions, and he called on the people of that part to meet him in a separate Parliament, but one chosen in exactly the same way as the existing law prescribed for the common Parliament of the whole. . . . In his new character of Grand Duke of Finland, the Tzar Alexander came to Borga, and there on March 27th, 1809, fully confirmed the existing constitution, laws, and religion of his new State. The position of that State is best described in his own words. Speaking neither Swedish nor Finnish, and speaking to hearers who understood no Russian, the new Grand Duke used the French tongue. Finland was 'Placé désormais au rang des nations'; it was a 'Nation, tranquille au dehors, libre dans l'intérieur.' [Finland was 'Placed henceforth in the rank of the nations; it was a Nation tranquil without, free within.'] And it was a nation of his own founding. The people of Finland had ceased to be a part of the Swedish nation; they

had not become a part of the Russian nation, they had become a nation by themselves. All this, be it remembered, happened before the formal cession of the lost lands by Sweden to Russia. This was not made till the Peace of Frederikshamn on September 17th of the same year. The treaty contained no stipulation for the political rights of Finland, their full confirmation by the new sovereign was held to be enough. Two years later in 1811, the boundary of the new State was enlarged. Alexander, Emperor of all the Russias and Grand Duke of Finland, cut off from his empire, and added to his grand duchy, the Finnish districts which had been ceded by Sweden to Russia sixty years before. The boundary of his constitutional grand duchy was brought very near indeed to the capital of his despotic empire."—E. A. Freeman, *Finland* (*Macmillan's Mag.*, March, 1892).

Also in Gen Monteith, ed., *Narrative of the Conquest of Finland, by a Russian Officer* (with appended doc's)—C. Joyneville, *Life and Times of Alexander I.*, 2 ch 2.

(Denmark and Norway): A. D. 1808.—Accession of Frederick VI.

(Sweden): A. D. 1809.—Accession of Charles XIII.

(Sweden): A. D. 1809.—Granting of the Constitution. See CONSTITUTION OF SWEDEN.

(Sweden): A. D. 1810.—Election of Bernadotte to be Crown Prince and successor to the throne.—The new king, lately called to the throne, being aged "the eyes of the people were fixed on the successor, or Crown Prince, who took upon himself the chief labour of the government, and appears to have given satisfaction to the nation. But his government was of short duration. On the 28th of May 1810, while reviewing some troops, he suddenly fell from his horse and expired on the spot, leaving Sweden again without any head excepting the old King. This event agitated the whole nation, and various candidates were proposed for the succession of the kingdom. Among these was the King of Denmark, who after the sacrifices he had made for Buonaparte, had some right to expect his support. The son of the late unfortunate monarch, rightful heir of the crown, and named like him Gustavus, was also proposed as a candidate. The Duke of Oldenburg, brother-in-law of the Emperor of Russia, had partisans. To each of these candidates there lay practical objections. To have followed the line of lawful succession, and called Gustavus to the throne, (which could not be forfeited by his father's infirmity, so far as he was concerned,) would have been to place a child at the head of the state, and must have inferred, amid this most arduous crisis, all the doubts and difficulties of choosing a regent. Such choice might, too, be the means, at a future time, of reviving his father's claim to the crown. The countries of Denmark and Sweden had been too long rivals, for the Swedes to subject themselves to the yoke of the King of Denmark, and to choose the Duke of Oldenburg would have been, in effect, to submit themselves to Russia, of whose last behaviour towards her Sweden had considerable reason to complain. In this embarrassing they were thought to start a happy idea, who proposed to conciliate Napoleon by bestowing the ancient crown of the Goths upon one of his own Field Marshals, and a high noble of his empire, namely, John Julian Bap-

tiste Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo. This distinguished officer was married to a sister of Joseph Buonaparte's wife, (daughter of a wealthy and respectable individual, named Clary,) through whom he had the advantage of an alliance with the Imperial family of Napoleon, and he had acquired a high reputation in the north of Europe, both when governor of Hanover, and administrator of Swedish Pomerania. On the latter occasion, Bernadotte was said to have shown himself in a particular manner the friend and protector of the Swedish nation, and it was even insinuated that he would not be averse to exchange the errors of Popery for the reformed tenets of Luther. The Swedish nation fell very generally into the line of policy which prompted this choice. It was a choice, sure, as they thought, to be agreeable to him upon whose nod the world seemed to depend. Yet, there is the best reason to doubt, whether, in preferring Bernadotte to their vacant throne, the Swedes did a thing which was gratifying to Napoleon. The name of the Crown Prince of Sweden elect, had been known in the wars of the Revolution, before that of Buonaparte had been heard of. Bernadotte had been the older, therefore, though certainly not the better soldier. On the 18th Brumaire, he was so far from joining Buonaparte in his enterprise against the Council of Five Hundred, notwithstanding all advances made to him, that he was on the spot at St. Cloud armed and prepared had circumstances permitted, to place himself at the head of any part of the military, who might be brought to declare for the Directory. And although, like every one else, Bernadotte submitted to the Consular system and held the government of Holland under Buonaparte, yet then, as well as under the empire, he was always understood to belong to a class of officers, whom Napoleon employed in deed, and rewarded but without loving them, or perhaps relying on them more than he was compelled to do, although their character was in most instances a warrant for their fidelity. These officers formed a comparatively small class, yet comprehending some of the most distinguished names in the French army. Reconciled by necessity to a state of servitude which they could not avoid, this party considered themselves as the soldiers of France, not of Napoleon, and followed the banner of their country rather than the fortunes of the Emperor. Without being personally Napoleon's enemies they were not the friends of his despotic power."—Sir W. Scott, *Life of Napoleon* v 2 ch 12.—The election of Bernadotte is said to have been brought about by the audacity of a young Swedish officer, Baron Mörner, who went to Paris as a courier, bearing a message on the subject from the Swedish government which had a very different aim. He interviewed Bernadotte and persuaded that marshal to become a candidate for the vacant throne. Bernadotte laid the matter before Napoleon. "Napoleon, who had officially been informed of the thoughts of the Swedish government, looked on the whole matter as a ghost of the brain, but declared that he would not meddle with it. At Mörner's last visit (June 27, 1810) Bernadotte gave him leave to communicate that the emperor had nothing against Bernadotte's election and that he himself was ready to accept if the choice fell on him. It is easy to imagine the astonishment of Engström, the minister of state, when

he heard Mörner's description of his bold attempt in Paris. 'What do you bring from Paris?' Engstrom asked, when Mörner came into the foreign Minister's cabinet in Stockholm. 'That I have induced the prince of Ponte Corvo to accept the Swedish crown.' 'How could you speak to him about it without being commissioned?' 'Our only safety lies in the prince of Ponte Corvo.' 'Are you sure that he will receive it so that we are not doubly committed?' 'Certainly. I have a letter here.' 'From him to you?' 'No, from me to him.' 'Boy,' exclaimed Mörner's relation, his excellency Von Essen, at the end of the conference, 'you ought to sit where neither sun nor moon will shine on you.' But Mörner's project won more and more favor in the country though he himself was arrested in Orebro, whereby the government desired to prevent his presence as a member of the house of knights at the special diet called at Orebro for election. Through messengers and a pamphlet he worked for his plan.—*Sveriges Historia, 1805-1875 (trans. from the Swedish by L. G. Skultvedt), pp. 29-31.*

ALSO IN *M. de Bourrienne Private Memoirs of Napoleon, v. 4, ch. 7*—Lady Bloomfield, *Memoirs of Lord Bloomfield, v. 1, pp. 17-34*—W. G. Meredith, *Memorials of Charles John, King of Sweden and Norway*.

(Sweden): A. D. 1810.—Alliance with Russia against France. See FRANCE A. D. 1810-1812.

(Sweden): A. D. 1813.—Joined with the new Coalition against Napoleon.—Participation in the War of Liberation. See GERMANY A. D. 1812-1813 to 1813 (OCTOBER--DECEMBER).

A. D. 1813-1814.—The Peace of Kiel.—Cession of Norway to Sweden and of Swedish Pomerania to Denmark.—'The Danes, having been driven out of Holstein by Bernadotte [see GERMANY, A. D. 1813 (OCTOBER--DECEMBER)], concluded an armistice December 18th, and, finally, the Peace of Kiel, January 14th 1814, by which Frederick VI. ceded Norway to Sweden, reserving, however, Greenland, the Ferroe Isles, and Iceland, which were regarded as dependencies of Norway. Norway, which was anciently governed by its own kings, had remained united with Denmark ever since the death of Olaf V. in 1387. Charles XIII., on his side, ceded to Denmark Swedish Pomerania and the Isle of Rugen. This treaty founded the present system of the North. Sweden withdrew entirely from her connection with Germany, and became a purely Scandinavian Power. The Norwegians, who detested the Swedes, made an attempt to assert their independence under the conduct of Prince Christian Frederick, cousin-german and heir of Frederick VI. of Denmark. Christian Frederick was proclaimed King of Norway; but the movement was opposed by Great Britain and the Allied Powers from considerations of policy rather than justice; and the Norwegians found themselves compelled to decree the union of Norway and Sweden in a storting, or Diet, assembled at Christiania, November 4th 1814. Frederick VI. also signed a peace with Great Britain at Kiel, January 14th 1814. All the Danish colonies, except Heligoland, which had been taken by the English, were restored.'—T. H. Dyer, *Hist. of Modern Europe*, bk. 7, ch. 13 (a.).

(Sweden): A. D. 1814.—The Allies in France and in possession of Paris.—Fall of Napoleon. See FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (JANUARY—MARCH), and (MARCH—APRIL).

(Norway): A. D. 1814-1815.—The Norwegian constitution under the union with Sweden.—'When, by the treaty of Kiel in 1814, Norway was taken from Denmark, and handed over to Sweden, the Norwegians roused themselves to once more assert their nationality. The Swedes appeared in force, by land and sea, upon the frontiers of Norway. It was not, however, until the latter country had been guaranteed complete national independence that she consented to a union of the countries under the one crown. The agreement was made, and the constitution of Norway granted on the 17th of May 1814, at which date the contemporary history of Norway begins. . . . The Fundamental Law of the constitution (*Grundlov*), which almost every peasant farmer now-a-days has framed and hung up in the chief room of his house, bears the date the 4th of November 1814. The Act of Union with Sweden is dated the 8th of August 1815. The union of the two states is a union of the crown alone. Sweden and Norway form, like Great Britain, a hereditary limited monarchy. One of the clauses in the Act of Union provides that the king of the joint countries must reside for a certain part of the year in Norway. But, as a matter of fact, this period is a short one. In his absence, the king is represented by the Council of State (*Statsraad*), which must be composed entirely of Norwegians, and consist of two Ministers of State (Cabinet Ministers), and nine other Councillors of State. As with us, the king personally can do no wrong: the responsibility for his acts rests with his ministers. Of the State Council, or Privy Council (above spoken of), three members, one a Cabinet Minister, and two ordinary members of the Privy Council, are always in attendance upon the king, whether he is residing in Norway or Sweden. The rest of the Council forms the Norwegian Government resident in the country. All functionaries are appointed by the king, with the advice of this Council of State. The officials, who form what we should call the Government (as distinguished from what we should call the Civil Service), together with the *préfets* (*Amtmen*) and the higher grades of the army are, nominally, removable by the king; but, if removed, they continue to draw two-thirds of their salary until their case has come before Parliament (the *Storting*, Great Thing), which decides upon their pensions. . . . In 1876 the number of electors to the *Storting* were under 140,000, not more than 7.7 per cent. of the whole population. So that the franchise was by no means a very wide one. . . . In foreign affairs only does Norway not act as an independent nation. There is a single foreign minister for the two countries and he is usually a Swede. For the purposes of internal administration, Norway is divided into twenty districts, called *Amt*—which we may best translate 'Prefectures.' Of these, the two chief towns of the country, Christiania (with its population of 150,000) and Bergen (population about 60,000) form each a separate *Amt*.'—C. F. Keary, *Norway and the Norwegians*, ch. 18.—See CONSTITUTION OF NORWAY.

(Denmark): A. D. 1815.—Swedish Pomerania sold to Prussia. See VIENNA, CONGRESS.